Non-contractibilities in the household: Theory and evidence. by Rasul, Imran
N o n -c o n t r a c t ib il it ie s  in  t h e  H o u s e h o l d : 
T h e o r y  a n d  E v id e n c e
I m r a n  R a s u l
P h D E c o n o m ic s  T h e s is  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  E c o n o m ic s  
L o n d o n  S c h o o l  o f  E c o n o m ic s  a n d  P o l it ic a l  Sc ie n c e  
U n iv e r s it y  o f  L o n d o n
J a n u a r y  2003
l
UMI Number: U209679
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U209679
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
L i D r c ^ y
British Library oi HOiiuca 
and Economic Science
1 °  (  %
Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................ 8
2 Household Bargaining Over Fertility: Theory and Evidence From Malaysia 15
2.1 Related Literature ..................................................................................  18
2.2 T heory ........................................................................................................  20
2.2.1 General Payoffs..............................................................................  20
2.2.2 Specific P ayoffs.............................................................................. 26
2.2.3 S u m m ary .......................................................................................  30
2.3 Institutional Background and D a t a ....................................................... 31
2.4 Empirical M ethod...................................................................................... 36
2.4.1 F e r ti l i ty ..........................................................................................  36
2.4.2 Transfers..........................................................................................  37
2.5 Basic R e s u l ts ............................................................................................ 38
2.5.1 F e r ti l i ty ..........................................................................................  38
2.5.2 Transfers..........................................................................................  41
2.6 Extensions.................................................................................................. 44
2.6.1 Renegotiation................................................................................. 44
2.6.2 Ethnic E ffects.................................................................................  48
2.6.3 Gender Preference ........................................................................ 49
2.6.4 Endogenous Preferences..............................................................  50
2.6.5 Measurement Error in Reported Preferences............................  52
2.6.6 S u m m ary .......................................................................................  53
2.7 Conclusions...............................................................................................  54
3 Making Divorce Easier: The Effect on C h ild re n ..........................................  62
3.1 The M odel..................................................................................................  67
3.1.1 S e t-u p .............................................................................................  67
3.1.2 Stages 3 and 4: Divorce and Marital B argaining......................  71
3.1.3 Stage 2: Child Q u a lity .................................................................. 75
3.1.4 Stage 1: Child Custody.................................................................. 78
3.1.5 Further Issues.................................................................................  83
3.2 Family P o lic y ............................................................................................. 85
3.2.1 Child S upport.................................................................................  85
3.2.2 Welfare Paym ents........................................................................... 87
2
3.2.3 Legal Custodial R ig h ts ................................................................. 88
3.3 Conclusion.................................................................................................... 89
3.3.1 Appendix: P roofs ..........................................................................  91
4 The Impact of Divorce Laws on M arriage......................................................  99
5 A Brief History of Divorce L a w ......................................................................  102
6 A Basic Framework...........................................................................................  104
6.1 No-fault Divorce .......................................................................................  I l l
6.2 Unilateral Divorce.......................................................................................  113
6.3 Empirical Predictions.................................................................................  116
7 Empirical A n a ly s is ...........................................................................................  117
7.1 Basic R e s u l ts .............................................................................................  118
7.2 Cohort Level Analysis ..............................................................................  125
7.3 Composition of the Marital S to c k .............................................................  129
7.4 Other Determinants of Marriage R a t e s ..................................................  130
8 Conclusion...........................................................................................................  133
9 Appendix: Proofs of R esu lts ............................................................................  135
10 Data A p p en d ix .................................................................................................. 138
3
List of Tables
Background to Malaysia 56
Summary Statistics from Malaysia Family Life Survey 57
Fertility Regressions 58
Monetary Transfer Regressions 59
Renegotiation 60
Endogenous Preferences 61
Family Law Across the United States 150
The Effect of Divorce Laws on Marriage Rates 151
Robustness Checks 152
The Effect of Divorce Laws on Marriage Rates Within Cohorts 153
The Effect of Divorce Laws on Turnover in the Marriage Market 154
Descriptive Statistics by Adoption of Unilateral Divorce (1964-2000) 155
Other Determinants of Marriage Rates 156
4
List of Figures
Peninsular Malaysia: Ratio of Malay Divorces to Marriages, by State 46
The Optimal Allocation of Physical Custody if Divorce 97
Occurs for Exogenous Reasons
The Optimal Allocation of Physical Custody With Endogenous Divorce 97
The Cost of Divorce and the Optimal Allocation of Physical Custody 98
Family Policy and the Optimal Allocation of Physical Custody 98
Informative Signals 140
No-fault Divorce - A Fall in the Cost of Exiting Marriage 140
The Probability of Divorce Under Different Divorce Regimes 141
The Introduction of Unilateral Divorce 141
The Passage of Divorce Laws 142
Marriage and Divorce Rates 142
Marriage Rates by Adoption of Unilateral Divorce 143
Divorce Rates by Adoption of Unilateral Divorce 143
Marriage and Divorce Rates for Adopters by Years Since Adoption 144
of Unilateral Divorce Law
The Stylized Effect of State Trends 145
The Estimated Effects of State Trends 145
The Adoption of Unilateral Divorce Laws Across the United States 146
Marriage and Divorce Rates by Gender and Age Cohort 147
The Dynamic Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Marriage Rates 148
Change in the Stock of Ever Married Individuals 148
Duration of First Marriages by Adoption of Unilateral Divorce 149
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank the many people who have made this thesis possible. First of 
all Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess for being excellent supervisors. Their encour­
agement, advice, and patience from the beginning has helped see me through. Their 
advice has influenced the way I think as an economist, and I hope to be able to 
continue put into practice what I have learned from them.
This work has also benefited from the comments of Richard Blundell, Anne Case, 
Michela Celia, Andrew Chesher, Leo Ferraris, Leonardo Felli, Markus Goldstein, 
Yong Kim, Pramila Krishnan, Sylvie Lambert, Valentino Larcinese, Alan Manning, 
Michele Piccione, Andrea Prat, Kevin Roberts, Max Steuer, Silvia Sonderegger, John 
Sutton, and Myrna Wooders. I have presented different parts of this work at various 
seminars and conferences and I would like to thank for their comments participants at 
Bocconi, Bonn, Brown, Chicago GSB, Essex, LSE, Mannheim, Maryland, Michigan, 
Northwestern, Oxford, Stanford GSB, Stockholm, Warwick, the World Bank, the RES 
Easter School 2001, and ESPE 2001. All remaining errors are my sole responsibility.
I also have to thank all the people at the Suntory Toyota International Centre 
for Economics and Related Disciplines for their friendship, support and discussions 
as well as for offering me an excellent work environment. Financial support from the 
ESRC, LSE and STICERD is gratefully acknowledged.
I wish to give a very special thank you to Ifti, Gerard, and Kam for keeping me 
sane, even if I drove them mad.
Finally, I owe a very special debt of gratitude to Oriana. Her never ending support, 
encouragement, love and time are from another planet.
This thesis is dedicated to my family and friends. Now you know what I have 
been doing all this time.
6
ABSTRACT
I develop and test models of household behavior where household members behave 
non-cooperatively. I view marriage as a contract between husband and wife. This 
approach stresses the importance of household members to make enforceable contracts 
or agreements with each other. The reason why actions taken by individuals within 
the household are non-contractible is because they are non-verifiable to third parties 
outside of the household.
This approach has two major appeals. First, whenever non-contractible choices 
are subject to renegotiation, dynamic inefficiencies arise. This helps provide a theo­
retical underpinning to a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests households 
do not always make efficient decisions. Second, thinking of marriage as a contract 
leaves scope for individual household members to have different preferences and face 
different constraints. As households renegotiate over the division of the surplus from 
marriage, individual threat points and outside options still play a role in determining 
the allocation of resources within the household.
I apply this framework to three settings - investing into fertility, investing into 
child quality, and decisions to marry and divorce.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the household decision making process is an important field of study 
in economics. The decisions households make have both welfare implications for 
household members themselves, and also macroeconomic consequences for society as 
a whole.
Furthermore, the process by which household make decisions is of fundamental im­
portance in not only predicting household choice, but also the response of households 
to government policies and a changing economic environment.
Since Gary Becker’s seminal works, summarized in Becker (1991), economists have 
developed a number of approaches to modelling household decision making. The first, 
as suggested by Becker himself, is the unitary model of the household.1 This approach 
assumes the existence of a household welfare function that aggregates the preferences 
of all members. Households then seek to maximize this welfare function subject to a 
series of resource constraints.
This generates a demand function for each good, with testable implications for the 
effects of prices and incomes on household demand. The beauty of the unitary model 
approach is its simplicity, its applicability to a diverse range of household choices, 
and the wealth of testable empirical predictions it generates.
Modelling the household as a unitary entity gives two powerful implications. First, 
because the household behaves as if it is a single individual, household decisions are 
necessarily Pareto efficient. Namely no one individual can be made better off without 
another member becoming worse off. Second, it is the aggregate resources available 
to the household that determines outcomes.
The main limitation of the unitary model is that it sheds little light on how 
households resolve internal conflict. Individuals within a household rarely agree on 
everything. Often understanding how households resolve internal conflicts is the key 
to predicting how behavior will change in response to altering circumstances and 
policies.
A second approach in economics to modelling household behavior, the collective 
approach, explicitly takes account of the fact that household members have individual 
preferences and constraint. In the existing literature, there are two classes of collective
1This approach is also referred to as the “common preferences” model, the “neoclassical” model, 
or the “dictatorial” model.
model - cooperative and non-cooperative.
Cooperative models take it as given that household decisions are Pareto efficient, 
but assume nothing about process by which these decisions are made (Chiappori 
(1988, 1992)). These models generate a set of empirical predictions from which the 
household “sharing rule” can be inferred.
There also exist cooperative models that explicitly model the household decision 
making process as some bargaining game amongst its members (Manser and Brown, 
McElroy and Horney (1981)). The key insight from these models is that the outside 
option, or threat point, that each household member has in the bargaining process, 
determines how the surplus that marriage creates, is shared amongst household mem­
bers.2
The collective approach, like the unitary model, takes it as given that household 
reach efficient outcomes. However a growing body of evidence casts doubt on this 
assumption in a variety of settings. These are as diverse as responses to income risks 
(Townsend (1994), Duflo and Udry (2001)), health shocks (Dercon and Krishnan
(1998)), and agricultural production (Alderman et al (1996), Udry (1996), Goldstein
(1999)).
M arriage as a  C ontract
In this thesis I develop an alternative way of thinking about household behavior. I 
view marriage as a contract between husband and wife, in which spouses behave non- 
cooperatively to maximize their own utility.3 This approach stresses the relationship 
between household actions and the ability of household members to make enforceable 
contracts or agreements with each other. The reason why actions taken by individuals 
within the household are non-contractible is because they are non-verifiable to third 
parties outside of the household. This is true even if these actions are observable to 
household members.4
2It is taken as given that marriage creates a surplus over remaining single, or divorcing. The 
source of this can be economies of scale in consumption, investment or production; the provision of 
household public goods; specialization within the household.
3 Other non-cooperative models of household decision making include Ulph (1988), Konrad and 
Lommerud (1995), and Chen and Woolley (2001). Some models combine the cooperative and non- 
cooperative approaches. For example in Lundberg and Poliak (1993) the household is assumed to 
act cooperatively, but the threat point in household bargaining is what would be the outcome if 
household members behaved non-cooperatively.
4 Independently, other recent contributions in economics have stressed the importance of non- 
contractible actions within the household (Lundberg and Poliak (2001), Murphy (2002), Rainer 
(2002)). Brinig and Crafton (1994) provide a overview of marriage as contract from a legal perspec­
9
The non-verifiability of actions means that agreements between household mem­
bers cannot be made contingent upon these actions. This is because at any time, any 
individual within the household could claim that the others had not undertaken the 
agreed-to actions and decide to renege on the agreement. As no third party outside of 
the household could verify this claim, household members face a “hold-up” problem 
with each other. This occurs when an individual reneges on a previous agreement 
and appropriates some of the benefits of others actions.
Thinking about marriage as a contract between individuals has appeal for the 
following reasons. First, this stresses the role that renegotiation plays in house­
hold decision making. Namely when individuals take non-verifiable actions within 
the household, they know they will later face a hold-up problem and this leads to 
renegotiation over the division of the surplus that marriage creates. The fact that 
individuals are aware that there will be renegotiation ex post, alters their choice of 
actions ex ante. In contrast to the unitary and collective approaches to household 
decision making, this model provides a theoretical foundation for why households 
make inefficient choices.
This result borrows from the growing literature in incomplete contract theory 
(Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)). Whenever non-contractible 
choices are subject to renegotiation, dynamic inefficiencies arise. Choices made today 
affect future bargaining positions. Marriage is thug not simply a repeated game in 
which efficient equilibria can be enforced. Rather marriage is an inherently non- 
stationary game, where bargains are commonly subject to renegotiation. Whenever 
marital contracts are unenforceable, equilibria in these games need not be efficient.
The inefficiency stems from the inability of spouses to make agreements contingent 
on all actions within marriage, as part of the marital contract. It does not stem from 
asymmetric information, or the existence of transactions costs.
The second appeal of this framework is that it leaves scope for individual household 
members to have different preferences and face different constraints. Moreover, as 
households renegotiate over the division of the surplus from marriage, individual 
threat points and outside options still play a role in determining the allocation of 
resources within the household.
T he Thesis C hapters
In this thesis I develop and apply this framework to three different settings,
tive. Poliak (1985) was the first economist to refer to marriage as a contracting problem.
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The next chapter models investments into fertility as being non-contractible. 
Given that world population is set to rise by two billion in the next 25 years, under­
standing how households make fertility choices remains a salient issue for economists 
and policy makers alike.
Modelling the household acting as a unitary entity may be inappropriate to an­
alyze the determinants of fertility if preferences conflict. In a unitary framework 
preferences of household members are aggregated in a family welfare function, so 
that there is no role for conflicting preferences. Yet much demographic evidence 
suggests fertility is one action that husbands and wives are most likely to disagree 
on.
Preferences over fertility are likely to diverge between husband and wife - men 
bear relatively little of the costs of producing children, and the returns to children 
may differ across spouses.
This chapter develops and tests a model of bargaining over fertility which makes 
precise how conflicts are resolved when transfers between spouses are possible. The 
analysis emphasizes that when bargains are subject to renegotiation, the bargaining 
power of wives affects both transfers and fertility.
Understanding the role of female bargaining power helps shed light on the efficacy 
of policies of female empowerment. This is the main channel through which policy 
makers today are attempting to reduce fertility.
The analysis also shows that male preferences and other factors, such as child 
custody rules, are important determinants of fertility outcomes.
The predictions of the model are tested using Malaysian household panel data 
containing information on household fertility outcomes and spouses’ fertility prefer­
ences.
I find evidence that - (i) male and female preferences are of equal importance in 
determining fertility outcomes; (ii) spouses renegotiate over fertility over the course of 
the fertility cycle; (iii) the social and institutional context strongly influences fertility 
outcomes and the effectiveness of empowerment policies.
The third chapter models investments into child quality as being non-contractible. 
Again the underlying framework is one in which spousal investments to be into child 
quality during marriage, cannot be written down as part of the marital contract at 
the start of marriage.
I use this framework to understanding the relation between divorce costs and
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children’s outcomes. In particular, I study the effects of making divorce easier on two 
child related outcomes - parental investments into child quality, and the allocation of 
child custody in divorce.
In a unitary or collective bargaining model of household decision making, making 
divorce less costly increases the probability of marital dissolution. This is generally 
regarded as being bad for children.
The chapter studies how reduced costs over divorce may have affected children 
when household bargains are subject to renegotiation. In doing so the model sheds 
new light on the relation between divorce costs and child outcomes. In particular, the 
model captures the intuition that when divorce costs axe low, couples own investments 
into marriage specific goods such as child quality, have relatively more influence on 
keeping the marriage intact. They therefore have more incentives to invest into child 
quality.
Hence making divorce easier can be good for children that remain in intact mar­
riages. By thinking of marriage in this framework, I show that there are actually 
two effects of reducing divorce costs and making divorce easier - (i) marginal mar­
riages break up with lower costs of exiting marriage, and this may have detrimental 
effects on children’s welfare; (ii) investments into child quality made during marriage 
rise. This latter effect, which applies to the stock of all marriages, may dominate the 
former effect which applies to the flow of marriages into divorce.
I also identify the conditions under which joint custody is optimal. The model 
predicts that incidence of joint custody increases as divorce becomes easier or female 
labor force participation rises.
In common with the first chapter, the model studies household outcomes when 
spouses have conflicting preferences. In this context, conflict arises because parents 
value child quality differently.
The final chapter studies the marriage market as a whole. I endogenize decisions 
to marry and divorce. Understanding these decisions appears particularly relevant 
at a time in which family structure has changed so dramatically. Economists and 
lawyers have placed most attention on the rise in divorce. In particular, studying 
whether there exists a causal relation between divorce laws and this rise in divorce 
rates. Ironically much of this debate has taken place when divorce rates have been 
falling. Indeed the last 15 years have witnessed the longest period of sustained decline 
in divorce in America since records began in 1860.
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A cursory look at the data suggests that of more concern now is the sustained 
decline in marriage. Today in America, fewer people are marrying than at any time in 
the past 40 years, the children of the unmarried account for nearly as many as those 
living in single parent households, and the majority of births occur out of wedlock.
The decline in marriage is of concern if we believe marriage to be a good thing, 
in that there are positive private and social returns to marriage. A large body of 
literature, summarized in Waite and Gallagher (2000), shows a strong correlation be­
tween being married and having better health, higher wages, and accumulating more 
wealth. They argue these effects exist for married individuals relative to cohabitees 
as well as divorced individuals.
This chapter studies the effects of divorce law changes on incentives to marry. In 
particular I examine the effect of the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce 
that swept through America in the 1970s.
A unitary or collective bargaining framework, which both assume household out­
comes to be Pareto efficient, would predict that such a law change ought to have no 
affect on the incidence of marriage and divorce. If spouses can bargain efficiently, the 
Coase theorem implies that moving from mutual consent to unilateral divorce only 
affects the distribution of welfare within marriage, not decisions to marry or divorce.
This chapter puts forward a model of search in marriage markets in which indi­
viduals learn the true value of marriage prior to, and during marriage. I then use US 
state level panel data to test the predictions of this model.
I provide evidence that after the adoption of unilateral divorce, marriage rates 
declined significantly and permanently in adopting states. This decline accounts for 
half of the initial gap in marriage rates between adopting and non-adopting states. 
The effect of unilateral divorce law is greatest for marriage rates amongst younger 
age cohorts, those marrying for the first time, and whites.
I also find the duration of marriages that take place under unilateral divorce to be 
significantly greater than those that occur under mutual consent. Taken together the 
results suggest unilateral divorce law reduces incentives to marry, but those couples 
that do marry are better matched than under mutual consent.
The result that unilateral divorce significantly and permanently reduces marriage 
rates, sheds light on the nature of household bargaining. This chapter suggests the 
underlying nature of household decision making is inconsistent with the unitary or 
collective approaches. Households do not bargain efficiently.
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Again, the reason for this may be that marital contracts are unenforceable. This 
stems from the non-verifiability to third parties of actions taken within the household. 
This leads spouses to renegotiate ex post over the division of the marriage surplus. 
Unilateral divorce reduces the expected value of this surplus and thus reduces the ex 
ante incentives of spouses to take first best actions within marriage. If so, we would 
expect to observe spouses making fewer marital specific investments, such as having 
children, after the introduction of unilateral divorce. This is precisely what the model 
in the second chapter predicts.
Conclusion
This thesis stresses the importance of non-contractible actions within the house­
hold. The actions of household members are often non-contractible because they are 
non-verifiable to third parties outside of the household. Whenever actions are non- 
contractible, household outcomes will be subject to dynamic inefficiencies that arise 
because household members renegotiate over the division of the marital surplus.
The range of such actions is enormous. They include not just investments into 
fertility and child quality, but any decision that cannot be committed to ex ante. 
Thinking about household decision making this way not only helps provide a theo­
retical underpinning to a growing body of empirical evidence on the inefficiency of 
household outcomes, but also calls for a re-assessment of the design and effectiveness 
of family policy more broadly. Some of these wider implications axe discussed in each 
of the following chapters. There remains much to be done.
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2 Household Bargaining Over Fertility: Theory 
and Evidence From Malaysia
In the last fifty years population in developing countries has been growing at unprece­
dented rates, more than doubling to reach nearly five billion. The social, economic, 
political and environmental consequences of this are expected to be tremendous. 
Hence understanding the determinants of fertility has remained a salient issue for 
policy makers, governments, and academics alike. The recent consensus in the public 
policy debate has been that policies designed to empower women will reduce fer­
tility rates.5 The 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo stated this position clearly in its 20-year program of action,
“Improving the status of women enhances their decision making capacity especially 
in the area of sexuality and reproduction. This is essential for the long term success 
of population programs. Experience shows that population programs are most 
effective when steps have simultaneously been taken to improve women’s status”.
Such policies are by definition exclusively targeted towards women.6 However 
if men have a significant say in fertility outcom§s, it is necessary to understand the 
process through which couples determine fertility, as a basis for examining the impact 
of female empowerment. Understanding the household decision making process is 
particularly relevant in this context as spousal preferences over fertility are likely to 
diverge - men bear relatively little of the costs of producing children, and the returns 
to children may differ across spouses.
Modelling the household acting as a unitary entity may be inappropriate to an­
alyze the determinants of fertility if preferences conflict. In a unitary framework 
preferences of household members are aggregated in a family welfare function. The 
Coase theorem predicts that households will always make efficient decisions, even if 
preferences diverge. However, as this chapter shows, when households bargain subject 
to renegotiation, inefficient outcomes can occur.
5See Jejeebhoy (1995) and Abadian (1996) for surveys of the literature in support of this view. 
The UNDP has a website devoted to such policies at http://www.undp.org/gender.
6Examples include increasing female education, income earning opportunities, access to credit, 
income transfers, and the availability of contraception and family planning services. They may 
also include changing institutional or legal rules with respect to inheritance, rights to divorce, child 
custody and alimony.
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This chapter develops and tests a model of bargaining over fertility which makes 
precise how conflicts axe resolved when transfers between spouses are possible. The 
analysis emphasizes that when bargains are subject to renegotiation, the bargaining 
power of wives affects both transfers and fertility. The analysis also shows that male 
preferences and other factors, such as child custody rules, are important determinants 
of fertility outcomes.
Modelling fertility as the outcome of a bargaining process has three main advan­
tages over a unitary framework. First, it gives a natural way in which to introduce 
spousal conflicts over desired fertility. Second, female empowerment policies can be 
parsimoniously modelled as changes in female bargaining power. Third, it can gener­
ate overinvestment into fertility in equilibrium, which is of interest given the current 
population growth rate.
The theory makes precise the relationship between fertility preferences and - (i) 
fertility outcomes; (ii) the transfers between spouses required in order to enforce that 
level of fertility. The predictions of the model are tested using Malaysian house­
hold panel data containing information on household fertility outcomes and spouses’ 
fertility preferences.
The main empirical findings of this chapter are as follows. First, in Malay house­
holds, preferences of husbands and wives are equally important in determining fertil­
ity. This suggests that policies also targeted towards men can reduce fertility rates.
Second, I find evidence that households renegotiate throughout the course of the 
fertility cycle. As explained below, such renegotiation implies policies to empower 
females can actually lead to increased fertility levels. In addition, policies that affect 
payoffs in divorce, such as child custody or alimony, also affect fertility decisions.
Third, the evidence for Chinese households in Malaysia suggests that only the 
preferences of the wife determine fertility outcomes. Therefore the social context 
in which empowerment policies are introduced also determines whether they will be 
successful or not.
In the model of bargaining over fertility, children are assumed to be a public 
good in marriage, utility is transferable so that transfers are possible, and spouses 
have heterogeneous fertility preferences. I make the simplifying assumption that only 
wives make investments into fertility. These types of investment include the frequency 
with which spouses have sex with each other, forms of contraceptive use, and the care 
the wife takes of herself over the fertility cycle. Fertility outcomes depend critically
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on whether spouses are able to make agreements contingent on such investments.
When agreements contingent on investments into fertility axe possible, wives 
choose fertility investments to maximize the total marriage surplus. Fertility out­
comes are therefore efficient and depend equally upon the preferences of husband and 
wife. Increases in female bargaining power allow women to appropriate a greater 
share of the marriage surplus, but have no effect on equilibrium fertility levels.
When fertility investments are non-verifiable to third parties however, agreements 
cannot be made contingent on them. After investments into fertility have been made, 
spouses can renegotiate over the division of the surplus created by marriage over 
divorce. In this case the wife chooses investments to maximize her payoff taking into 
account the transfers she receives in the renegotiation phase. The equilibrium level 
of fertility is in general inefficient, and can be above or below the first best level. The 
Coase theorem breaks down because of the inability of spouses to write agreements 
contingent on fertility investments. I show that in general, female preferences will 
be at least as important as male preferences in determining outcomes. Since female 
bargaining power determines the transfers the wife receives in the renegotiation phase, 
policies to empower women will have direct effects on fertility outcomes, albeit not 
necessarily in the expected direction.
Furthermore, if households renegotiate there is an additional channel through 
which policy affects fertility. Policies that change the divorce payoffs to spouses when 
children are present, such as child custody or alimony, will affect the fertility outcomes 
of married couples. This is because the relevant threat point of each spouse in the 
renegotiation phase is to divorce when children are present, as renegotiation takes 
place after fertility investments are made. This opens up a range of policy channels 
that can be expected to have both distributional and efficiency consequences.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature, 
section 3 sets out the theory. Section 4 discusses the institutional background and 
data, section 5 sets out the empirical method, section 6 gives the basic empirical 
results, section 7 considers some extensions and econometric concerns, and section 8 
concludes.
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2.1 Related Literature
This chapter is at the intersection of two areas of literature - microeconomic models 
of fertility, and household decision making.
Microeconomic models of fertility include household demand models (Becker (1960), 
Becker and Lewis (1973)) which apply the framework of consumer demand to fertil­
ity, and synthesis models (Easterlin (1978), Easterlin et al (1980)) which introduce 
supply side variables, like tastes, contraceptive use, and social group behavior, into 
the analysis.
These models generate a rich set of testable empirical predictions for price and 
income effects on fertility, the trade-off between child quality and quantity, and the si­
multaneous determination of fertility and labor supply, child labor, and contraceptive 
use (see Birdsall (1988) and Schultz (1997) for surveys).
The main limitation of these approaches is that they do not allow for conflicting 
spousal preferences over fertility. Yet there is much evidence, mainly from demogra­
phers, to suggest that males and females do differ in their desires both across develop­
ing countries generally (Mason and Taj (1987), Pritchett (1994)), and within Malaysia 
in particular (Leung (1987)). Empirical work that has controlled for spousal prefer­
ences in fertility regressions (Freedman et al (1980), Thomson et al (1990), Bankole
(1995), Thomson (1997), Dodoo (1998)) has found that both male and female prefer­
ences determine fertility. This chapter bridges the gap between economic research on 
how households resolve conflicts, with the demography literature showing that such 
conflicts exist in fertility decisions.
In line with existing evidence I find that male and female preferences are equally 
important in determining fertility for Malays in Malaysia. In contrast with the ex­
isting theories, this chapter provides a framework to analyze fertility decisions when 
parental preferences conflict.
In addition, the model precisely identifies potential sources of bias in existing es­
timates of household fertility, when preferences are typically not controlled for. In 
particular, the model shows that when spouses are able to make agreements contin­
gent on investments, fertility outcomes are determined by the sum of preferences. 
In this case, household fixed effects capture any relevant unobservable heterogeneity 
implying that omitting preferences will not bias estimation. However, if such binding 
agreements cannot be made (as the evidence in this chapter suggests), the model 
shows that fertility outcomes are determined by individual preferences. Hence pa-
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rameter estimates in fertility equations are biased even if household fixed effects are 
included.
The chapter relates to the literature on household decision making. Unitary mod­
els (Becker (1981)), assume preferences are homogeneous within the household. Hence 
aggregate resources, pooled across household members, determine outcomes. Bar­
gaining models (Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981)) and col­
lective models (Chiappori (1988)), allow individual characteristics and preferences to 
differ, and therefore predict that outcomes depend upon the distribution of resources 
and preferences across household members.
Much of the empirical work in this field has tested the resource pooling implica­
tion of the unitary framework (Haddad and Hoddinott (1993), Strauss and Beegle
(1996), Behrman (1997)). Failure to accept the resource pooling hypothesis is used to 
infer that there exists some bargaining process in the household, and by implication, 
underlying preferences may be the source of conflict. These tests axe inferential in 
that preferences are typically not observed.
Such inferential approaches are not without econometric problems. For instance, 
proxies for bargaining shares such as income, education, transfers, and assets are 
typically endogenous to household outcomes. Even if exogenous, these proxies may 
be correlated with unobservable household characteristics that also determine intra­
household allocations. Finally, if household members have differential productivities 
in home or market work, or face different resource constraints, the unitary framework 
gives observationally equivalent predictions to bargaining models without the need 
to assume conflicting preferences.
This chapter avoids many of the pitfalls of the inferential approach precisely be­
cause I am able to control directly for preferences. This has not been done before in 
empirical work on household bargaining. Moreover, the theory imposes restrictions 
onto the estimated equations that allow the inference of bargaining shares from coef­
ficient estimates. Thus I do not use any observable variable as a proxy for bargaining 
power.
Both the unitary and cooperative bargaining models assume household decisions 
to be Pareto efficient. As households are engaged in repeated interactions, there is 
symmetric information across household members, and low transactions costs, it may 
be reasonable to assume households are efficient. The empirical evidence, however, 
suggests that decisions are inefficient in a variety of settings such as responses to
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income risks (Townsend (1994), Duflo and Udry (2001)), health shocks (Dercon and 
Krishnan (1998)), and agricultural production (Alderman et al (1996), Udry (1996)).
This chapter reconciles these two literatures by being amongst the first to provide 
a theoretical justification for inefficient household decision making (see Lundberg and 
Poliak (2001) for a similar argument). In particular, I show that if agreements cannot 
be made contingent on investments or efforts, the Coase theorem breaks down and 
outcomes will be Pareto inefficient. In addition to the fertility investments analyzed 
in this chapter, investments into child quality and agricultural production may be 
non-contractible and lead to inefficient household outcomes in those areas too.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 G eneral Payoffs
The household comprises a married couple - a husband (h) and a wife (w). Only 
the wife makes a sunk investment, q, to produce children, and this leads to exactly 
q children being born ex post7 This simplification reduces the level of notation, and 
the results hold as long as there exists a one-to-one mapping between investments 
and outcomes.8 Only wives bear the investment costs, c(q), where c(.) is convex and 
c'(O) =  0. These include the time and resource costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and 
lactation over the fertility cycle. Finally, children are assumed to be a public good in 
marriage.
Denote spouse i ’s preferred number of children as 7r*, i € {h, w j. The payoff to 
i  from having q children in marriage, when z’s preferred number of children is n* is 
V(q, 7T*). The payoff to spouse i  in divorce is V(q, 7T*). Spouses prefer to be married 
rather than divorced so that V(q,n*) > V(q, 7r*). This can be because of non child 
related benefits of marriage over being single such as economies of scale in household 
consumption, increasing returns to scale in household production, or the production 
of household public goods.
C ontractib le  Investm ents
7Wives can always undertake some hidden action, such as contraceptive use, that allows them to 
control their fertility levels without the consent of their husband.
8Suppose fertility outcomes are stochastic such that an ex ante investment of q produces q +  £ 
children ex post, where £ is a random shock. If £ is mean independent of g, the stochastic component 
of fertility does not affect ex ante investment incentives.
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Suppose agreements between spouses can be made contingent on fertility invest­
ments. With transferable utility, the wife chooses the level of investment to maximize 
the total surplus in marriage;
q* =  maxi/(q, ir*h) +  1/(q, tt* ) -  c(q)
9
The equilibrium investment q* solves;
*h) + O  = c'(?) (!)
which is the Samuelson rule. The result that bargaining leads to an efficient outcome 
is an application of the Coase theorem. Here q* is the first best level of investment. 
As the payoff in marriage, V(.), is the same across spouses, it follows that;
P roposition  1: With contractible investments, the level of investment will be 
Pareto efficient Both spouses’ preferences will be equally weighted in determining the 
equilibrium number of children.
Transfers between spouses ensure that both spouses are left at least as well off in 
marriage as in divorce. If investments are contractible, spouses can write agreements 
at any stage of the marriage. Hence the relevant outside option of each spouse in 
bargaining is to leave the marriage before fertility investments are made. Hence 
=  V (0) ni) which is independent of the number of children produced. 
Denoting the bargaining power of husbands as 9 and the transfer as t , where this 
is positive if it is from husband to wife, the equilibrium transfer solves;
t = max [V(q, ttJ) -  z -  7(0, < ) ] 9 [V(?, < ,) +  z  -  7(0 , < ) ]  (2)
t = (1 -  6) [V(q, < )  -  7(0, < )]  -  e [V{q, < )  -  7(0 , < ,)] (3)
It follows that;
P roposition  2: Increasing the bargaining shares of women increases the level of 
transfers husbands give to their wives. The equilibrium fertility level is unaffected.
Policies designed to empower women, raise the bargaining power of women and 
leave them better off. This is because they are able to appropriate a greater share of 
the marriage surplus. However such policies have no affect on fertility levels, which
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remain at the efficient level q* given by (l).9
If utility were non transferable within the household, the equilibrium investment 
would equate the sum of marginal rates of substitution between children and all other 
goods, to the shadow cost of fertility investments. This defines a contract curve of 
efficient investment levels. The preferences of husband and wife still have equal effects 
on each of these Pareto efficient outcomes.
N on-C ontractib le  Investm ents
The types of fertility investment the wife makes includes the frequency with which 
she has sex with her husband, and the care she takes of herself over the fertility cycle. 
These investments are non-verifiable to third parties outside of the household. Hence 
agreements between spouses cannot be made contingent upon the wife’s fertility in­
vestment. If spouses were to make agreements contingent on investments, one spouse 
could claim the other had not made the agreed-to investment, and dissolve the mar­
riage. Hence spouses face a standard hold-up problem. This leads to renegotiation 
over the marriage surplus even after the investment has been made.10
If the couple divorce, a pre-specified child custody rule is enforced. Both spouses 
are in general able to obtain some share of child custody. Hence the wife is unable to 
appropriate the full marginal benefit of her fertility investment. This alters the wife’s 
incentives to invest ex ante and leads to an inefficient level of fertility.
The timing of actions is as follows;
1. At the start of her fertility cycle, the wife makes an observable but non-verifiable 
sunk investment, q, into producing children.
2. During the fertility cycle, husband and wife Nash bargain over the allocation 
of the surplus created by marriage over divorce.
3. At the end of the fertility cycle the spouses decide to remain married or divorce. 
If they divorce, a specified child custody rule is enforced.
The framework in which spouses renegotiate ex post is appropriate if the wife’s 
investment also has the following characteristics. First the investment must be costly
9This result is an application of Bergstrom and Cornes (1983). They show the Pareto optimal 
provision of a public good is independent of the distribution, of resources for a class of utility 
functions, in which F (.) is a special case.
10I assume spouses cannot credibly commit not to renegotiate ex post. However, one interpretation 
of marriage vows or pre-nuptial agreements may be precisely to “‘tie the hands” of spouses, and thus 
prevent ex post bargaining taking place.
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to reverse. Otherwise the wife could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to her husband ex 
post, and there would be no scope for renegotiation during the fertility cycle. In this 
context, the wife can reverse her investment by having an abortion, which is costly.
Second, the wife’s investment must not be expropriable by her husband. Otherwise 
husbands could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to their wives and there would again 
be no scope for renegotiation. Here the wife’s investment is literally embodied in her.
Third, there must be a period of time between when the investment is made and 
when the equilibrium number of children is actually realized, in order for there to be 
time for renegotiation. Here the fertility cycle of the wife is the relevant period over 
which renegotiation takes place.
Fourth, ex post custodial rights must be well defined and costly to transfer. I 
assume ex post custodial rights are exogenously given, either by social norms or by 
law.11
With non-contractible investments, the relevant threat point in renegotiation is to 
divorce with children, as investments are already committed to. Hence the equilibrium 
level of transfers is given by;
t = (1 - 0 )  [V(qXh) ~ V{qX h)\ -0[V{q,n*w) ~ V ( q X w)\ (3a)
Changes in relative bargaining shares across spouses will alter the distribution 
of the marriage surplus. Given spouses anticipate renegotiation, the wife’s ex ante 
payoff is;
V{<l,K) + t - c (q )  (4)
The wife chooses the investment level to maximize her ex ante payoff. The crucial 
point to note is that with renegotiation, spousal payoffs in divorce depend upon the 
number of children produced. This in turn depends on the allocation of custodial 
rights.
Substituting (3a) into (4) and maximizing with respect to q, the first order con­
dition for fertility is;
(1 -  6) [Vq(q, TTj) + Vq(q, <,)] + 0V,{q, < ) -  (1 -  ff] V,(q, ttJ) = c'(q) (5)
11 The next chapter endogenises ex post custodial rights in a model where parental investments 
into child quality are non-contractible.
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In general each spouses preferences will not have equal weight in determining 
fertility levels. The weight of each spouse’s preference depends on their bargaining 
power and the marginal benefits of investing in divorce to each spouse.
The wife has two sources of investment incentive - (i) maximizing the total surplus 
created in marriage as captured in the first term; (ii) investments change the relative 
payoffs in divorce to both spouses. Given that transfers ensure both spouses are at 
least as well off in marriage as in divorce, the wife can appropriate a greater share of 
the marriage surplus as her divorce payoff increases relative to that of her husband.
If the wife’s marginal divorce payoff is sufficiently greater than her husbands, at 
the first best level of investment q*, then her incentives to invest are higher than in 
the case with contractible investments. This is because by overinvesting in fertility 
the wife is able to appropriate a greater share of the surplus in marriage. Hence there 
can be over investment into fertility. More precisely;
Proposition  3: With non-contractible investments, spousal preferences have dif­
ferent weights in determining fertility levels. Wives will over invest infertility, relative 
to the first best, if  at the first best level of investment, q*;
evq(?*,<,) -  (i -  0)F,(9>;) > ed(q')
and under invest otherwise.
From the first order condition (5) it is clear that female bargaining power has 
a direct effect on equilibrium fertility. This is because when the wife chooses her 
investment she takes account of the transfers she receives in the renegotiate phase, 
and these transfers are directly influenced by her relative bargaining power.
However increasing female bargaining power will not necessarily reduce fertility. 
To see this rewrite the first order condition (5) as;
V q fa K )  +  (1 - 9 )  [Vq(q,ir*h) - V q(q,7T*h) + Vg(q,n*w) - V q{q, < ) ]  =  c'(q) (6)
The effects of bargaining shares on fertility depend on whether the total marginal 
benefits in marriage exceed the total marginal benefits in divorce. As female bargain­
ing power increases, the wife is able to appropriate a greater share of the marginal 
benefits that marriage creates over divorce. If these benefits are positive then in­
creasing female bargaining power increases the investment incentives of the wife. If
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policies of female empowerment are to actually reduce fertility we require the total 
marginal benefits of investment to husbands in marriage over divorce, to be less than 
the marginal loss to wives of investment in marriage over divorce.
P roposition  4: For a given equilibrium investment q, a necessary condition for 
fertility to be decreasing in female bargaining power is;
IX(9,0  ~  O ]  < - IX(?> O  - O ]  (7)
If (7) does not hold for any q, then it is always the case that the marginal benefits 
of investment in marriage are greater than in divorce. Empowering women allows 
them to capture a greater share of this surplus and only increases their investment 
incentives, contrary to the conventional wisdom on empowerment policies.
When is (7) likely to hold? If spouses have conflicting fertility preferences, the 
marginal benefits of investment to husbands can be less than the marginal loss to their 
wife. This is true if husbands prefer more children than their wives, and spouses suffer 
a loss as the number of children produced diverges form their preference.
Why should spouses suffer a loss when the number of children diverges from their 
preference? This can be thought of in terms of a model in which parents care about 
child quantity and quality (Becker (1991)). The desired number of children is that 
which equates the marginal rate of substitution between child quality and quantity, to 
their ratio of shadow prices. Diverging from this optimal number reduces the payoff 
from marriage.
Proposition 4 gives insights into the relation between fertility preferences and 
policies of female empowerment. Consider married couples who have fewer children 
than either spouse desires. The marginal benefits in marriage of investing in fertility 
are still positive. Empowering women in such households allows them to appropriate 
a greater share of this surplus, and thus increases fertility level.
Households in which the number of children lies between the preferences of spouses, 
where there is the most conflict over fertility, are those in which the marginal benefits 
of investing are likely to be negative for the spouse that prefers fewer children, most 
likely to be the wife. If the wife is made sufficiently worse off by producing another 
child, then empowering these women leads them to produce fewer children.
The aggregate effect of female empowerment on fertility rates depends upon the 
level of heterogeneity of fertility preferences within married couples, and the age
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distribution of fertile women. If household bargains are subject to renegotiation, 
suggests targeting policies of empowerment towards women early in their fertility 
cycle with few children, could be particularly counterproductive.
2.2.2 Specific Payoffs
In order to move towards an empirical test of the model, I put more structure on the 
payoffs in marriage and divorce.
A ssum ption 1: The payoff to spouse i in marriage is;
V(q,  ttJ )  =  Vi +  (f>(q) ~ \ ( q -  < ?  (8)
where Vi are the private benefits to marriage, (f)(q) captures the consumption and 
investment benefits of having children, with (f){q) concave, </>(0) =  0, <  1. We
can think of the last two terms in (8 ) as capturing the separable benefits from child 
quantity and child quality
A ssum ption 2: The payoff to spouse i in divorce is;
V f o O  =  -  \  (? -  O 2 (9)
The parameters (5h, Sw, rj) are exogenous and such that 6h +  Sw < 1.
In divorce spouses lose the private benefits of marriage. 1 2  Moreover, each spouse 
has partial custody of children so the benefits from children are lower. In other words, 
children are a public good in marriage, but a private good in divorce. The (6h, Sw) 
parameters capture the allocation of child custody to each parent. The fact that Sh 
and 5W may sum to less than one captures the fact that children are a relationship 
specific good - they generate greater benefits in marriage than in divorce. 1 3
The extent to which preferences over the desired number of children still matter 
ex post is captured by the 77 parameter. This is because in divorce spouses may be 
less able to monitor child quality investments (Weiss and Willis (1985, 1993)). In the 
extreme, if a divorced spouse no longer invests in child quality their utility will not
12 The model does not endogenise the decision to marry. I take it as given that this loss is 
sufficiently large so that individuals always prefer to be married rather than divorced.
13There is a wealth of literature detailing the negative impact on children’s welfare when one 
parent is absent from the household (Kiernan (1997)). If divorced parents internalize this reduction 
in children’s welfare, then even if one parent has sole custody of the children, it will be the case that 
the benefits of children are reduced vis-a-vis the benefits from children in marriage.
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be affected by the fact that the actual number of children diverges from the preferred 
number of children.
If 77 =  0 spouses no longer suffer a loss from not having achieved their desired 
number of children in the last marriage. If rj = 1 spouses continue to suffer disutility 
from not having achieved their desired number of children. 1 4
If the loss to each spouse associated with diverging from their preferred number 
of children is different in marriage and divorce, the marginal surplus that marriage 
creates over divorce can be decreasing in the number of children. Thus (7) may hold, 
which is a necessary condition for policies of female empowerment to be effective.
Transfers
If investments are non-contractible, the surplus in marriage over divorce is; 
V (q ,rh) + V ( q ,K ) - V ( q X h) - V ( q ,  t t 'J
= vh + vw + (2-Sh- 6 W) 4>(q) -  i  (1 -  rj) (q -  7r i f  -  I  (1 -)?)(« -  < ) 2
If spouses suffer the same loss in marriage and divorce from not having achieved their 
desired fertility level (rj = 1 ), the surplus that marriage creates over divorce does not 
depend on these divergence terms, and so they do not enter the transfer function . 1 5
If in divorce spouses no longer suffer this source of disutility (77 =  0), these diver­
gence terms form part of the marriage surplus, and enter the transfer function. Each 
spouse receives a higher transfer, all else equal, as the number of children diverges 
from their desired number.
The marriage surplus also depends on the benefits spouses obtain from children. 
These include the consumption and investment benefits of children, captured in (f)(q). 
How these benefits are divided across spouses, depends upon two effects that are 
expected to go in opposite directions. First, there is the effect of ex ante bargaining 
shares. Holding all other factors constant, as q increases then so does the surplus
14Of course spouses may not suffer the same loss in divorce from not having achieved their desired 
fertility level. In this case there would be a combination of the effects discussed for the two cases I 
focus on, 77 =  0 , 1 .
15The equilibirum transfer level is found by substituting (8 ) and (9) into (3a);
t  =  [(1 -  6)vh -  0vw] +  [(1 -  6) (1 -  5h) -  9 (1 -  <*„)] 0(g)
- \ ( i  -  «) ( i  -  >>) Or-  < f  + ( i  - 1) (9 -  < ?
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created by marriage as 4>(q) is concave. If husbands have the greater bargaining 
power they are able to appropriate the majority share of this marriage surplus. They 
therefore need greater transfers to remain married.
Second, there is the effect of custodial shares. These shares act as ex post bar­
gaining powers. The parent with the majority custodial share has a higher payoff in 
divorce and therefore needs greater transfers to remain married. These have opposite 
effects on the direction of transfers if husbands have the greater ex ante bargaining 
power and wives are assigned the greater share of child custody.
Transfers from the husband will be increasing in the number of children if;
1 ~ &h Q
1 -  5W 1 - 6
so the relative division of ex post custodial rights, is more in favour of the wife than 
ex ante bargaining shares.
Fertility Preferences and Outcomes
When fertility investments are contractible the wife chooses investment to maxi­
mize the total surplus in marriage. As stated in proposition 1 , fertility investments 
are efficient, and place equal weight on the preferences of both spouses. Hence it is 
the sum of preferences that matters. Policies targeted towards reducing male prefer­
ences will be as effective in reducing fertility as those targeted towards women. As 
stated in proposition 2 , bargaining shares alter the division of the marriage surplus, 
but have no effect on fertility investments.
If fertility investments are non-contractible, the weights given to spousal prefer­
ences depend on if fertility preferences enter divorce payoffs.
If fertility preferences no longer matter in divorce (rj =  0), spousal preferences 
have equal weight in determining fertility levels. To see this recall that the wife has 
two sources of investment incentive - (i) to maximize the total payoff in marriage, 
(ii) the relative divorce payoffs of spouses. Preferences determine investments only 
through the first source of incentives. The marriage surplus is increasing equally in 
both spouses’ payoffs, and so each spouses preferences matter equally.
If fertility preferences still matter in divorce (rj = 1 ), then only the wife’s prefer­
ence determines fertility outcomes. The intuition is that the wife maximizes the value 
of her outside option plus her share of the marriage surplus. In this case, both spouses 
suffer disutility in marriage and divorce as the number of children produced diverges
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from their desired number. Therefore the surplus that marriage creates over divorce 
does not depend on this disutility. The only way in which preferences influence the 
wife’s investment incentives is through her incentive to maximize her divorce payoff, 
which depends on her own preferences. Therefore only her preference determines the 
equilibrium fertility level.
As stated in proposition 3, there will be overinvestment into fertility when the 
marginal benefits to investing in divorce are sufficiently greater for the wife than for 
the husband. This is more likely to occur if women have the majority custodial rights 
over children in divorce. As women are relatively better off than men in divorce 
because they have child custody, husbands have to give their wives greater transfers 
in marriage for them to remain married. By investing into fertility wives are able to 
extract a greater share of the surplus that marriage creates over divorce. This can 
leave them better off overall, even though by over investing in fertility the wife moves 
further from her own preferred number of children.
Female Em powerm ent
The model makes precise when policies of female empowerment will be effective. 
From proposition 4, a necessary condition for this is the marginal benefits of invest­
ment to the husband are less than the marginal loss to the wife. In other words, if 
there is sufficient preference heterogeneity in the household, the total marginal sur­
plus that marriage creates over divorce is somewhere decreasing in the number of 
children produced.
When parents suffer disutility in divorce from not having achieved their desired 
number of children the surplus that marriage creates over divorce depends only the 
benefits of children. Given children are a marriage specific good, the returns to 
investing in fertility are higher in marriage than divorce. From proposition 4 this 
implies that policies of female empowerment lead to increased fertility levels.
If spouses no longer care about their desired preferences in divorce, the marginal 
benefits of investing can be lower in marriage than divorce. This is more likely to 
occur if, first, there is sufficient heterogeneity in spouses preferences so that marginal 
increases in investment lead to one parent being better off and the other worse off. 
Hence the total surplus created by marriage over divorce falls. Second, if children are 
not a marriage specific good, the total marginal benefits in divorce of investing are 
almost as great as in marriage, but in marriage parents suffer disutility from diverging 
from their preferences. Overall this can lead to the marginal benefits of investment in
29
marriage to be lower than in divorce. Empowering women would then reduce fertility 
rates.
2.2.3 Sum mary
The link between female empowerment and fertility rates is not as straightforward as 
suggested in the public policy debate. The theory provides the following insights.
First the nature of household bargaining, and the role of preferences is key to 
understanding the links between female empowerment and fertility. If spouses are 
able to make agreements contingent on investments, bargaining leads to the result 
that both spousal preferences equally determine fertility outcomes. Hence fertility 
policies ought to be targeted to men and women alike.
Second, if spouses are able to make agreements contingent on investments, the 
role of female bargaining power is purely distributional - empowering women does 
improve their welfare but has no effects on fertility outcomes.
Third, if investments are non-contractible, the relation between preferences and 
fertility depends on how preferences enter divorce payoffs. If they still matter then 
only wives preferences drive fertility, and policies directed at changing preferences 
will only be effective when targeted at women.
Fourth, female bargaining power now affects both fertility and the distribution 
of welfare in marriage. Empowering women allows them to appropriate a greater 
share of the marital surplus. This affects investment incentives. These incentives 
are determined by how the surplus that marriage creates over divorce changes with 
children, as well as the marginal changes in the wife’s divorce payoff. These factors 
depend upon how fertility preferences enter divorce payoffs, the degree of preference 
heterogeneity, and the allocation of child custody rights.
Fifth, over and under investment into fertility can occur relative to the case with 
contractible investment. Empowering women can exacerbate these inefficiencies. In 
particular the fact that women have the majority custodial rights over children can 
lead women to produce too many children. This is because by producing more children 
within marriage, they are able to extract a greater share of the surplus that marriage 
creates over divorce.
Finally, empowering females only leads to unambiguous falls in fertility rates if the 
total marginal benefits of children in marriage are Hess than in divorce. A necessary 
condition for this to be the case is if there is sufficient heterogeneity in fertility
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preferences across spouses.
In conclusion, the effects of policies to empower women will depend on the social 
context in which they are introduced. The effects depend on how preferences matter 
in divorce, and the rules on child custody. Hence the same empowerment policies 
within a country can have different effects if social norms differ across groups within 
society. An ethnically diverse country such as Malaysia provides an excellent testing 
ground for this framework.
2.3 Institutional Background and Data
Fertility rates have been of concern to policy makers in Malaysia. Due to growing 
awareness of the pressures being placed on the economy by its growing population, 
two major policies have been implemented over the past forty years. First, in 1966 
the National Family Planning (NFP) board was established to coordinate a family 
planning program. This met with considerable success as the fertility rate dropped 
from over 6  in 1966 to 3.6 by 1988. However, because the program was concentrated 
in urban regions, its effect was least on the predominantly rural Malay population. 
Second, the New Population Policy (NPP) announced in 1982 also called for a decline 
in the total fertility rate, but it nevertheless gave tax incentives and maternity benefits 
to encourage parents to “go for five”.
The decline in fertility has been different across ethnic groups. Between 1958 and 
1983 the fertility rate for Malays dropped from 5.9% to 4.5%, a smaller drop than 
for the other ethnic groups. 1 6 Much of this decline can be attributed to the rising 
age at marriage for females - this rose from 17 in 1950 to 22 in 1985. Marriage is a 
near universal practice for Malay women, with nearly all marrying by age 30. Births 
out-of-wedlock are almost non existent.
Since the 1950s, Malays in Malaysia have had one of the highest divorce rates in 
the world (Jones (1981, 1997)).17 Table li gives the divorce rates from 1965 to 1990 
for Malays in Peninsular Malaysia, for Malays in Indonesia, as well as for England
16 Chinese accounted for 30% of the population in 1970 and Indians 10%. For the Chinese the 
fall in fertility between 1958 and 1983 was 6.5% to 2.7%, and for Indians it was 7.2% to 3% (Pong 
(1994)).
17 This has been confirmed using a variety of other data sources such as vital statistics and survey 
data (such as the World Fertility Survey (1974) or the Malaysian Population and Family Survey 
(1984)).
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and Wales and the United States. 1 8  Over the periods 1950-57 and 1972 - 76, in some 
states half of all marriages were ending in divorce (see map lii). In some Malaysian 
states the divorce rate in the late 1970s was four times as high as that in the United 
States today. Divorce is clearly a credible threat in Malaysia. 1 9
Islam ic Family Law
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia prescribes that Muslim family law is the 
jurisdiction of state legislatures. Whilst procedures regarding marriage and divorce 
differ by state, these follow the orthodox tenets of the Shafi’i School of Law (Ibrahim 
(1973)).20 Four types of divorce exist -  (i) talak, where husbands file for divorce; (ii) 
cerai taalik, where wives file for divorce; (iii) khula, where the wife files for divorce 
and the husband has to “buy” the divorce by transferring money or assets; (iv) fasah, 
where the divorce is granted to the wife by an Islamic court on grounds of desertion 
or failure of the husband to provide maintenance.
While talak constitutes the majority of all divorces performed, ethnographic evi­
dence suggests that Islamic law is liberally interpreted and that in practice, the num­
bers of women instigating divorce is higher than officially recorded (Rudie (1983), 
Jones (1981, 1997)). Malay women have historically been given considerable auton­
omy with regards to marriage partner, household decisions within marriage, and the 
decision to divorce (Swift (1965), Firth (1966), Kuchiba et al (1979), Resid (1988)). 
These studies also suggest there is little social stigma associated with being a divorcee 
of either gender.
Shafi’i law states that divorced women should retain custody of their children. 
Boys are then passed into the care of their fathers at age seven, whilst girls remain
18 The general divorce rate is defined as the number of divorcees per thousand population aged 
15 and over. This measure understates the true divorce rate in Western countries as individuals 
marry at an older age compared to in Malaysia. The measure understates the true divorce rate in 
Peninsular Malaysia in later periods relative to early periods because the median age at marriage 
for Malays has been rising over this period. However, the general trends remain unchanged if we 
use those currently married as the denominator. Also, the incidence of marital reconciliation has 
remained constant over the period (Jones (1981)) suggesting that the trends in table li  are truly 
reflective of changes in divorce rates themselves.
19Data on the timing of divorce is harder to obtain. Guest (1991) shows that of the 27 countries 
included in the World Fertility Survey, the ratio of the probability of marital dissolution in the first 
five years, to the probability of dissolution in the next five, was higher in Indonesia and Malaysia 
than any other country. Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan (2001) use 1970 census data to show 
that timing of first births is a significant determinant of marital dissolution, suggesting that in 
divorce, the allocation of custodial rights over children is a salient issue.
20The Islamic Family Law Act (1984) was enforced by most states by the late 1980s, and was 
designed to formalize common divorce procedures across states.
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with their mothers until they marry. Jones (1981, 1994) suggests this practice is not 
followed and children actually always tend to reside with their mothers, regardless of 
age or gender. The Malaysian Marriage Survey (1984) reports that 55% of children 
involved in divorce reside with their mothers, 19% stayed with their fathers, and 13% 
resided with both parents in some form of joint custody (Tan and Jones (1990)).21
D ata and K ey Variables
I use the Malaysian Family Life Surveys (MFLS) for the empirical analysis. This 
is a short household panel, collected in two waves in 1976/7 (MFLS-1) and 1988/9 
(MFLS-2). The MFLS-1 sample consists of 1,262 households with an ever-married 
woman aged 50 or less, located in 52 districts, and representative of Peninsular 
Malaysia in 1976. Both the wife and her current husband were interviewed. MFLS-2 
re-interviewed 926 households. Each survey collected detailed current and retro­
spective information on family structure, fertility, preferences, economic status, and 
transfers. The key variables used are the following;
Preferences
In the first wave both spouses were asked, “suppose you could start your married 
life all over again and you could decide what children to have. How many children 
would you want?” I use the response as the measure of each spouses desired number of 
children (7r£, 7t^). This question was also asked regarding the desired number of boys 
and girls. Respondents were specifically asked about wants rather than expectations, 
and the questionnaire was administered in one of ten languages further reducing the 
possibility of respondents misinterpreting the question. 2 2
Equilibrium  Fertility Outcomes
The number of children alive in the second wave measures the equilibrium level 
of fertility. 2 3  This is measured twelve years after fertility preferences were expressed. 
The average age of women in the second wave is 47 years. Census data confirms that 
over 98% of women of this age have completed their fertility cycle.
M onetary Transfers
I use data on monetary transfers from husband to wife measured in wave 1, twelve
21 Fathers are required by Islamic law to pay maintenance to their former wives in divorce to cover 
child costs. In practice, the incidence of fathers paying is less than universal. Tan and Jones (1990) 
report 59% of husbands never paying any maintenance.
22Less than 10% of the sample did not respond to this question.
23 The number of children ever born has a correlation coefficient of .95 with the number of preg­
nancies the wife has ever had. Malaysia experienced a sharp reduction in mortality rates during the 
1960s before the population boom of the 1970s (Jones (1994)).
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years prior to when the equilibrium fertility outcomes are measured. Spouses were 
asked, “in the past 12 months did you receive money from your husband/wife?” If yes, 
they were asked the amounts and frequency of payments. I use this data to construct 
weekly monetary transfers from husbands to wives. 2 4
Monetary payments are the most direct means by which spouses can make trans­
fers between each other in marriage. The effects ought to be stronger than for other 
forms of transfer.
O ther Covariates
Information on the age at which the wife began menstruating is used to construct 
an indicator of the stage of the fertility cycle the women is at. To measure wealth, I use 
information on the value of household assets, property, and whether the household has 
its own supply of running water and electricity. Finally, each household is located in 
one of 70 census districts. I match the MFLS data with census information regarding 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the local district. This is used to control for local 
marriage market characteristics.
In order to match with the theory, it is important to identify the required timing 
of the variables of interest. If investments axe contractible, spouses are able to specify 
investments and the transfers between spouses required to enforce these investments. 
These transfers can take place at any stage of the fertility cycle.
If investments are non-contractible, transfers take place during the fertility cycle, 
the period of renegotiation. Transfers need to be measured before the equilibrium 
number of children are produced. Once the fertility cycle is completed, there is no 
reason why observed transfers ought to be related to fertility investments as there is 
nothing left to bargain over.
The measure of monetary transfers from MFLS-1 is measured during the fertility 
cycle, when spouses can renegotiate over the distribution of the marriage surplus. 
Spousal preferences (n*h, r:*w) are also measured in wave 1, while the equilibrium num­
ber of children, q, is measured in wave 2  when wives have completed their fertility 
cycle.
If spouses renegotiate over the course of the fertility cycle, variables that reflect 
changing relative divorce payoffs have to be measured during this renegotiation phase. 
I will use marriage market characteristics from census data to capture changing di-
24 Around 60% of these women said they received these transfers weekly, suggesting this variable 
is not just picking up lump sum transfers which occur at the time of the survey.
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vorce payoffs over the fertility cycle. The following figure details the timing of when 
the key variables are measured;
Date 1
wife makes sunk 
investment q
(start o f fertility cycle)
Date 2
I
Transfers
(during fertility cycle)
Date 3
q children in 
marriage/ divorce
(end of fertility cycle)
Renegotiation
MFLS-1 (1976) Census (1970,1980) MFLS-2 (1988)
(preferences, transfers) (marriage markets) (fertility outcomes)
The working sample used for the fertility regressions is Malay husband and wife 
pairs for whom, (i) both spousal preferences, expressed in MFLS-1, were available; 
(ii) were continuously married between MFLS-1 and MFLS-2; (iii) were both fertile 
over the two waves. 2 5  There are 472 pairs of Malay husband and wife pairs, and 220 
Chinese pairs that satisfy these criteria. Whilst this sample is not representative of 
Peninsular Malays, it is exactly those households that the theory applies to. Namely 
households that bargain to allocate the marriage surplus so the couple remain married 
in equilibrium.
Table 2i presents summary statistics of the main variables used. The average age 
at marriage of women in the sample is 17, precluding the possibility of children being 
born prior to marriage.
Table 2ii reports the desired number of children by spouse, also broken down 
by gender of child. There exist significant differences in the spousal desires, largely 
driven by husbands wanting more sons than their wives. Note that 34% of spouses 
agree on the number of children desired, 22% differ by one child, and 44% differ by 
at least two children - 1 0 % differ by more than four.
These levels of preference heterogeneity underestimate the true levels of conflict 
in the population as the sample is restricted to households which are continuously
25 To determine whether spouses are fertile, each was asked, “are you and your spouse physically 
able to have more children now?” Whilst spouses may be unaware of their own fecundity, the sample 
of Malay women have had on average 3.46 children in wave 1 and 6.38 in wave 2, a significant 
difference.
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married over both waves. 2 6
As a consistency check, I report the additional number of children wanted, and 
attitudes regarding what constitutes a large and small family. 2 7  On average both 
spouses wanted to almost double their family size. The figures for large and small 
family sizes are reasonable given average family sizes in the sample.
The fact that spouses report significantly different preferences to each other, is 
consistent with them reporting their innate preferences and not some outcome of a 
bargaining model. In addition I found no evidence that the degree of preference het­
erogeneity between spouses differs with the number of years they have been married.
Table 2iii gives the summary statistics for the number of children ever born in 
wave 2. This is significantly greater than the number of children in wave 1, suggesting 
the fertility cycle is incomplete at MFLS-1. The number of children born are greater 
than either spouses’ desired number. This suggests households are over investing in 
fertility, an issue I return to later.
2.4 Empirical M ethod
2.4.1 Fertility
The equilibrium fertility level is given by the first order condition (5), which after 
substituting in for payoffs (8 ) and (9 ) reduces to an equation of the form;
9 (0, Sh, 6W, 7 7, q) = ph (9, 8h, 6Wi 77) ttJ + pw (0,6h, 5W, rj) ir*w -  d(q) (1 1 ) 
I estimate a linear approximation to this first order condition for each household;
q = a +  PhTT*h + /?w7r* + /iX + u (12)
26The model suggests that there ought to be sorting by preferences in the marriage market. For 
any given level of fertility investments, if spousal preferences are more homogeneous then the absolute 
level of transfers required in equilibrium is lower, and investments are closer to the first best level. 
However, fertility preferences are not the only source of marital conflict. The sample correlation 
between spousal preferences is .33, for age .79 , and for years of schooling .60. Hence spouses appear 
to sort more on other dimensions.
27Respondents were asked, “would you personally like to have any more children than the number 
you have now?", and if yes, “how many more children do you want?” . This second question was 
broken down by the gender of the child. The other question asked, “how many children would there 
be in a small/large fam ily?"
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where q is the equilibrium number of children, ir*h and 7r^  are the spouse’s preferences, 
X  is a vector of covariates that proxies for the marginal cost of investments and 
other exogenous factors that determine fertility outcomes, and u is a household level 
disturbance term.
If fertility investments are contractible then both spousal preferences will have 
the same effects on equilibrium fertility levels so fih = > 0. If investments are
non-contractible, the effect of female preferences on fertility will be at least as great 
as male preferences so /3W > @h.
2.4.2 Transfers
The theory makes precise how transfers depend on preferences. Substituting payoffs
(8) and (9) into (3a), the level of transfers can be written in the general form;
t = 7{0,6h, 5W) <f>(q) +  Xh (0, r}h) (q -  Tr*h)2 4- Xh (9,77 J  (q -  tt* ) 2  (13)
I estimate the following form for the transfer equation;
t  = a +  7 ? + Xh {q -  Tr*h)2 + Xw( q -  ir*w)2 +  t Z + v  (14)
where q is the equilibrium number of children produced, (q — 7r*)2 is the preference 
divergence term for each spouse, Z is a vector of exogenous determinants of intra- 
household transfers, and v is a household specific disturbance term.
The coefficients (A ,^ A^ ,) map into the underlying structural parameters of the 
model as follows;
(15)
= ^(! ~v)
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Hence the implied bargaining share of the husband can be inferred from28;
? =  —
XV) Xh
2.5 Basic Results
2.5.1 Fertility
I estimate a household fertility equation of the form;
q = a +  PhTT*h + pwn*w + fiX  + u (12)
The dependent variable is the number of children born to the spouses by wave 2. 
Preferences are measured twelve years earlier in wave 1. In X I also control for 
wife’s age in MFLS-1, her age at marriage, and the age at which she first started 
menstruating . 2 9
In addition, I control for the wife’s years of schooling, and her monthly non-earned 
income. These capture the opportunity cost of having children. More educated 
women have to forgo higher earnings if they become pregnant and so ought to have 
lower fertility. Women with higher non-earned incomes have a lower opportunity cost
28 A confidence interval for 9 is constructed using the delta method. Define / ( A ,^ A^) =  * so
Ati; Xh,
that;
d f  _  Xw d f  _ Ah
Using the delta method, the asymptotic distribution of f(Xh, Xw) for sample size n is given by;
[ / ( ^ ,  A„) -  /(Aft, A„)] A  N  (0,
where;
*=(tety -(Ay)->*=(:;; z)
a n  =  var(Xh), cr22 =  var(Xw), and cr12 =  tr21 =  cov(Xh, Xw). Hence;
V ar \f(Xh,  A^) — /(A^, Xw)] —> ——-------— ^ [crn A  ^— 2cri2A/lAlu +  <t22A2]
L J a n (Xw -  Xh)
29Age at marriage is unlikely to be endogenous because teen marriage is the social norm, and 
first marriages are typically arranged, although women do have some say in the choice of marriage 
partner (Jones (1994)).
(16)
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of having children, and should have higher fertility levels, all else equal.
I also control for wealth using data on whether the household has its own supply 
of running water and electricity. Wealth has ambiguous effects on fertility levels as 
income and substitution effects move in opposite directions if children are a normal 
good.
I control for husband’s years of schooling, non-earned income, and employment 
status. These capture the husband’s opportunity costs of raising children.
Finally, I control for district fixed effects because of regional variations in mar­
riage markets (table 1), how Islamic law is interpreted. Robust standard errors are 
calculated throughout. All regressions are estimated using least squares. I report p- 
values in parentheses, and do not control for potentially endogenous regressors such 
as income.
In table 3 I estimate the specification in (12). The key test of the theory is 
whether spousal preferences determine equilibrium fertility outcomes. Column 1 of 
table 3 controls only for the preferences of husband and wife. At the foot of table 3 
I give the p-value for the hypothesis that (3h = (3W.
Both preferences have positive and significant effects on the equilibrium level of 
fertility, measured twelve years after fertility preferences were measured. I cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the marginal effects of spousal preferences on fertility are 
equal across spouses (p-value of .8428).
In column 2 I additionally control for each set of covariates described above. 
Introducing these variables, (i) the coefficients on spousal preferences remains positive 
and significant; (ii) the test for the equality of these coefficients still cannot reject 
the null that (5h =  f3w\ (iii) the point estimates ((3h,(3W) remain stable suggesting 
preferences axe not proxying for an earlier omitted variable. 3 0
The preferences of husbands and wives are equally important in the determination 
of fertility. The policy implication is striking - policies designed to reduce fertility 
should not only be targeted towards females. Policies that target male preferences 
will be equally effective in reducing fertility as those that target women. This policy 
channel has been largely ignored in the public policy debate.
The coefficients on the other covariates are also informative. In column 2, women
301 used non-parametric regressions to check for the linearity of spousal preferences in the fertility 
equation. I did this by first estimating (12), and then estimating a kernel regression of qi — qi on 
spousal preferences. Using 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals on the kernel regression, I could 
not reject linearity.
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who are older, married earlier, and started menstruating later, have more children. 
Surprisingly female non-earned income and the measures of household wealth do not 
enter significantly. This last result may be because the income and substitution effects 
offset each other. This is not unreasonable in a developing country where there are 
large consumption and investment benefits of children.
Husband’s characteristics all enter significantly - husbands that are more educated, 
have higher non-earned income, and are employed, have significantly higher levels of 
fertility. Husband’s education is most likely proxying for household income.
One surprising result is that wife’s education has no effect on fertility, once spousal 
preferences are controlled for. This contradicts a body of empirical evidence that 
suggests a robust negative correlation exists between female education and fertility 
(see Dreze and Murthi (2000) for a review). This result suggests that one of the most 
central policies of female empowerment, educating women, may have little direct effect 
on fertility. 3 1
Raising female education is expected to reduce fertility, either because it increases 
the opportunity cost of having and raising children; it reduces infant mortality; it 
increases knowledge and use of contraception; or it reduces the desired number of 
children. One interpretation of the result in column 2 is as confirmation of female 
education affecting fertility outcomes through preferences. As a check, in column 3 
I drop the preference data, and find the standard negative and significant effect of 
female education.
This raises two issues - (i) preferences may be endogenously determined; (ii) what 
is the role of public policy in affecting household fertility decisions. I return to both 
issues in more detail later.
The efficiency of the estimates can be improved if I explicitly take account of 
the discrete nature of the dependent variable. In column 4 I run an ordered probit 
regression. The signs and significance of the variables are in line with column 2. I 
continue to fail to reject the hypothesis that (3h = (3W.
The results in table 3 imply the sum of spousal preferences determine fertility 
outcomes. 3 2  This is consistent with households being able to bargain efficiently. Fe­
31The correlation between female education and preferences is -.1270 suggesting the result is not 
driven by multicolinearity. Similar results were obtained using households in which preferences 
differed across spouses.
32Throughout I have not included any potentially endogenous regressors such as income. Including 
income leaves both preferences significant, and I am still unable to reject the hypothesis that =
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male bargaining power should not determine fertility outcomes in this case. If female 
education and non-earned income are proxies for this, the fact that neither of these 
are significant is consistent with efficient bargaining within households. However, 
these characteristics are significant for husbands, although they may be picking up 
income effects.
To precisely identify the underlying nature of household bargaining, I turn to 
estimating the transfers equation. For now it is worth noting that all the observ­
able male characteristics controlled are significant determinants of fertility in Malays 
households. Clearly men matter for fertility outcomes, and this has been largely 
overlooked in the current policy debate.
2.5.2 Transfers
I estimate the following specification for the transfers equation;
t = a +  7 4  +  Xh (q -  O 2 + (q -  tt*w)2 +  t Z + i /  (17)
where monetary transfers between spouses are measured in wave 1. This is measured 
during the fertility cycle, when spouses can renegotiate over the distribution of the 
marriage surplus. Spousal preferences (7r£, tt*w) are also measured in wave 1, while the 
equilibrium number of children, q, is measure twelve years later, when women have 
completed their fertility cycle.
Table 2iii shows that monetary transfers constitute a non-negligible proportion of 
Malay wives incomes, especially for wives who are not employed (40% of the sample).
The set of other covariates controlled for in Z are the wife’s age, age at marriage, 
years of schooling, non-earned income, and whether the wife is employed. I also 
control for the value of household assets, husbands years of schooling, non-earned in­
come, employment status and earnings from employment. In part these controls pick 
up other potential channels through which transfers are determined. For instance, 
women who do not work may receive transfers from their husbands to compensate 
them from not having any earned income.
The available sample is only 88 Malay households, so I am unable to control for 
district fixed effects. I allow for clustering of the errors by sampling district, and
(3W. Furthermore, as income and preferences are negatively correlated, the omitted variables bias 
suggests that the true effect of preferences on outcomes is underestimated in these regressions.
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calculate robust standard errors.
Column 1  of table 4 regresses monetary transfers from husband to wife, on the 
equilibrium number of children, and the divergence of this number of children from 
each spouses desired number of children. As the divergence between the number 
of children produced and the desired number of the husband increases, then during 
the fertility cycle, the husband significantly reduces his monetary transfers to his 
wife. Similarly, as the divergence between the number of children produced and the 
desired number of the wife increases, the husband significantly increases his monetary 
transfers.
The fact that transfers depend on these preference divergence terms is consistent 
with households bargaining over the division of the surplus in marriage. Furthermore 
the results are consistent with spouses needing to be compensated for the loss of 
not achieving their desired fertility level. This compensation takes place during the 
fertility cycle.
The result also suggests that as the equilibrium number of children rises, transfers 
given to wives during the fertility cycle rise.
Column 2 shows that this result is robust to the inclusion of the full set of co­
variates Z, discussed above. Women who marry earlier (and have thus been married 
longer) receive significantly lower transfers. 3 3  Husbands with more years of schooling 
give greater transfers, but husbands with higher levels of non-earned income signifi­
cantly reduce transfers. Husbands income from employment has no effect on trans­
fers. I cannot reject the hypothesis of equal bargaining shares across spouses. This is 
consistent with ethnographic evidence suggesting high levels of female autonomy in 
Malaysia relative to other Islamic societies.
I test whether it is valid to assume that the divergence terms are quadratic. 
Expanding (17) gives the unrestricted regression;
t =  a + 'yq + 60q2 +  5\qq*h -I- 82 (ql)2 +  ^3 QQw +  £4  (<iC) 2 +  tZ-J-Z' 
which generates the linearly independent restrictions;
# 3  +  84 — — 2  + ^2 ) ; ^ 0  = — +  ^2 )
33 One reason for such an age profile of transfers is that women make relatively more marriage 
specific investments early in marriage.
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I use a Wald test for the null hypothesis that both restrictions hold. The p-value 
for this is reported at the foot of column 2. The restrictions are valid, although the 
power of such a test is inevitable low in such a small sample.
The result in column 2 may be spurious for a number of reasons. First, if women 
have greater control over household resources, expenditures on child goods increase 
(Schultz (1990), Thomas (1990), Haddad and Hoddinott (1994)). Monetary transfers 
may be given to wives specifically for this purpose. If so, transfers should be correlated 
with the contemporaneous number of children. The earlier results may be picking up 
the fact that the equilibrium number of children, measured in MFLS-2, is correlated 
with the contemporaneous number of children, measured in MFLS-1. In column 
3 I drop the divergence terms and control only for the number of children in the 
household, measured contemporaneously with transfers from husbands in MFLS-1, 
and the set of covariates Z. Children in the household in MFLS-1 do not significantly 
affect the level of transfers the wive receives.
Column 4 runs the same regression as in column 2 but also controls for the number 
of children measured in wave 1. The contemporaneous number of children has no 
significant effect on the level of transfers to wives. In addition, the equilibrium number 
of children continues to have a positive and significant effect, and the preference 
divergence terms remain significant. The earlier results are not spuriously picking up 
transfers to wives given to look after the contemporaneous number of children.
An alternative hypothesis is that women receive more transfers because they care 
more about children, or have a comparative advantage in child care. To address this I 
control for the relative valuations of parents for children by including spouses desired 
number of children.
The result in column 5 shows fertility preferences have no significant direct effect 
on the level of transfers. Controlling for spousal preferences and the number of 
children in the household in wave 1 , the result is the same as in earlier specifications. 
It is the divergence between spousal preferences and realized numbers of children that 
drives transfers across spouses.
Another concern is that if spouses determine the equilibrium level of fertility in­
vestments and transfers simultaneously, then in the transfers equation the equilibrium 
number of children is endogenous. If this endogeneity is due to any unobservable fac­
tor that drives both fertility outcomes and preferences, it will be washed out in the 
preference divergence terms, and only affects the level of equilibrium children in wave
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2. In column 6  I deal with this by instrumenting for the number of children in wave 
2. The instruments are the number of stillbirths and miscarriages the wife has had 
by wave 2. The identifying assumption is that these events are correlated with the 
equilibrium fertility level, and uncorrelated with unobservables that drive both fer­
tility and transfers. This is true if stillbirths and miscarriages are random events. In 
column 6  once the number of children in wave 2  is instrumented for, the preference 
divergence effect continues to hold, although there is no longer any levels effect of 
children in wave 2  on transfers in wave 1 .
To conclude, estimating the transfer equation suggests spouses do compensate 
each other during the fertility cycle, in monetary terms, as they move away from 
their own desired fertility level. Transfers do not appear to be given to women simply 
because they have more children to look after at the time, nor do they reflect fully 
different valuations that spouses may have for children.
Throughout I have also found the estimated bargaining shares to be around one 
half for each spouse. This is in line with sociological evidence, cited earlier, that 
shows high levels of female autonomy with respect to household decision making in 
Malaysia.
2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 R enegotiation
Taken together, the fertility and transfers imply - (i) husband and wife preferences 
both determine fertility outcomes; (ii) during the fertility cycle spouses compensate 
each other through monetary transfers, as the number of children produced diverges 
from their preferred number. This suggests an underlying model in which households 
are able to bargain efficiently over fertility investments, or one where spouses renego­
tiate over the fertility cycle and preferences no longer determine payoffs in divorce. 
Given that, as the model makes clear, the policy implications will be different in these 
cases, it is important to empirically distinguish between these two. I do this using 
four different approaches.
First, irrespective of the bargaining process, the marginal effects of spousal prefer­
ences on fertility outcomes are stronger for couples earlier in the fertility cycle. This 
is because younger couples have greater opportunities to adjust to shocks to fertility, 
and thus reach an outcome closer to their preferences, all else equal.
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If households renegotiate during the fertility cycle however, the marginal effects of 
preferences differ across spouses over the fertility cycle. This is because spouses rela­
tive payoffs in divorce changing during the course of marriage as fertility investments 
are undertaken. If investments are contractible, this would not be true - investments 
do not change the relative payoffs in divorce as those are independent of the level of 
investment made.
Let L denote the stage of the fertility cycle at which the wife is at. I test for the 
presence of different marginal effects of preferences of husband and wife, over the life 
cycle, by interacting this life cycle variable with spousal preferences;
q = a + Ph7r*h +  Pwtt*w +  ph (ttJ.L) -f pw (ttJ.L) +  p X  +  u (18)
If investments are contractible and households bargain efficiently the marginal 
effects of preferences are the same across spouses over the fertility cycle (ph — pw). 
If households renegotiate over the course of the fertility cycle, P h ^ Pw
The results in table 3 did not reject the null hypothesis that the sum of preferences 
is what determines fertility outcomes. I now assume this restriction to be valid. The 
regression specifications in table 5 continue to control for the set of baseline covariates 
in table 3. Column 1 runs the basic fertility specification (12) imposing the restriction 
that (3h = (3W for comparison.
In column 2 I estimate specification (18). As the wife is at a later stage in her 
fertility cycle, the marginal effects of husbands’ preferences on fertility outcomes, falls 
significantly. There are no significant changes over the female fertility cycle of the 
marginal effect of wives preferences, although the point estimate of the interaction 
effect is still negative.
There are at least two ways to interpret this result. First, later in the fertility 
cycle husbands are less able to exert their preferences than wives because, as we saw 
in table 2ii, husbands typically want more children than their wives. This would 
be true if shocks to fertility were negative so that spouses on average underachieved 
their desires. The results in table 2 suggest the opposite however - spouses tend to 
over achieve relative to their desires.
The second explanation is that with renegotiation, as more children have been 
produced later in the fertility cycle, relative divorce payoffs change. If females obtain 
the majority share of child custody, their relative payoffs in divorce are increasing
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later in the fertility cycle as more children are born. Hence the marginal effect of 
male preferences is weaker, in line with the evidence in column 2 .
The result can only be consistent with some model of bargaining with contractible 
investments, if spouses can make agreements contingent on all future outcomes.
The second approach uses the intuition that divorce payoffs are different when 
investments are contractible, to when they are not. In the former case fertility lev­
els ought to depend upon divorce payoffs at the time of marriage before fertility is 
invested into. Factors correlated to parental wealth, such as the value of inheritance 
and parental education, pick up the value of this payoff.
The result in column 3 shows parental education variables to be insignificant de­
terminants of fertility. Only the value of husband’s inherited land has a significant 
effect, and this may just be picking up wealth effects. Taken together these vari­
ables are not strong determinants of fertility, suggesting payoffs at marriage are not 
determining fertility outcomes, consistent with ex post bargaining between spouses.
The third approach stems from the intuition that if households renegotiate during 
marriage, fertility depends on divorce payoffs after children have been produced. 
These payoffs are proxied by local marriage market characteristics. In particular, 
using census data I control for the proportion of single males in the same census 
district as the household.
The mean age at marriage of women in the sample is 17, and women tend to marry 
slightly older men. Therefore I control for the proportion of single males aged 15-24 
in 1960, the average year of marriage of women in the sample. This is the relevant 
pool of available marriage partners. The average age of women in MFLS-1 is 35, and 
as women marry older men, I also control for the proportion of single males aged 
35-44 in 1974.34 This is the relevant pool of men available for re-marriage. These 
should only be a determinant of fertility outcomes if households renegotiate over the 
fertility cycle.
If these measures are picking up re-marriage possibilities, then given that there 
is no marriage across ethnic groups (Jones (1994)), we ought to find only Malay 
demographics have any effect on fertility in Malay marriages. Hence I also control 
for the same marriage market variables amongst the Chinese. All the measures are 
taken at the census district level, so I drop the district level fixed effects. 3 5
34These variables are constructed from 1970 and 1980 Malaysian census data.
35If there were no variation in these district level variables over time, then they just proxy for
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The result in column 4 shows that - (i) the more competition there is for females 
at the time of marriage, as measured by the proportion of single Malay 15-24 year 
olds, the greater the equilibrium fertility level; (ii) the greater possibilities for re­
marriage to 35-44 Malay males significantly reduces equilibrium fertility levels; (iii) 
the proportions of Chinese males in each age group are not a significant determinant 
of fertility levels in Malay households. In short, local marriage markets influence 
equilibrium fertility outcomes, as would be the case if spouses renegotiate throughout 
the fertility cycle.
The coefficient signs axe consistent with the theory - as there is more competition 
for females in the re-marriage market then females enjoy relatively greater bargain­
ing power in marriage, and thus are able to move fertility outcomes closer to their 
own preferences, which on average, are less than those of males. The fact that the 
characteristics of the local Chinese marriage market are not significant for Malays is 
as expected given the low incidence of inter-ethnic marriage.
However, an alternative explanation for this result is that these local ethnic pop­
ulation shares are correlated to the local political power of demographic groups. If 
Malays are able to lobby more effectively for local public services that affect fertility, 
such as the provision of schools, hospitals or family planning clinics, this creates a 
spurious correlation between these demographic shares and fertility outcomes.
In column 5 I additionally control for the following district level variables - (i) 
the number of family planning clinics per 1 0 0 0  currently married women; (ii) the 
proportion of women aged 15-34 with education greater than primary, and (iii) the 
proportion of women aged 15-34 in the non-agricultural sector. These are correlated 
to the levels of income and female autonomy in the region.
The signs and significance of the coefficients of interest are unchanged from column 
4. Local family planning clinics appear to reduce fertility, rising local female education 
raises fertility, whilst a greater proportion of women engaged in the non-agricultural 
sector reduces fertility levels.
The final method to find evidence of households renegotiating is based on the 
transfers equation. Recall that if (10) holds, which is true if husbands have the
district level fixed effects. I calculated the average change in these variables over the period 1970 
to 1980 and 1980 to 1990 using census information. I find that the average changes across districts 
of these marriage market variables are around 10% from 1970 to 1980 and 9% from 1980 to 1990. 
The fact that the proportions of single males in each category is rising over time is largely due to 
the median age at marriage also rising, and the high degree of geographical mobility in Malaysia.
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majority ex ante bargaining power and wives obtain the majority ex post share of 
child custody, then the sign of 7 , the coefficient on the equilibrium number of children 
in the transfers equation, is informative about the nature of household bargaining. 3 6  
In particular, 7  < 0 would be consistent with investments being contractible, and 
7  > 0  would be consistent with households renegotiating over the fertility cycle.
In table (3) the coefficient on the number of children in wave 2, the equilibrium 
number of children, was positive and significant. As the equilibrium number of chil­
dren rises, transfers rise. This is consistent with households renegotiating over the 
fertility cycle.
2.6.2 Ethnic Effects
Given the theory stresses the role institutional norms play in determining fertility 
outcomes, it is of interest to see if the results for Malay households continue to hold 
for the Chinese, for whom marriage markets operate very differently.
I estimate the fertility equation (12) for the Chinese, controlling for the full set 
of covariates. The result is reported in column 5 of table 3. Only female preferences 
have positive and significant effects for fertility outcomes. This result remains true 
controlling for any subset of the other covariates in this regression.
Unlike for Malays, policies targeted towards altering male preferences will be 
ineffective in changing fertility outcomes in Chinese households. However, the small 
sample size does not allow the rejection of the hypothesis that the marginal effects of 
spousal preferences are equal.
The conclusion that males matter less for fertility outcomes in Chinese than Malay 
households is reinforced if we examine the other coefficients. Wife characteristics such 
as age, age at marriage, and non-earned income affect fertility in the expected direc­
tion. Unlike for Malays, female education has a significant effect (at the 10% level) 
on fertility even after preferences are controlled for. Once preferences are dropped as 
in column 6  of table 3, female education and non-earned income continue to have the 
expected signs and significance.
The striking result is that, unlike for Malays, husbands’ education, non-earned 
income and employment status are not significant determinants of fertility. Chinese
36The implied bargaining share of the husband was one half, so (10) holds if women have the 
majority custodial share.
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men have no influence in fertility outcomes through these observable characteristics. 3 7  
The policy implication is that policies targeted towards Chinese males would have 
limited effects on fertility outcomes.
The result that only female preferences determine fertility is consistent with di­
vorce payoffs being;
V (q , < )  =  6i<t>(q) O 2
Unlike for Malays, preferences still matter in divorce. Earlier this was interpreted as 
capturing the ability of parents to monitor child quality investments in divorce. For 
the Chinese, an alternative interpretation may be appropriate.
It is extremely rare for Chinese marriages to end in divorce (Tan (1988), Jones 
(1994)). Divorce may not be a credible outside option for Chinese spouses. If bar­
gaining over fertility breaks down, the relevant threat point is therefore some non- 
cooperative outcome within marriage (Ulph (1988), Lundberg and Poliak (1993), 
Chen and Woolley (2001)). The divergence term still appears in the outside op­
tion payoff above as both parents continue to contribute to child quality investments 
in marriage, but because of marital conflict, spouses lose part of the returns from 
children, as picked up by the Si parameter above.
The results suggest the social context of marriage markets matters. Whatever 
the threat point in marriage is, not only determines fertility outcomes, but also the 
effectiveness of policies of empowerment.
2.6.3 Gender Preference
One striking feature to emerge out of the descriptive analysis in table 2 is that Malay 
households tend to over invest in fertility relative to what either spouse desires. If 
households bargain subject to renegotiation, they may overinvest in fertility. How­
ever such overinvestment may also be consistent with spouses having strong gender 
preferences. For example, they may continue producing children until at least one 
boy and girl are born. Such “stopping rules” lead to parents overinvesting relative to 
their preferences. 3 8
37Chinese households on average desire fewer children than Malays. However, the level of prefer­
ence heterogeneity is similar. Husbands want 4.30 children, wives want 4.03, which are significantly 
different (the p-value is .0225).
38Suppose both parents desire one boy and one girl, and they decide to continue producing children 
until this is achieved. Given equal probability of a boy or girl being born, the expected number of 
births is 2 . |  +  3 . |  +  4 . |  +  ..., greater than either spouse desired.
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Table 2ii suggests husbands have a preference for boys over girls. To see if this 
drives the results, I define a measure of gender preferences - the ratio of boys desired 
to the total number of desired children for each spouse, denoted for i G {h, w}. I 
then estimate the following specification;
<? =  “ + / 3', f e ) + ^ f e ) + / i X + “
The result in column 1 of table 6 , shows that gender preferences of neither husband 
nor wife determine fertility outcomes. This result is consistent with previous literature 
which also finds little evidence of son preference amongst Malays (Leung (1994).
2.6.4 Endogenous Preferences
At the time preferences are expressed, households have an average of 3.5 children 
and so were already some way into the fertility cycle. This could lead to preferences 
being endogenous if spouses learn the true costs and benefits of children, and update 
their preferences accordingly. In addition, the sample consists of households that 
have been continuously married for at least twelve years. There may be selection bias 
such that some unobservable characteristic drives preferences, fertility outcomes and 
marital stability - for instance, the level of communication between spouses.
If so preferences will be correlated to the error term in the fertility equation (12) 
and the coefficients will be inconsistently estimated. I address this issue using the 
following methods. 3 9
Using information on the additional number of children desired (expressed in wave 
1 ), a,i i G {h,w},  provides an alternative way to estimate the effect of preferences on 
fertility;
AQit — Phah “H "f" Uit (19)
where Aqa = qt — qt-i is the additional number of children born between waves 
1  and 2. Given that the additional number of children desired is a* = 7r* — qt- 1
39 As a preliminary check, I find that earnings significantly reduce both spouses preferences. In 
addition the number of children measured in the household at the same time significantly increases 
husbands reported preferences. Education, non-earned income, and age are not predictors of pref­
erences. For 106 women fertility preferences are also available for the second wave. The majority of 
women revise their preferences downwards. These revisions are significantly related to the number of 
children in the household in MFLS-1, but are unrelated to either spouses education, age, non-earned 
income or years married.
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where tt* is spouse i ’s innate preference, and qt- \  is the number of children in the 
household in wave 1 , any fixed unobservable factor that drives both fertility outcomes 
and preferences is washed out in this specification. The result is given in table 6 .
Column 2 gives the most preferred baseline specification for comparison. Column 
3 controls for each spouses additional number of children wanted. The coefficients /3h 
and Pw remain positive and significant. The null hypothesis that they are equal has 
p-value .5899. Given that the additional number of children born between the two 
waves takes discrete values, I also estimate (19) using an ordered probit. The result 
is in column 4 where the coefficients of interest continue to follow the same pattern.
The second strategy is to instrument for preferences directly. I use the number of 
older brothers at age 1 0  for the husband, and the number of older sisters of the wife 
at age 10 as instruments for fertility preferences. The identifying assumption here 
is that spouses’ birth order within the same gender may be correlated to their own 
preferences, but will not be correlated to any other household unobservable driving 
fertility outcomes. Additional instruments are the gender of the first two children - 
these are valid if gender of child, assumed to be a random outcome, is correlated to 
the total number of desired children say because parents learn the returns by gender 
of child, but has no additional influence on fertility controlling for all other factors. 
The final instrument used is the number of miscarriages caused by shock or accident 
(I do not count miscarriages caused by illness or not wanting the child). Again this 
is a valid instrument if it is a random event correlated to preferences, but has no 
additional influence on fertility outcomes once all other covariates are controlled for. 
Given that I already control for the stage of the fertility cycle the wife is at, this 
ought to have no direct effect on fertility outcomes.
The instrumental variables regression is in column 5. Each spouses preference 
continues to have positive and significant effects on fertility outcomes, and I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effects are equal. The instruments pass 
tests of overidentification, and are significant determinants of preferences in the first 
stage regression.
The final robustness check deals with the possibility that some household unob­
servable drives both marital stability, preferences and outcomes. This is of concern 
as the sample has been restricted to be spousal pairs continuously married between 
the two waves. I estimate a Heckman selection equation to predict the likelihood of 
the spouses remaining married, and then estimate the fertility equation.
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The exclusion restrictions that identify the selection equation axe that the hours 
spent by the wife on various household chores, as a proportion of the total hours 
devoted to those chores in the household, are predictors of marital stability but not 
of fertility outcomes. The chores I use are shopping, cleaning, and hours spent on 
“other” chores (not including shopping, cleaning, child care, food preparation or 
washing). The results axe in column 6 . Again I cannot xeject the hypothesis that 
the sum of spousal preferences drives fertility outcomes. In the selection equation I 
find that marital dissolution becomes significantly more likely as the wife devotes a 
greater share of the total time devoted to these household chores.
To conclude, using a variety of robustness checks, the results together suggest 
the sum of spousal preferences determines fertility outcomes in Malay households. 
Table 6  also shows the coefficients on male and female education throughout. After 
accounting for the possible endogeneity of preferences using these methods, female 
education is always an insignificant determinant of fertility. Male education also 
becomes insignificant after accounting for the potential endogeneity of preferences. 
However after controlling for potential selection biases I do find significant effects 
of both spouses education. Clearly the relationship between education and fertility 
remains an important topic for future research.
2.6.5 M easurem ent Error in Reported Preferences
A second concern for the fertility equation (12) is that preferences may be reported 
with error. This may be for two reasons. First, spouses may alter their reported 
preferences if their partner is present at the time of the interview. Spouses may 
not wish to contradict their partner, or give an appearance of a household in conflict. 
Second, individuals may report some societal norm on the desired number of children, 
rather than their true preference. This report may be at some focal point, such as the 
number of children they actually have at the time of the survey, or some other socially 
accepted level. In both cases, such systematic deviations away from true preferences 
would bias the estimated coefficient of interest, [3.
To deal with the first problem, I use information on whether spouses were present 
at the time of interview. The reported preferences, by others present in the interview, 
are given in table 2iv. There are no significant differences in reports, nor in the 
difference between reports, depending on the presence of others . 4 0
40 Around 80%, of spouses were interviewed alone.
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To deal with the second form of measurement error, table 2iv also reports the 
preferences of each spouse relative to the actual number of children they had in 
MFLS-1, when the preference data was collected. We see that there is no tendency 
to report the desired number as being equal to the contemporaneous number in the 
household. If all households were reporting some fixed social norm there would be 
no variation in reported preferences. This is not the case. Furthermore, given that 
fertility cycles are incomplete in wave 1 , it is reassuring to see that the majority of 
spouses report wanting more children than they actually have at that time.
2.6.6 Sum m ary
The fertility regressions in table 3 lead to the robust conclusion that for Malay house­
holds both spouse’s preferences are equally significant determinants of fertility out­
come. Hence policies targeted towards altering male preferences will be as effective 
as those targeting women. Furthermore female education has no direct effect once 
preferences are controlled for. This may be because female education determines pref­
erences. I used three strategies to deal with this endogeneity bias - the main results 
remain robust to each of these.
The transfer regression results in table 4 confirms that monetary transfers axe 
used by spouses to compensate each other consistent with bargaining over fertility. 
In particular, as the number of children produced diverges from the wife’s preferred 
number, husbands are observed to give larger money transfers to wives. Similarly 
transfers from husbands fall as equilibrium fertility outcomes diverge from their own 
desires.
Further analysis in table 5 suggests households renegotiate over the fertility cycle. 
I find that divorce payoffs at the time of marriage, measured by proxies of parental 
wealth, have no effect on fertility outcomes. However, factors relating to divorce 
payoffs over the course of marriage, proxied by marriage market characteristics, do 
have significant effects on fertility.
These results have been argued to be robust to the potential endogeneity of, and 
measurement error in, reported preferences, as well as potential selectivity bias.
53
2.7 Conclusions
Since Malthus wrote An Essay on the Principle of Population economists have been 
trying to understand the determinants of fertility. Empowering women is one of the 
main channels through which governments are currently seeking to reduce fertility 
rates. This chapter has developed a model of household bargaining to assess the 
validity of these types of policy.
The model of household bargaining presented here makes precise the relationship 
between spousal preferences and fertility outcomes when transfers are possible. The 
theory highlights that the ability for couples to renegotiate agreements is key to 
understanding how conflicts over fertility preferences are resolved within households.
The theory shows that the social context into which policies axe introduced, as 
defined by whether bargains are subject to renegotiation, the level of conflict over 
fertility preferences within households, and whether divorce is socially acceptable, 
are all factors which impinge on the success of empowerment policies. The analysis 
highlights the importance of alternative policies to reduce fertility. These include male 
preferences, the legal framework governing divorce, the allocation of child custody and 
other factors that determine divorce payoffs.
The empirical analysis is unique in that, unlike the existing literature, I use pref­
erence data directly rather than having to infer the presence of conflicting spousal 
preferences from tests of resource pooling. I find that couples do have conflicting 
preferences over fertility, and I empirically identify how these conflicts translate into 
fertility outcomes. 4 1  The model and results both imply that how these conflicts are 
resolved depends on the social context. Identifying precisely which characteristics 
are relevant for fertility outcomes, helps improve the design and implementation of 
population policies.
Understanding household decision making in the way put forward by this chapter, 
sheds light on the precise circumstances when we can expect policies of female em­
powerment to have the desired effects of reducing fertility. The model and empirical 
results reverse much of the received wisdom amongst policy makers on the usefulness 
of such empowerment policies. The chapter gives alternative insights into policies 
that can be expected to reduce fertility, such as those targeted towards men, and
4 inform ation on preferences has been used in economics before, but almost exclusively as a left 
hand side variable. For instance, research into the determinants of happiness and preferences for 
redistribution use this approach.
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those that change the relative outside options of males and females to marriage.
The chapter also gives a theoretical underpinning to a growing body of empirical 
research showing that households make inefficient decisions. The reason suggested 
here for inefficient household outcomes is the inability of spouses to make agreements 
contingent on investments.42 In the context of fertility investments, I have shown 
how such non-contractibilities can lead to over or under investment into fertility.
This chapter thus provides a new framework for thinking about several other 
household decisions. Whenever the actions of individuals in the household cannot 
be contracted upon, we can expect spouses to renegotiate over the allocation of the 
surplus that marriage creates over divorce. In decisions as diverse as effort into 
agricultural production, investments into child quality, insurance against shocks, and 
intergenerational transfers, the framework presented here suggests that the Coase 
theorem will break down, and households will be unable to reach efficient outcomes. 
The broad policy implication in all of these cases is that policies designed to change the 
outside options of spouses will not only affect the behavior of individuals in marriage, 
but can also lead to Pareto improvements. This leads to far greater welfare effects 
than would be predicted using a unitary or collective choice approach to household 
decision making.
Finally, this chapter also gives new insights into demographic transitions. The 
model suggests women over invest into fertility if, by improving their relative divorce 
payoff, this allows them to appropriate a larger share of the surplus that marriage 
creates. I have found evidence that monetary transfers are indeed used for this 
purpose. Changes in societal attitudes, allowing fathers a greater share of child 
custody and visitation rights, have all contributed to reduce the incentives of wives to 
over invest in fertility. Long run changes in the labour market reduce the importance 
of intrahousehold transfers, and thus also contribute to fertility declines. Assessing 
the relative importance of policies relating to the role of fathers in divorce, labour 
markets, and female empowerment in reducing fertility rates, is the subject of future 
research.
42Pollak (1985) first suggested marriage as a contracting problem. This paper formalizes many of 
those intuitions.
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Table 1: Background to Malaysia
(I) General Divorce Rates: 1970 - 1990
(number of divorces per 1000 population aged 15 and over)
Malays in Peninsular 
Malaysia Indonesian Muslims England and Wales United States
1965 7.4 11 1 3.5
1970 6.1 5.2 1.5 4.8
1975 5.6 4.6 3.2 6.3
1980 3.9 2.6 3.8 6.7
1985 2.8 1.5 4 6.3
1990 n/a 1.1 3.7 6
Source: Jones (1994, table 5.8)
(ii) Peninsular Malaysia: Ratio of Malay Divorces (Net of revocations) to Marriages, by State 
(divorces as percentage of marriages)
1 950 -57  1972 -76
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Table 2: Summary Statistics from Malaysia Family Life Survey 
(i) Basic Characteristics (standard errors in parentheses)
Husband Wife Difference Test (p-value)
Age 41.32
(.49)
35.25
(.40)
6.07
(.63)
.0000
Age at marriage
25.67
(.45)
16.51
(3.09)
9.16
(.47)
.0000
Age menstruation started 13.44
(153)
Years of schooling 4.49
(.15)
3.00
(.15)
1.49
(.21)
.0000
Non-eamed income (monthly] 297.80
(67.42)
218.77
(54.07)
79.29
(86.43)
.3608
Employed (yes==1) .96
(01)
.60
(02)
.36
(.02)
.0000
.26
(.44)
Electric supply (yes»°1) .33
(.47)
(ii) P references for Children (95% confidence interval)
Husband(<7>) Wife(?») Difference Test (p-value)
Number of total children wanted
4.97 
(4.72, 5.22)
4.60 
(4.42,4.77)
.37
(16)
.0161
Number of boys wanted 2.48
(2.37,2.63)
2.25 
(2.24,2.43)
.23
(09)
.0114
Number of girls wanted 2.16 
(2.03, 2.26)
2.20 
(2.10, 2.31)
-.03
(09)
.7068
Number of additional children wanted 3.31 
(3.06, 3.57)
3.05
(2.81,3.28)
.27
(.18)
.1280
Number of children in a small family 2.74 
(2.62, 2.86)
2.98 
(2.86, 3.10)
-.243
(09)
.0053
Number of children in a large family 8.29 
(8.03, 8.55)
8.29 
(8.06, 8.53)
-.002
(.18)
.9905
(iii) Dependent Variables (95% confidence interval)
Wave 1 Wave 2 Difference Test (p-value)
Number of children 3.46 
(3.25, 3.67)
6.38
(6.11,6.64)
2.92 
(2.58, 3.25)
.0000
Monetary Variables Measured In wave 1, Malay Households (weekly - standard deviations In parentheses)
Monetary transfer from 
husband to wife
Wife's non earned 
income Wife's earned income
28.27 218.8 148.7
(23.79) (1174.7) (246.4)
(iv) C onsistency Checks on Reported Preferences
(95% confidence intervals in parentheses)
Husband (>r j Wife (O Difference
Alone 4.96
[4.71,5.18]
4.71
[4.52,4.91]
1.74
[1.55,1.93]
Spouse Present 5.04
[4.00,6.08]
4.18
[3.21,5.15]
1.86
[.84,2.87]
(95% confidence intervals in parentheses)
Husband Wife Difference Test (p-value)
Prefer less children than in wave 1 .22 
(.18, .26)
.21 
(18, .25)
.01 
(-.06, .04)
.7526
Prefer same number of children as in wave 1 .10
( 07. .12)
14
(10, .17)
-.04 
(-.002, .08)
.0679
Prefer more children than in wave 1 .68
( 64, .72)
.65 
( 61, .69)
.03 
(-.09, .03)
.3343
Notes: Tests of differences of means and proportions all have two-sided alternative hypothesis. For tests of means I do not impose the 
restriction that the samples have the same variance or are paired. All monetary amounts are measured in 1986 Malaysian Ringgit. 
Samples are those used in the regression analysis.
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iertility Regressions
Variable = Number of Children in Wave 2 
ported in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) - No Preferences (4) - Ordered Probit (5) - Chinese (6) - No Preferences
preferred number of children (TT*) .145 .123 .053 .047
(.009) (.039) (.023) (.724)
rred number of children (7r*) .164 .143 .063 .325
(.014) (.034) (.018) (.006)
.071 .058 .029 .134 .151
(.000) (.002) (.000) (.000) (.000)
iage -.170 -.0138 -.079 -.233 -.255
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
uation started .245 .163 .110 .076 .128
(.005) (.039) (.002) (.301) (.080)
:hooling -.051 -.117 -.015 -.072 -.067
(.390) (.043) (.516) (.097) (.090)
income x 10"4 -.645 .275 -.201 .414 .482
(.421) (.716) (.515) (.039) (.028)
ly (yes=1) -.373 -.594 -.148 -.636 -.909
(.419) (.194) (.400) (.068) (.009)
ply (yes=1) -.307 -.296 -.124 -.180 .095
(.385) (.370) (.370) (.631) (.800)
years of schooling .124 .118 .052 .003 -.030
(.019) (.016) (.011) (.950) (.431)
non-earned income x i(T* 2.97 2.10 1.10 -.498 -.700
(.001) (.020) (.001) (.681) (.398)
nployed (yes=1) 2.52 2.19 1.00 1.06 2.03
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.336) (.149)
id Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
e): P > = P „ .8428 .8523 .8091 .1753
squared .1263 .2392 .1893 .0754 .5949 .5846
472 472 472 472 220 220
fctandard errors are calculated throughout. For OLS regressions, adjusted R-squareds are reported. The pseudo R-squared is reported for the ordered probit regression. Controlling for the value of assets, and property values led to similar
p 's  age, access to credit availability of savings, and the gender composition of the children in wave 1 were insignificant in all specifications.
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Table 4: Monetary Transfer Regressions
Dependent Variable = Monetary Transfers From Husband to Wife in Wave 1 (measured in 1986 Malaysian Ringgit) 
P-values reported in parentheses
(1) (2) - All Covariates (3) - Needs (4) - Needs (5) - Preferences (6)-IV
(Male preference - number children wave 2) squared -.766 -.769 -.791 -.592 -.926
(.032) (.033) (.035) (.094) (.107)
(Female preference - number children wave 2) squared .584 .769 .771 .685 .788
(.004) (.002) (.002) (.011) (.031)
Number of children in wave 2 1.624 2.07 2.35 2.62 1.90
(.115) (103) (.097) (.065) (.781)
Number of children in wave 1 199
(.871)
-.649
(.644)
-.005
(.997)
Husband's preferred number of children (*j) -3.84
Wife's preferred number of children (*'.)
(.147)
-.454
(.852)
Age .515 .545 .464 .506 .392
(.182) (.231) (.256) (.241) (.544)
Age at marriage -1.24 -1.81 -1.13 -1.34 -1.18
(.044) (.001) (.060) (.031) (.539)
Years of schooling -.578 -.431 -.612 -.833 -.357
(.527) (.639) (.500) (.388) (.698)
Non-earned income x HT* .530 5.54 .163 .899 -.099
(.922) (284) (.976) (.862) (.983)
Wife employed (yes°1) -5.04 -3.27 -4.75 -4.49 -5.27
(.286) (.496) (304) (.340) (.309)
Value of household assets x 10~5 .218 .266 224 .273 .462
(.564) (.430) (.559) (.517) (.418)
Husband's years of schooling 3.09 2.54 3.06 2.60 2.52
(.009) (.029) (.010) (.035) (.054)
Husband's non-earned income x HT* -12.99 -.14.84 -11.82 -14.52 -11.36
(.092) (.089) (140) (.078) (.267)
Husband employed (yes=1) -4.16 -4.43 -3.62 -4.65 -5.28
(.584) (.716) (.640) (.527) (.748)
Husband's employment income x KT* 14.4 19.9 13.4 13.7 14.6
(.557) (.411) (.579) (582) (•572)
Test (p-value): A, +  A„ =  0 4600 .9981 .9294 .6923 .8467
Implied theta .4325
1.3790,4861]
.4998 
(.4553, .5444]
.4937
[4490,5384]
.5366 
[.4816,.5917]
.4595 
[3042, .6149]
Wald test for functional form (p-value) .5952
R-squared .0960 .2926 .2095 .2943 .3160 .2929
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88
Notes: Robust standard struts calculated throughout, allowing lor clustering across sampling districts. Additional variables controlled tot Indude whether the household has electricity, and whether It has a  direct water supply. Similar results are obtained It the number ot children per adult in the household is controlled tor 
instead ot household size Confidence Intervals tor the implied theta parameter are calculated using the delta method The overidendficatlon test is based on a Lagrange mutOpter test formed by regressing the Instrumental-variables residuals on the tun Instrument matrix The joint null hypothesis is that the equation is property 
specified and the instruments are valid instruments (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term). The test statistic, under the null, is distributed Chi-squared(m), where m is the number of overidentifying restrictions See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p 236). In column (6) the p-value for the overidentification test is .9343, and the p- 
value for the test of undendentification of the instruments in the first stage regression is .0145.
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Table 5: Renegotiation
Dependent Variable = Number of Children in Wave 2 
P-values reported in parentheses
(1) - Restricted (2) - Fertility Cycle (3) • Divorce Payoff at Marriage (4) - Marriage Market (5) - Marriage Marfcet
Total preferred number of children Or,’ + / r j .131
( .000)
.316
(.002)
.112
(.005)
.113
( 001)
.107
(.002)
Husband's preferred number of children (n ,) 
x (age - age menstruation started)
Wife's preferred number of children (*’) 
x (age - age menstruation started)
-.009
(.044)
-.006
(•176)
Husband's father's education 
Mother's father's education 
Husbands inherited value of land x 10"4 
Husband's inherited value of gifts x 10-4
.016
(.843)
-.040
(.557)
.162
(.032)
.167
(.143)
Malay males single aged 15-24 .254 .334
(.004) (.000)
Malay males single aged 35-44 -.333 -.285
(.074) (.108)
Chinese males single aged 15-24 .173 .196
(.410) (.341)
Chinese males single aged 35-44 -.070 .073
(.309) (.403)
Family planning clinics per 1000 currently -.649
married women (.015)
Proportion of women aged 15-34 with education .350
greater than primary (.074)
Proportion of women aged 15-34 in non- -.656
agricultural sector (.004)
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Adjusted R-squared .2410 .2439 .2468 .1926 .2112
Observations 472 472 337 472 472
Notes: Alternative measures of life cycle effects, such as the number of years married led to similar results as in column 2. In column 3, inheritance can take the form of land, a house, farm equipment, 
business, or money from either parent. The district level variables are derived from the 1970 and 1980 Malaysia census. There are 70 such districts in Peninsular Malaysia, covering a population of 12 
million individuals - 36 of these districts are in the sample above.
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Table 6: Endogenous Preferences
Dependent Variable = Number of Children In Wave 2 (columns 1,2,4,5)
Dependent Variable ■ Number of Children Born Between Waves 1 and 2 (column 3) 
P-values reported In parentheses
(1) - Gender Preference (2) - Baseline (3) - Additional (OLS) (4) - Additional (Oprobit) (5) - IV (6) - Selection
Husband's gender preference (£) 
Wife's gender preference (ir)
-.993
(.194)
.589
(.467)
Husband's preferred number of children (??») .123 .501 .109
(.039) (.110) (.040)
Wife's preferred number of children (k ’w ) .143 .923 .136
(.034) (.096) (.023)
H usband's additional children wanted .122 .068
(.043) (.069)
Wife's additional children wanted .184 .113
(.024) (.023)
Years of schooling -.051 .007 .014 .032 -.096
(.390) (.896) (.645) (.742) (.098)
H usband's years of schooling .124 .001 .012 .090 .099
(.019) (.977) (.664) (.191) (.062)
Test (p-value): 0, = p. .8523 .5899 .5227 .4868 .7698
Over-identification: (p-value) .7803
Augmented Hausman test: (p-value) .1679
Observations 453 472 177 177 415 574
First Stage Regressions for IV Estimation First Stage Selection 
in Column 5 Equation in Column (6)
Husband s preferred P. . Probability remain,  . number of '  .number of children . . . .  married
Husband's older brothers at age 10 .192 .019
(.067) (.838)
Wife's older sisters at age 10 .112 .177
(.342) (.032)
Gender of first child (boy * 1) .106 .259
(.068) (.209)
Gender of second child (boy >1 ) .265 .079
(.289) (.692)
Number of miscarriages caused by accident or shocks -.832 .267
(.000) (,14Rt
Under-identification: (p-value) .0027 .0969
Adjusted R-squared .1710 .1900
Observations 415 415 574
Notes: The augmented Hausman test for the validity of the instruments test whether the residuals from the first stage regressi 
in the second stage regression. Under the null hypothesis, these residuals are not significant in the second stage regression.'on are significant
3 Making Divorce Easier: The Effect on Children
In 1970, 42% of families consisted of an employed father, a homemaker mother and 
children. The figure today is less than 20%. In addition, those marriages that do form 
have become less likely to endure, to the extent that half of all recent marriages can 
be expected to dissolve sometime in the future, and one million children are involved 
in divorce each year.43
The increased instability of marriage has been associated with a host of economic, 
legal and sociological factors that have contributed to reducing the cost of exiting 
marriage. These include increased participation of women in the labor force, greater 
financial independence of women, welfare payments to single parents, the reduction in 
social stigma towards divorcees, the rise in women’s rights, and divorce law changes 
such as the introduction of no-fault divorce.
This chapter studies the relationship between the costs of divorce and parental 
behavior towards their children. I present a model in which married parents make 
three decisions - (i) how much to each invest into child quality, a household public 
good; (ii) whether to divorce or remain married; (iii) how to allocate physical child 
custody if the couple were to divorce.
The chapter makes precise the relationship between the costs of divorce and two 
child related outcomes - investments into child quality during marriage, and the 
allocation of physical custody in divorce. I show that making divorce easier is not 
necessarily bad for children. This is because when divorce costs are lower, parents 
own investments into marital specific capital have a stronger impact on keeping the 
marriage intact. Hence parents increase their investments into child quality. This 
effect, which applies to the stock of all intact marriages, may offset the detrimental 
effects of lower divorce costs causing an increase in the flow of marginal marriages 
into divorce.
The chapter also shows that when divorce is easier couples are more likely to 
share custody ex post. As children then maintain contact with both parents in di­
vorce, children may be better off with lower divorce costs even conditional on divorce 
occurring.
Understanding the determinants of parental investments is important because
43In 1994 37% of children in single parent households were living with divorced parents, 36% were 
living with a never married parent, and the remainder lived with a separated parent (US Census 
Bureau (1996)). In the US, the divorce rate more than doubled between 1965 and 1980.
62
as recent research suggests, these not only affect the emotional well-being of children 
when young, but are correlated with schooling outcomes that at least partly determine 
early labor market opportunities and welfare across the life cycle. Understanding the 
determination of child custody is equally important. The living arrangements of 
children in divorce, and contact time with each parent, are determinants of the long 
run material and emotional well-being of children.44
The chapter also provides insights into why lower costs of divorce do not nec­
essarily imply a higher probability of divorce; the interaction between divorce costs, 
gender roles and children’s outcomes; the different incentives to invest into child qual­
ity that married couples have vis-a-vis cohabiting couples; and a rationale for why 
there has been a move away from the legal presumption of maternal custody, towards 
the allocation of custodial rights “in the child’s best interests” ,45
The same framework is utilized to examine the effects of family policy on children 
in intact families. In particular I make precise how child support, welfare payments, 
and legal custodial rights, affect investments into child quality and the allocation of 
physical custody.46
The framework makes two key assumptions. First, spouses are unable to specify 
investments into child quality ex ante, as part of the marital contract. This is because 
such investments are non-verifiable and non-describable to third parties outside of the 
household. If spouses were to make agreements contingent on child quality invest­
ments, at any stage of marriage either spouse could hold-up the other, claiming they 
had not made the agreed-to investment. As no third party can verify whether each 
parent has undertaken the agreed-to investments, there remains scope for spouses to 
renegotiate over the division of the marital surplus even after investments are made.
44Danziger and Waldfogel (2000) summarize recent literature showing the beneficial benefits of 
parental investments, particularly in young children, over the life cycle. On the second point, note 
that throughout the last decade female headed households with children were five times as likely 
to be living in poverty than intact households (US Census Bureau (1998)). Del Boca and Ribero 
(1998) provide evidence that non-residential parents with joint custody are more likely to voluntarily 
transfer resources to children.
45 The presumption that the interests of young children were best served when the mother had 
sole custody was abolished or demoted in nearly all states between 1960 and 1980.
46Joint custody is defined to include - (i) joint legal custody where both parents retain joint 
responsibility for the care and control of the child and joint authority to make decisions concerning 
the child even though the child’s primary residence may be only with one parent; (ii) joint physical 
custody where both parents share physical and custodial care of the child; (iii) any combination of 
joint legal and joint physical custody which the court deems to be in the best interests of the child. 
I deal first with physical custody, and then in section 3 consider the effects of legal custody.
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Second, the framework explicitly recognizes the instability of marriage so that 
divorce occurs with positive probability. The probability of divorce is partly ex­
ogenously determined by a random realization of marriage quality.47 It is also partly 
endogenously determined by parental investments themselves. Since the benefits from 
child quality are marriage specific, the gains from marriage increase in investments. 
This reduces the probability of divorce.
The first main result is that reducing the cost of exiting marriage and thereby 
making divorce easier, can be better for children in that parents invest more into 
child quality during marriage. This follows from the fact that the probability of the 
marriage remaining intact is partly endogenously determined by spousal investments 
into child quality. Hence one reason why spouses want to invest into child quality is to 
increase the likelihood of the marriage remaining intact. This incentive is maximized 
when divorce costs are low so the likelihood of the marriage surviving is largely 
determined by parent’s own investments into child quality.
The result that reducing the costs of exiting marriage is not necessarily bad for 
children is contrary to much popular opinion. The no-fault divorce revolution that 
swept across the US in the 1970s is largely credited with reducing the barriers to 
exiting marriage, increasing marital instability, and reducing investments into chil­
dren. Indeed, there has been a gradual tendency for state legislatures to reverse the 
no-fault revolution and make divorce more costly. The analysis here shows that it is 
not necessarily the case that making divorce easier is bad for children. There are ac­
tually two effects present - (i) marginal marriages break up with lower costs of exiting 
marriage, and this may have detrimental effects on children’s welfare; (ii) investments 
into child quality made during marriage rise. This latter effect, which applies to the 
stock of all marriages, may dominate the former effect which applies to the flow of 
marriages into divorce.
This result helps explain why establishing the empirical relation between divorce 
costs and the incidence of divorce has proved so difficult. Reduced costs of divorce, 
such as the introduction of no-fault divorce, will all else equal, increase the probability 
of divorce. However as this chapter makes clear, lower divorce costs increase invest­
ments into marital specific capital such as child quality, reducing the probability of 
divorce.
47Similar to Becker et aVs (1977) seminal work on marital instability, divorce is thus an optimal 
response to new information received during marriage.
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The second main result is on the optimal allocation of rights over physical custody 
of children in divorce. There are opposing effects on investment incentives of having 
more own custodial rights. On the one hand, because child quality is a public good, 
spouses prefer the parent that values child quality the most to have ex post child 
custody. This gives the high valuation parent the greatest incentives to invest in 
marriage, leaving both parents better off. On the other hand, as divorce occurs 
with positive probability, both parents prefer to have more own custody to maximize 
their returns to investment should the couple divorce. These sources of investment 
incentive are traded-off to give the optimal allocation of physical child custody.
For couples with relatively homogeneous preferences, joint custody will be optimal 
with the high valuation spouse having the majority share. Couples with relatively 
heterogeneous preferences prefer the high valuation parent to have sole custody.
The ex post efficient allocation of custody, giving sole custody to the high valu­
ation parent, only maximizes ex ante investment incentives if the degree of spousal 
preference heterogeneity is sufficiently strong.
Joint custody is more likely to be optimal when the costs of exiting marriage 
are low. Hence as divorce becomes easier, children in dissolved marriages are more 
likely to maintain contact with both parents. This is recognized to generally improve 
children’s welfare in divorce (Beller and Graham (1993), Del Boca and Ribero (1998)).
I also show that if a spouse is more specialized in household production, the effects 
on investment and custody are similar to the spouse having a greater valuation of 
child quality relative to their partner. Hence as women have devoted more labor to 
the market rather than within the home, the traditional comparative advantage of 
women in household production has been eroded. This leads to a greater incidence 
of joint custody.
The model thus provides a rationale for why the incidence of joint custody has 
risen as divorce has become easier and female labor force participation has risen.
Related Literature
By applying contract theory to the household, this chapter shows how insights in 
the literature on asset ownership, interpreted here as child custody, sheds light on 
household behavior.
Economists have sought to understand the impact on individual welfare as house­
holds break-up (Smock (1993)), and the efficacy of divorce policies to maintain the 
welfare of divorcees and their children. These issues are of concern because children
65
from divorced families do worse than children in intact families in a diverse range of 
welfare outcomes (Amato and Keith (1991)). Similarly, empirical evidence suggests 
the welfare of adults is also higher in marriage than divorce. Married individuals 
are typically found to have better health, higher wages, be more attached to the 
labor market, and accumulate more wealth than divorcees or cohabitees (Waite and 
Gallagher (2000)).48
By considering household behavior in a framework of marital contracting, this 
chapter is amongst the first to provide a theoretical underpinning to how parents 
allocate custody, and the relation of ex post custodial rights to ex ante incentives to 
invest in child quality during marriage.49
Furthermore, the framework provides a natural way of thinking through the effects 
of family policy and a range of socioeconomic and legal factors that have contributed 
to making divorce easier over time. This chapter thus builds on related empirical work 
examining the effects on behavior within intact families of policies such as divorce laws 
(Gray (1998), Flinn (2000), Stevenson and Wolfers (2000), Chiappori et al (2001)), 
and welfare payments (Del Boca and Flinn (1994), Lundberg et al (1997), Rabaclava 
and Thomas (2000)).
This chapter also relates to the literature on asset ownership in firms (Grossman 
and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990) (henceforth GHM)). In the standard 
GHM environment ownership improves an investors bargaining power within the re­
lationship, and it is generally optimal for one investor to have sole ownership based 
on some technological advantage over the other investor. Extensions to this frame­
work show joint ownership can be optimal when some part of investment is embodied 
in physical assets rather than human capital (Hart (1995)), dynamic concerns such 
as reputation (Halonen (2002)), alternative bargaining rules such as outside options 
bargaining (de Meza and Lockwood (1998)), and if ownership induces greater spe­
cialization (Rajan and Zingales (1998)).
48It is not easy to identify the causal effect of divorce on children’s welfare because the relevant 
counterfactual is that parents stay together in an unhappy marriage. Absent exogenous factors that 
cause divorce but not child quality, very little of this literature is able to disentangle the effect of 
divorce on child quality from the effect of marital conflicts that causes parents to divorce in the first 
place.
49Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973) first introduced the notion of child quality when 
studying the trade-off between the quantity and quality of children. Child quality has become 
of independent interest in economics, where it is typically interpreted as the psychological and 
emotional well-being of children. The return on investment into child quality is interpreted as the 
formation of a lasting emotional bond between parent and child.
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Besley and Ghatak (2001) extend the GHM framework to when investments are 
made into a public good. They show the public good is optimally owned by whichever 
party values the public good the most. Hence allocating property rights ex post 
efficiently maximizes ex ante investment incentives, so joint ownership is generally 
suboptimal.
This chapter extends their model to allow investors to endogenously choose from 
a continuum of ex post ownership structures, and by allowing the relationship to 
break down endogenously.50 I show joint custody is always optimal for some couples 
if the marriage breaks down with positive probability. Typically this leads to the 
spouse with the higher valuation of child quality having the majority custodial share 
in divorce.
In keeping with earlier literature, I find that when investments into child quality 
cannot be specified ex ante as part of the marital contract, investments are below 
the surplus maximizing level. This is in contrast to unitary (Becker (1991) and 
cooperative bargaining models (McElroy and Horney (1981)) of the household, which 
assume household decisions to be Pareto efficient.51
The chapter is organized as follows. In section two I present the model and solve 
for the Nash equilibrium investment levels, the optimal allocation of custodial rights, 
and show how these change with divorce costs. Section three considers the effects of 
various family policies on investment and custodial rights. Section four concludes. 
All proofs are in the appendix.
3.1 The M odel
3.1.1 Set-up
The household comprises a married husband (h) and wife (w) with at least one child. 
Spouse i decides how much to invest into child quality, denoted g* > 0. Spouses derive 
benefits from - (i) child quality; (ii) the private gains from marriage. Child quality is
50Rainer (2002) extends the Besley and Ghatak (2001) framework in a different direction. He 
considers the effects of rules on the division of property in divorce, on investments into marital 
specific assets. He assumes these investments are non-contractible, but does not allow for divorce 
to occur in equilibrium.
51Peters (1986), Lundberg and Poliak (2001), and Murphy (200) also present models of house­
hold behavior in which there are limits on marital contracting that result in inefificent household 
outcomes.
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assumed to be a public good so the payoff to spouse i in marriage is;
= "i + 6iu (q) (!)
where Vi is the private gain from marriage, q = (qh, qw) is the vector of parental 
investments into child quality, u(q) are the benefits in marriage of making these 
investments, and &i > 0 is spouse z’s observable valuation of the benefits from child 
quality.
The private benefits, or “happiness”, of marriage, z/i, are randomly drawn from a 
known distribution.52 These are unknown to either spouse at the time of marriage, 
but are observed during marriage.
The divorce payoff to spouse i is;
U,D(q) = m  (?) (2)
In common with the earlier literature on the economic analysis of divorce (Weiss 
and Willis (1985)), child quality remains a public good in divorce so that each parent 
enjoys this level of benefit even if the children do not reside with them. The benefits 
from child quality in divorce are less than those in marriage if investments into child 
quality are partly embodied in the human capital of the other parent, and thus cannot
be appropriated in divorce. Hence I take it as given that u(q) > u(q) so investments
into child quality are marriage specific.53 In keeping with the empirical literature 
cited in the previous section, other things equal, individuals are better off within 
marriage than divorce.
If spouses divorce, some allocation of physical custodial rights over the children is 
enacted. Each parent’s share of physical custody can be thought of as the proportion 
of the child’s time endowment spent with them in divorce. A fraction of custody, 
Ah, goes to the husband, and Xw to the wife such that A^  +  A  ^ =  1. This covers 
arrangements of both sole physical custody to one parent, and joint physical custody 
where children spend some time with both parents.
The marginal benefit to each spouse’s investment made during marriage depends
52The happiness of marriage can also be thought of as marriage quality. I use the term happiness 
to keep clear the distinction between the quality of marriage and the quality of children.
53Becker (1991, page 329) cites children as the prime example of marital specific capital. However, 
in contrast to other forms of marital specific capital, property rights over children still have to be 
allocated in divorce.
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on their custodial rights. This return to investment is interpreted as the formation 
of a lasting emotional bond between parent and child.
I make the following assumptions on the returns to investment;
A l. > 0 for all qj
A2- &  ( ^ )  > 0
Al says the returns to own investments are higher within marriage than divorce 
so, other things equal, spouses prefer the marriage to remain intact. A2 says the 
marginal returns to own investment are higher in divorce if the parent has greater 
custody of the child. This is because with a greater share of physical custody, each 
parent is better able to form a lasting emotional bond with their children. This is 
the channel through which the allocation of custody affects investments in marriage.
I assume the benefits from child quality in marriage, u(q), are concave, continuous 
and twice differentiable in each investment, with bounded from above for all
> 0, |um(<?)| > \uji{q)\ for i ^  j .  The same assumptions are made on the 
benefits from child quality in divorce, u(q).
While spousal investments in marriage are observable to both parents, I assume 
they cannot be specified ex ante as part of the marriage contract at the start of 
marriage. This is because they cannot be verified by third parties. If spouses were 
to make agreements contingent on child quality investments, then at any stage of 
marriage either spouse could hold-up the other, claiming they had not made the 
agreed-to investment. No third party can verify whether each parent has undertaken 
the agreed-to investments, even if total child quality is observable to third parties.54
Hence after investments are made, there remains scope for renegotiation over the 
division of the marital surplus. When renegotiation takes place there is symmetric 
information across spouses because at that stage of marriage, spouses know their
54 Courts are reluctant to intervene with respect to parental conduct towards children during 
marriage (with the obvious exception of abusive behavior). This includes decisions that have direct 
consequences for child welfare, such as the allocation of financial resources within the household or 
where children go to school. This suggests parents are unable to write legally enforceable agreements 
contingent upon actions within marriage even if actions within marriage are verifiable. In cases 
where spouses have written explicit marital contracts, courts have still been reluctant to enforce 
them (Rasmusen-Stake (1998)). This raises the interesting issue of why an increasing number of 
couples are observed making such contracts, an issue I return to in the conclusion.
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own, and their partners, private benefits from marriage, as well as the investments 
each has made into child quality.
I assume the allocation of child custody is contractible between spouses at the 
start of marriage. I do this for two reasons. First, suppose spouses were to ex post 
bargain over custody, so custodial allocations do not form part of the marital contract. 
Given child quality is a public good, the surplus maximizing outcome would be for 
the high valuation parent to have sole custody. As both parents know custody goes ex 
post to the high valuation parent, this affects investments during marriage. However 
this is just a special case of the framework set out below.55
Second, this assumption helps focus on the first order contracting problem in mar­
riage, that actions taken within marriage cannot be specified ex ante. In contrast, 
custodial arrangements can be written as part of the marital contract. Indeed, courts 
of law and government agencies are observed devoting resources towards the enforce­
ment of spousal agreements over custody.56 In this framework, the role of the legal 
system is to determine the set of feasible custodial allocations, but parents themselves 
endogenously choose the allocation of custody implemented.
The timing of actions is as follows;
1. at the start of marriage, the married couple decide upon a verifiable allocation 
of custodial rights should they divorce.
2. each parent makes a non-verifiable investment into child quality.
3. the happiness of marriage to both parents is observed, and spouses decide 
whether to remain married or to divorce.
4. if they remain married, spouses bargain over the surplus created by marriage 
over divorce. If they divorce, each spouse pays their share of the divorce cost and the 
child custody arrangement is enacted.
55 One way to empirically distinguish whether custodial arrangements form part of the marital 
contract, or whether they are bargained over ex post, is to see if custody depends on divorce costs. 
With ex post bargaining, custodial allocations ought not to depend on the sunk costs of exiting 
marriage.
56In an overview of divorce law practice, Mnookin-Kornhauser (1979) argue the role of courts has 
been to provide, “a framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their post­
dissolution rights and responsibilities” . If courts were not just to rubber stamp parental agreements 
over custody, there may be strategic incentives for parents to manipulate investments during mar­
riage. Spouses could also engage in post marital behavior that influence court rulings over custody, 
for example if one spouse threatened to relocate. I focus on behaviour within marriage in this paper, 
and will not consider such actions outside of marriage.
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All payoffs are received in stage 4. I assume investments are made before the 
happiness from marriage is realized. For the results to still hold in a setting in which 
investments were made over a number of periods, there needs to be at least one period 
in which investments are made before the private benefits of marriage are realized. 
This model better captures the investment incentives of those early in marriage, where 
divorce is more likely and investments still have to be undertaken. Arguably, it is 
investments into young children that have the most permanent effects on welfare.57
In this framework individuals once divorced do not remarry. Allowing for remar­
riage would further reduce investment incentives of married couples if child quality 
across marriages is partially substitutable.
3.1.2 Stages 3 and 4: D ivorce and M arital Bargaining
Couples divorce if and only if it is efficient to do so. In other words the costs of 
divorce, c, are smaller than the gain from divorcing;
c < U?(q) + UZ(q) -  U?(q) -  U*(q) (3)
By the Coase theorem, when spouses can bargain at little or no cost, the allocation 
of property rights has no effect on divorce outcomes, only on the intrahousehold 
allocation of resources. Hence this divorce rule holds irrespective of whether there 
are mutual consent or unilateral divorce laws in place.
However divorce laws do affect the cost of divorce. For example, the introduction 
of no-fault divorce laws reduced divorce costs because they reduced the proof re­
quired to instigate a divorce, and courts cannot impose financial penalties on at-fault 
spouses. By reducing the costs of exiting marriage, no-fault divorce laws have been 
widely perceived as increasing marital instability. This framework makes precise the 
relationship between divorce costs and investment incentives within marriage, and 
the allocation of custody.
Rearranging (3), spouses remain married if the happiness of marriage is such that;
<l>=(vh + vw) > - c -  (eh +  ew) A (q) (4)
where A (q) =  u(q) — u(q) are the (positive) gains from marriage. Hence some couples
57Recent advances in neurology show the first three to five years of brain development are crucial 
for cognitive and socio-emotional development (Shore (1997)).
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can remain in a “unhappy” marriage in that the only reason they stay together is 
either because the costs of exiting the marriage axe prohibitively high, or because they 
have made large investments into marriage specific capital such as child quality.58
The total happiness in marriage, 0 =  Uh +  isw, is distributed according to a 
probability distribution <?(0), with associated cumulative density function G{4>) and 
support [0,0].
The probability of divorce is therefore;
G ( ^ )  = G ( - c - ( e h + ew) A ( q))
where 0* is the value of happiness in the marginal marriage. The probability of 
divorce depends on parental preferences (#;), and divorce costs (c). Couples are more 
likely to remain married if they value child quality more, or divorce costs axe high.
The probability of divorce is also partly endogenously determined through invest­
ments in child quality (A (q)). As investment increases, because the benefits from 
child quality are marriage specific, the gains from being married increase and so the 
probability of divorce falls.
Consistent with the idea that marital specific investments reduce the likelihood 
of divorce, marital dissolution is less likely if children (especially young children) are 
present in the household, or marital duration increases (Becker et al (1977), Lillard 
and Waite (1991)), or the couple have more property (Weiss and Willis (1997)).
Suppose the marriage has remained intact after the happiness from marriage has 
been realized. As investments cannot be ex ante specified as part of the marital 
contract, the couple renegotiate over the division of the marital surplus. Husband 
and wife can foresee such renegotiation when they make their investments. I make the 
simplifying assumption that spouses split divorce costs and the gains from marriage 
equally, and the marginal cost of investing into child quality, p , is constant and finite.
Hence the ex ante payoff to spouse i before investments are undertaken is;
c 1
VM) = {0&(q) -  g) + 2E(gains fr°m marriaS<# > $*) ~ PQ* (5)
The first term is the divorce payoff, the second term is each spouse’s share of the 
expected gains from marriage conditional on the marriage surviving, and the final
58The results are robust to 0 being correlated with investments. The model as presented keeps 
clear the distinction between exogenous and endogenous sources of divorce.
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term is the total cost of making the investment.59
Substituting the expected gains from marriage conditional on the marriage sur­
viving into (5);
Vi(q) =  (6Mq)  ~ \ )  +  \  W )  +  (1 -  G(<P)) ((eh +  6W) A  (q) +  c)] -  p 9i (6 )
where h{4>*) = 1S the expected value of happiness conditional on the marriage
surviving or the hazard rate for the happiness in marriage, and;
S  = {Oh 4- 9W) A (q) +  c
is what I refer to as the marriage surplus.60 Writing ex ante payoffs as in (6) decom­
poses the expected gains from marriage conditional on the marriage surviving into 
two parts - (i) the expected happiness from marriage conditional on the marriage 
surviving; (ii) the expected surplus in marriage if the marriage survives.61
In order ensure there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in spousal 
investments, more structure needs to be imposed on the distribution of happiness
59 As payoffs are quasi-linear in the happiness from marriage, the expected marital surplus depends 
on the total happiness from marriage. If individual realizations of happiness (vh, v w) are correlated, 
this is taken account of in their joint distribution, (f>.
60 An underlying model of household bargaining consistent with this is where spouses ex post Nash 
bargain with transfers over the marriage surplus. Define the transfer t to be positive if it is from 
husband to wife;
t* =  arg max [Uf? (q) -  z -  U ?  (g)] [U™ (q) +  z -  U% (g)]
Z
=  \  iuh - V w  +  {Qh -  Qw) A (q)]
The wife’s ex ante payoff is;
v w{q) =  j  K >{q) + 1*} 9(<t>)d<P +  [Owu(q) - 1] G(<f>*) - pqw
The first term is her expected payoff in marriage, conditional on the marriage surviving. The second 
term is her expected payoff in divorce. As the payoff in marriage is additive in the happiness of 
marriage, the wife’s ex ante maximization problem simplifies to;
max^ [h(4>*) +  {0h +  0W) u(q) +  [6W -  6h)u{q)\ [1 -  G(0*)] +  \owu(q) -  G{(f>*) -  pqw
Rearranging gives (6).
61 If divorce costs become arbitrarily large, the probability of divorce and the expected happiness 
in marriage conditional on the marriage surviving, tend towards zero. Hence the wife’s ex ante
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in marriage. In particular, if the expected gains from marriage conditional on the 
marriage surviving are concave in the marriage surplus, then each spouses ex ante 
payoff is concave in their own investment. The following assumptions are sufficient 
to guarantee this;
A3, (f) is log-concavely distributed
A4. > 0
A5. 1 -  G(<f?) > h 'W )
A6. p < -  }1^ — I s'(<£)
Assumptions A3 to A5 ensure the expected gains from marriage surplus increase in 
the actual marriage surplus. Log concavity implies the hazard rate is non-decreasing 
and the distribution of happiness in marriage is unimodal. A4 says that the marginal 
marriage is less likely to break up if spouses invest into child quality.
To understand the intuition behind A5, note from (4), marriages remain intact 
either because the happiness from marriage, or investments into child quality, are high. 
Hence the expected happiness in marriage conditional on the marriage remaining 
intact, declines in investments because happiness in marriage and the benefits from 
child quality are substitutable reasons why the marriage remains intact. Assumption 
A5 places an upper bound on how quickly the expected happiness from marriage 
declines in investment, so that these disincentive effects do not dominate.
A6 ensures that the expected gains from marriage increase are concave in the 
marriage surplus. As the happiness in the marginal marriage is minus the marriage 
surplus (</>* =  —S) this condition requires this surplus to be sufficiently high.
Assumptions A4 to A6 relate to the happiness in the marginal marriage. This is 
because the payoff in any marriage is expressed as a function of the happiness in the 
marginal marriage, as seen in (5) above.
payoff reduces to;
Vw(q) =  (Owu ( q ) - ^ )  +  ^( l -G(<j )* )) ({eh +  ew) A ( q )  +  c ) - p q w 
=  ^[ {dh +  dw)u(q) +  (6w - 6 h) u ( q ) ] - p q w
The model is then identical to Besley and Ghatak (2001).
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P roposition  1: I f  A3-A6 hold, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equi­
librium in spousal investments. Spouses always underinvest relative to a first best 
world in which - (i) spouses can specify investments during marriage as part of the 
marital contract; (ii) there is no uncertainty over the stability of marriage.
Assumptions A3 to A6 ensure the expected gains from marriage are concave in 
the marital surplus. This is sufficient to ensure that there exists some marginal 
investment cost, p, at which positive investments axe made in equilibrium.
Spouses underinvest relative to a first best world because they cannot appropriate 
all of the return on their own investment. As spouses renegotiate ex post over the 
marriage surplus, each receives half of the return to their own investment. The 
returns on own investment are further reduced because divorce occurs with positive 
probability which reduces the expected surplus to be bargained over.
3.1.3 Stage 2: C hild Q uality
I focus on the wife’s investment choice to keep the exposition clear. The first order 
condition for the wife’s investment is;
dVw _  . du(q) 1 dE(surplus|<ft > (f>*) OS _  (
dqw w dqw 2 8S dqw P
where S  = (Oh +  6W) A (q) +  c, is the marriage surplus. This can be rewritten as; 
dVw du(q) 1 OS 1 , dS I DS
There are thus four sources of incentives to invest. First there are the returns on 
this investment in divorce captured in the first term above. Second, by investing the 
wife increases the surplus available to be bargained over if spouses remain married. 
Third, as investments and happiness in marriage are alternative reasons why the mar­
riage remains intact, investing lowers the expected happiness of marriage conditional 
on the marriage remaining intact. This acts as a disincentive to invest.
Finally, by investing the wife increases the probability that the marriage remains 
intact. This last effect is the “endogenous divorce” effect. By investing, the wife 
increases the likelihood the marriage remains intact.
An implication is that both the absolute gains and marginal benefits of investing, 
determine investment incentives. Policies that affect either the marginal returns
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to investment, or the level of payoffs in marriage and divorce, affect equilibrium 
investments into child quality. Such policies are considered in section three.62
Investm ent and  Divorce Costs
The costs of exiting marriage have been falling steadily over the past thirty years. 
The effect of lower costs of divorce is to increase investment incentives during mar­
riage;
d f  dVw(q)\ _  1 <92E (surplus |0 > 0*) dS OS 
dc \  dqw )  2 dS2 dc dqw <
To see the intuition for this, note that there are two separate margins along which 
divorce costs and investments interact. On the one hand higher divorce costs make 
the marriage more stable and this increases investment incentives.
On the other hand as the probability of divorce is G(—c — (Oh +  9W) A (q)), with 
high divorce costs, individual investment choices have less influence, relative to the
divorce cost, on the probability the marriage remains intact. Through this endogenous
divorce effect, spouse have lower incentives to invest when divorce costs are high.
This latter effect dominates under assumptions A3-A6. In short, divorce costs have 
the greater affect on investment incentives along the margin of keeping the marriage 
intact, rather than marital stability per se. As divorce costs fall incrementally, by 
marginally increasing investment, the marginal gain from remaining married rather 
than divorcing, dominates the marginal loss from investing within a more unstable 
marriage.
The model captures the intuition that when divorce costs are high, the couple is 
effectively locked into marriage irrespective of their own actions. Hence they have 
less incentives to make marriage specific investments into child quality.
P roposition  2: Investments made during marriage into child quality increase as 
the costs of exiting marriage fall.
Key to this result is that divorce occurs endogenously. If divorce occurred for ex­
ogenous reasons, then as divorce costs rise marriage becomes more stable irrespective 
of spouse’s own actions. As investment returns are higher in marriage than divorce, 
equilibrium investment always rises. This captures the traditional notion that making
62The returns to each spouse’s investment depends on both spouse’s valuations. Hence one spouse 
does not completely free-ride on the others investment even if they themselves do not value child 
quality. This is in contrast to standard models of the private provision of public goods. Free 
riding does not occur here because of ex post bargaining that arises from the non-verifiability of 
investments.
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divorce easier is bad for children.
With endogenous divorce this chain of reasoning breaks down. In such a world, 
the offsetting effect when divorce costs are high, is that individual investment choices 
have less effect on the likelihood that the couple remain married. In essence the 
couple are locked into marriage irrespective of their own actions. Hence they have 
lower incentives to invest into marriage specific capital, such as child quality.
The result that investment increases as divorce costs fall is contrary to popular 
opinion. For example, the no-fault divorce revolution of the 1970s is perceived as 
having considerably reduced the barriers to exiting marriage and increased marital 
instability. Policy makers concerned with the detrimental effects on adults and chil­
dren have tried to reverse the decline in divorce costs, through increased periods of 
separation before divorce is legitimized, or the reintroduction of fault based divorce.63
This framework clarifies two separate effects that divorce costs have on children 
- (i) in all marriages parents make a greater commitment to marriage through in­
vestments in child quality; (ii) children in marginal marriages may be worse off as 
divorce becomes easier and their parents marriage no longer remains intact. The 
former effect could have a potentially greater and offsetting welfare impact than the 
effect of lower divorce costs on children from marginal marriages alone. Evaluating 
the relative importance of these two channels remains an important topic for future 
research.
Finally note the effect of divorce costs on the probability of divorce is ambiguous;
d G ( f )
- n ~  = ]
\  + {eh + gw ) ( ^  + ^ \  
\  uqh dc d(Jiv dc J (8)
On the one hand it is easier to divorce, on the other hand spouses make more in­
vestments during marriage. Cross sectional evidence on the probability of divorce 
is indeed mixed as to the effects of divorce cost. For example Johnson and Skinner 
(1986) and Peters (1986) find no evidence that no-fault divorce increases the probabil­
ity of marital dissolution, while Weiss and Willis (1993) find a positive and significant 
effect.
63Sixteen states had required periods of separation in 1980, the average length of which was 6.7 
months. By 2000, 28 states had introduced such requirements, the average duration of which was 
9.2 months. Furthermore, between January and April 1996 legislators in 18 states introduced bills 
to make divorce more difficult (Estin (1998)). Arizona and Louisiana have passed such laws and 
moved towards covenant marriages so that spouses can only seek divorce on grounds of adultery, 
felony conviction, abandonment, abuse, or two years separation.
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3.1.4 Stage 1: C hild C ustody
In the first stage of marriage parents decide the allocation of physical custody over 
children if the couple were to divorce. The fraction of physical custody that goes to 
spouse i is Xi, such that +  Xw = 1. The key assumption is;
A 2- & ( ^ )  > 0
The marginal returns to child quality are higher in divorce if the parent has a 
greater share of custody. This is because the parent is better able to form a lasting 
emotional bond with their children.
I make the simplifying assumption that when a parent has zero custody the returns 
to investing are zero, when they have sole custody the returns are the same as in 
marriage, and when parents have equal custodial rights, the returns to each parent 
are the same.
To see how the allocation of custody relates to investment incentives, consider 
the case in which divorce occurs largely for exogenous reasons so the probability of 
divorce is approximately G(—c). The effect of granting the wife greater custodial 
rights on her investment incentives is;
d (  dVw(q) -‘'i MW)11-c<-c))+,-k (t£ !)g<-c)
(9)
On the one hand, as child quality remains a public good in divorce, giving custody 
to the high valuation spouse increases that spouse’s incentive to invest, leaving both 
partners better off. This effect is captured in the first term. On the other hand 
both spouses would like to have more own custody so that in the event of divorce, 
their own return on investment is maximized. Hence it is not necessarily the case that 
giving more ex post custody to the wife, increases her ex ante investment. Investment 
incentives and custodial rights move together for the wife if;
9W 1 — G(—c)
Oh 1 +  G(—c)
If the investment incentives of both spouses increase with their own share of custody, 
joint custody is optimal. Hence joint custody is optimal for the following non-empty
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set of couples64;
{(eh,ew) : ^ ep/i
1 - G ( - c )  1 +  G(—c)
1 +  G(—c) ’ 1 — G(—c) (10)
Proposition  3: When divorce occurs for largely exogenous reasons - (i) for cou­
ples with heterogeneous valuations, the high valuation spouse optimally has sole cus­
tody. For couples with homogeneous valuations, joint custody is always optimal; (ii) 
the set of couples for whom joint custody is optimal decreases in divorce costs.
Figure 1 shows the optimal allocation of custody by the heterogeneity in spousal 
valuations of child quality. Intuitively, the high valuation spouse always has the 
majority custodial share.
The ex post efficient allocation of custody, giving sole custody to the high valu­
ation parent, only maximizes ex ante investment incentives if the degree of spousal 
preference heterogeneity is sufficiently large.
To see the effect on divorce costs on the allocation of custody, note that as divorce 
costs rise, the probability the couple remain married increases. It is then more im­
portant for couples to give custody to the spouse who invests the most, namely the 
high valuation spouse. This reduces the likelihood of joint custody being optimal. 
The share of custody for the high valuation spouse is non-increasing in divorce costs.
For any given couple (holding constant), higher divorce costs shift the optimal 
custodial allocation towards the high valuation spouse. Across the population of all 
married couples, the incidence of joint custody decreases in divorce costs. These 
effects are shown on figure l .65
This framework provides a rationale for why as the costs of exiting marriage have 
fallen, there has been an increased incidence of joint custody per se, and, controlling 
for couples characteristics, fathers have been given a greater custodial share.
64Consider a couple for whom |^- <  . Granting the husband incrementally more custody
will increase his investment incentives, and decrease those of his wife. Given that for this couple the 
husband values child quality more than his wife, it is optimal for the husband to have sole custody. 
A similar argument applies for couples for whom Only for couples with relatively
homogeneous preferences will it be optimal for custody to be allocated jointly. This equates each 
spouses investment incentives, maximizing aggregate investment and the marriage surplus.
65In the limiting case of infinite divorce costs, the high valuation parent has sole custody - this is 
the result in Besley and Ghatak (2001).
79
To isolate the effect endogenous divorce has on the allocation of custody, differ­
entiate the wife’s first order condition with respect to her own custodial share;
Endogenous divorce introduces the last two effects. First, giving more ex post
surplus. This follows from A1 - investment returns are higher in marriage than
quality during marriage. In short, endogenous divorce causes investment and custody 
to move in opposite directions.
ments as she has more custody. In other words having more own custody reduces the 
wife’s disincentive to invest that arises from expecting a less happiness in marriage 
as she invests. This increases her investment as she has more own custody.
The first of these two new factors means investment and custody need not move 
together and this can have perverse effects on the allocation of custody. The strength 
of this effect depends on the size of the marriage surplus, S  =  (Oh +  6W) A (q) +  c. 
The surplus increases in divorce costs if;
This is the same condition that ensures the probability of divorce increases as 
the costs of exiting marriage fall. When the marriage surplus is small, the net effect 
of the new incentives arising from endogenous divorce is the same as when divorce
the margin with her investment, because her investment returns are the same inside and outside of 
marriage.
custody to the wife reduces the marginal effect her investment has on the marriage
divorce.66 Granting the wife more custody reduces the impact her investment has 
on keeping the marriage intact. This in turn reduces her incentive to invest in child
Second, the expected happiness in marriage is less sensitive to the wife’s invest-
(12)
66In the extreme case when the wife has sole custody, the mariage surplus would not change on
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occurs for exogenous reasons.
The set of couples for whom joint custody is optimal is greater than with exogenous 
divorce, because of the increased investment incentives arising from having more own 
custody that come through the happiness effect.
Now suppose (12) holds and the cost of divorce rises. This increases the marriage 
surplus. The desire to have less own custody because of the endogenous divorce effect 
becomes stronger vis-a-vis the desire to have more own custody through the stronger 
happiness effect. Hence the set of couples for whom joint custody is optimal shrinks, 
but remains non-empty.
When the costs of divorce rise further, spouses prefer their partner to have more 
custody. This effect can become the dominant effect so that it is optimal to give the 
majority share of custody to the low valuation spouse. Joint custody remains optimal 
for some couples - those for whom both husband and wife’s incentives to invest are 
decreasing in their own custodial share.
Similar to the case of exogenous divorce, the ex post efficient allocation of custody, 
only maximizes ex ante investment incentives if the degree of spousal preference 
heterogeneity is sufficiently strong.
Proposition  4: I f  the probability of divorce decreases in the cost of divorce, then 
for low (high) divorce costs - (i) the high (low) valuation spouse has the majority 
custodial share; (ii) the low valuation spouse’s custodial share is decreasing in the 
divorce cost.
Figure 2 shows how the allocation of custody changes in the marriage surplus. 
The disincentives to invest arising from the weakened endogenous divorce gradually 
become stronger vis-a-vis the incentives to invest arising from the higher expected 
happiness in marriage.
An alternative way to think about this is if (12) holds so the marriage surplus 
rises in the divorce cost, and the probability of divorce decreases as divorce costs rise.
The relationship between divorce costs and custodial shares is non-monotonic. 
When divorce costs are low, if (12) holds, the marriage surplus is also small. Hence the 
incentives to invest arising from the higher expected happiness in marriage outweigh 
the disincentives arising from the weakened endogenous divorce effect. The net effect 
of having custody is similar to when divorce occurs for exogenous reasons. Namely 
the high valuation spouse has the majority custodial share, and this share increases 
with the divorce cost.
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As divorce costs rise there exists some cost, c, at which the dominant effect be­
comes both spouses preferring their partner to have more custody. For divorce costs 
above c, the low valuation party has the majority custodial share.67
Figure 3 shows the non-monotonic relationship between the husband’s optimal 
allocation of child custody and the divorce cost in the case where husbands have a 
lower valuation of child quality than wives.68
Joint custody can be optimal because child quality is a public good, and divorce 
occurs with positive probability. These two features are sufficient to generate con­
flicting incentives to invest across parents so that it is optimal to share custody.69 
Endogenous divorce introduces the possibility that investment and custody do not 
move together so the low valuation spouse may have the majority custodial share.
This contrasts with previous explanations of why joint custody is optimal in the 
literature on non-contractible investments into a private good. For instance, Raj an 
and Zingales (1998) argue that if investment leads to greater specialization within 
a relationship, the returns to outside options fall in own investment. Hence parties 
appropriate a lower share of the marginal benefits in the current relationship because 
their position is weakened in ex post renegotiation. Each party is therefore better 
off by not owning the asset so that they do not lock themselves into the current 
relationship. Hence joint ownership can be optimal. Alternatively, de Meza and 
Lockwood (1998) present a model in which parties use outside options bargaining so
67 Children were considered as legal property solely of fathers in divorce up until the second half 
of the nineteenth century (Mason (1994)) - a period in which divorce was prohibitively expensive.
68Holding total valuation constant, a small increase in the divergence of valuations such that 
dOw =  —ddh when ddw >  0, changes aggregate investment by;
V Oqh dqw )
where (q ,^ q^) are investment levels with homogeneous preferences. With low divorce costs it is 
optimal for the high valuation spouse to have the majority share of custody and so aggregate 
investment falls as parental preferences diverge. Hence spouses want to positively sort by valuations 
in the marriage market. Therefore as divorce costs fall, this sorting effect in the marriage market 
reinforces the main effect discussed, that investments increase as divorce costs fall.
69Consistent with this result, Seltzer (1990) and Brown et al (1997) find that joint custody is 
more likely to occur for marriages of greater duration, where couples are likely to have made more 
marital specific investments such as those into child quality. Furthermore, if parental valuation of 
child custody is positively correlated with own income, this model helps understand the results in 
Brown et al (1997) that - (i) parents are more likely to have sole custody as their incomes rise 
relative to their spouses; (ii) joint custody is most common when parents have higher aggregate 
incomes, or more similar incomes.
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that if one parties divorce payoff binds after the investment is made, then the other 
party appropriates all of the surplus. Hence investing in the relationship increases 
the likelihood that a parties own outside option binds in renegotiation, and they do 
not appropriate the returns on their own investment. Again joint ownership can be 
optimal in such a setting.
The result here builds on Besley and Ghatak (2001). They show that when invest­
ments are made into a public good and there is no uncertainty over the stability of 
the relationship, then allocating property rights ex post efficiently maximizes ex ante 
investment incentives. In this framework when marriage is unstable, joint custody is 
always optimal for some couples, with the high valuation spouse having the majority 
custodial share. With endogenous divorce, there remains a set of couples for whom 
joint custody is optimal, and it may be the case that the low valuation spouse has 
the majority share of custody depending upon the strength of the endogenous divorce 
effect.
3.1.5 F u rth er Issues
Specialization in H ousehold P roduction  Traditionally women have been 
more specialized in household production. The effects of specialization are captured 
in the model by assuming;
du ^  du du ^  du
dqw dqh dqw dqh
The effects of specialization on investment incentives can be seen from the first order 
condition (7'). If the degree of specialization is independent of the marital state, 
specialization affects investment through the returns to investment in divorce, the 
first term in (7'). Hence the more specialized spouse invests more into child quality 
during marriage. Both spouses are better off if the more specialized spouse has a 
greater custodial share in divorce.
One of the most important factors that has influenced household behavior in the 
last generation is the rise in the labor force participation of women. This framework 
predicts that as this women devote more labor to the market, the comparative advan­
tage in household production women have relative to men, is eroded. This leads to -
(i) investments of men rising relative to women; (ii) a greater incidence of joint cus­
tody. Furthermore the model predicts that for any given couple, the custodial rights
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of each parent increases in the amount of labor supplied outside of the household by 
their spouse.
C ohabitation  The framework provides a way of thinking through whether mar­
ried and cohabiting couples invest differently in child quality. This is important given 
the dramatic rise in out-of-wedlock births, a significant part of which are attributable 
to cohabiting couples. 7 0
In contrast to married couples, cohabiting couples face zero divorce costs, so the 
probability of their relationship breaking up is;
G(<J>C) =  G ( -  (9h +  ew) A ( q ) ) > G  (<(>*)
where </>c is the value of happiness in the marginal cohabiting relationship. Hence for 
given valuations of child quality and gains from marriage, cohabiting couples are more 
likely to break up than married couples. This is supported by evidence from the US 
(Bumpass and Sweet (1989)) and the UK (Ermisch and Francesconi (1999)). Hence 
on the one hand as cohabiting relationships are more unstable, cohabitees make lower 
investments than identically married couples.
On the other hand, as cohabitees face zero divorce cost, their own investments have 
a greater impact on the marginal probability that the relationship remains intact, than 
for married spouses. This gives cohabitees greater incentives to invest than identically 
married couples. By proposition 2 this second effect dominates so overall, cohabiting 
couples invest more in child quality than identically married couples. 7 1
Prom proposition 4, cohabiting couples have a lower marriage surplus than iden­
tically married couples. For a cohabiting couple with relatively heterogeneous val­
uations, the high valuation spouse has sole custody. For cohabiting couples with 
relatively homogeneous valuations, joint custody is always optimal, with the high
70The prevalence of cohabitation has increased rapidly in America since the 1960s. Then there 
was one cohabiting couple for every 90 married couples. By 2000, there was one cohabiting couple 
for every 12 married couples. In America today, 5% of all children aged under 18 live with cohabiting 
parents. The percentage of births to unmarried women in America rose from 5% in 1940 to 65% in 
2000. Between 1980-4, 29% of non-marital births were to cohabiting couples. By 1990-4 this figure 
had risen to 39%. (National Vital Statistics Report (2000)).
71 This begs the question whether there is selection into cohabitation. Rindfuss and VandenHeuval 
(1990) provide evidence from the National Longitudinal Study showing cohabitees to be more similar 
to singles than married individuals, on a range of socioeconomic characteristics and attitudinal 
variables.
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valuation spouse having the majority share.
Again the framework helps rationalize observed legal reforms over time. A series 
of Supreme Court rulings since 1971 have led to the equal recognition of the rights 
and obligations of unwed fathers, and the gradual erosion of custodial presumption 
in favour of mothers, unwed or otherwise. The analysis here suggests joint physical 
custody can maximize ex ante parental incentives to invest into child quality when 
parents are cohabiting. If courts place positive weight on the welfare of children, we 
would then expect the expansion of custodial rights to unwed parents.
3.2 Family Policy
The framework presented offers a number of insights into how behavior within families 
towards children changes as divorce becomes easier. The same framework can also be 
used to study the impact on children of family policy. The policies I look at work both 
through changing the level of payoffs in divorce, such as child support and welfare 
payments, and changing the marginal returns to child quality, such as legal custodial 
rights.
3.2.1 Child Support
Child support payments made at the time of divorce change the level of divorce 
payoffs to the following;
U°{q) = 6hu (q )~ T  (13)
U^(q) = 8wu(q) + r
where r  denotes the transfer from husband to wife. 7 2 If child support payments 
form part of the marriage contract, these transfers cannot be made contingent upon 
investments into child quality, because at the time they ought to be paid - if and when 
the couple divorce - either spouse could claim the other had not made the agreed to 
investment during marriage. No third party can verify this claim, and the level of
72 Of the 14 million American custodial parents in 1998, 57% had some type of alimony award or 
child support agreement, averaging $4200 annually. If the tax system introduces a wedge between 
the amount paid and the amount received, the effect of such transfers is similar to that of welfare 
payments, considered in the next subsection.
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transfer is then determined by bargaining ex post;
r* = argmax [U?(q) -  z] [U°{q) +  z] (14)
Z
=  \{(9h-0w )u(q)\
As spouses anticipate such ex post bargaining, spouse i ’s ex ante payoff is;
VM) = +  Ow) u(q) -  c) +  ^E(gains from marriage|0 > 4?) -  pq{ (15)
In contrast to (6 ), ex ante payoffs are determined by the sum of parental valuations 
of child quality. Hence ex post bargaining over divorce transfers eliminates the source 
of conflict across spouses. Both spouses then face an identical investment choice 
problem.
Proposition  5: I f  spouses bargain ex post over child support, spouses make the 
same investments into child quality during marriage. Joint custody is always optimal.
Investments in marriage are higher in the presence of child support payments 
because the divorce payoff to both parents rises with ex post bargaining. The effect of 
ex post bargaining over child support is to undo the effect of preference heterogeneity 
that leads parents to have conflicting interests within marriage.
This result suggests that resources devoted towards the enforcement of alimony 
and child support awards amongst divorcees will have beneficial consequences for 
children within intact marriages. 7 3  This externality is typically not recognized as 
a potential benefit of enforcing support awards. If improved enforcement increases 
the expected value of child support, this - (i) raises investments into children during 
marriage; (ii) makes joint custody more likely for all couples.
73The Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement was established in 1975, and subsequent federal 
legislative acts have sought to further increase state enforcement powers. However payment rates 
are largely unchanged since the 1970s. Despite the fact that the majority of awards are considered 
legally enforceable by a court or government agency, only 59% of the total amount due in 1998 was 
actually received by custodial parents (Case et al (2000), US Census Bureau (2000)).
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3.2.2 W elfare Paym ents
A number of welfare programs target transfers to single parents . 7 4  Welfare payments, 
cj, differ from transfers between spouses in that they reduce the marriage surplus so 
the probability of divorce rises to;
G (P ) = G ( - c - { 6 h + 8W) A  (?) +  u) > G(<A*) (16)
where <f>u is the value of happiness in the marginal marriage with welfare payments. 7 5  
There are two opposing effects - one the one hand the relationship is more likely 
to break down because the gains from marriage are smaller. On the other hand, 
conditional on the marriage surviving, the marriage surplus is greater, because welfare 
payments effectively reduce divorce costs from c to (c — uj).
The net effect of welfare payments on parental investments is;
dVi _  du(q) 13E(surplus|0 > </>w) dS  _  
dqi dqi +  2  dS dqi P
The surplus marriage creates over divorce, falls, so the marginal returns to in­
vestments rise. Hence both parents invest more even if only one of them is a welfare 
recipient in divorce. The identity of the recipient is irrelevant for investment incen­
tives within marriage.
As welfare payments rise, the marriage surplus falls and hence from proposition 
4, the incidence of joint custody increases.
P roposition  6: I f  one parent is a welfare recipient in divorce, both parent’s 
investments rise. For any given couple, the custodial share of the high valuation 
parent is increasing in the welfare payment. The incidence of joint custody increases 
with the level of welfare payments.
74 Examples include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which replaced the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in 1996. States are permitted to use TANF 
grants to - (i) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for; (ii) encourage 
the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. The main federal eligibility criterion is that 
funds are targeted towards families with children.
75 Consistent with this, evidence from the income maintenance experiments suggests family break­
down is more likely to occur with generous welfare payments (Knudsen et al (1977)). More recently, 
Nixon (1997) finds a positive association between receipt of AFDC benefits and the likelihood of 
divorce.
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3.2.3 Legal C ustodial R ights
In marriage physical and legal custody coincide, but there is a distinction in law 
between the two in divorce. Physical custody refers to the fraction of time the child 
spends with each parent. This covers both where the child resides and parental 
visitations rights, and has been the focus of analysis so far. Legal custody refers to 
each parent’s right to make decisions regarding their children’s health, education, and 
welfare. It is seen as a way to maintain emotional ties between non-custodial parents 
and their children.
If the allocation of legal custody can be written into the marital contract, the ef­
fects of this policy can be captured by allowing the difference in returns to investment 
inside and outside of marriage to narrow. In other words when a parent has more 
legal custody, the benefits of child quality become less marriage specific.
To see the effect on investment, consider the extreme case in which legal custody 
implies =  Jp so that returns to investments into child quality are the same across 
marital states. Hence investment has no effect on the marriage surplus and so - (i) 
the surplus to be split between parents in ex post bargaining does not depend upon 
investments made during marriage; (ii) the likelihood that the marriage remains intact 
does not depend upon parental actions within marriage. Therefore the only incentive 
to invest arises from the fact that there is some positive return on investment in 
divorce.
P roposition  7: Granting legal custodial rights in divorce decreases investments 
during marriage. The incidence of joint custody falls. In the limiting case where legal 
custody equates the returns to investments across marital states, the high valuation 
parent has sole custody.
If legal custody equates the returns to investments into child quality across marital 
states, spouse z’s first order condition for investment is;
dVi _ du(q) _ 
dqi dqi
The optimal allocation of custodial rights is for the high valuation parent to have 
sole custody. This is because in this limiting case, child quality is less of a marital 
specific good, so spouses have fewer incentives to invest within marriage unless they 
know they will obtain custody ex post.
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More generally, granting legal custodial rights to parents effectively weakens the 
investment incentives that arise from the endogenous divorce effect, and leads parents 
to place more emphasis on the return on their investment should divorce occur. Over­
all investments into child quality become less sensitive to the cost and probability of 
divorce. 7 6
The effects of the three policy interventions on the allocation of custody are shown 
in figure 4. The policies have very different effects on equilibrium investment and 
custody. Child support, or more generally ex post transfers across spouses, offset 
the effects of preference heterogeneity across spouses, increase investments and make 
joint custody optimal for all couples.
Welfare payments, or more generally policies that reduce the level of gains from 
marriage, increase the likelihood of divorce, increase parents’ investments during mar­
riage, and increase the probability of joint custody being optimal.
Granting legal custodial rights, or more generally policies that reduce the marginal 
gains from marriage, decrease spousal investments because spouses no longer have an 
incentive to invest in order to keep the marriage together. Sole custody by the high 
valuation parent then becomes optimal.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the debate on whether making divorce easier is bad for 
children. The traditional view is that making divorce easier is bad for children. This 
is because marriages are more likely to break up with lower divorce costs. This 
chapter suggests that an additional effect has to be considered. As divorce becomes 
easier, parental investments into marital specific capital such as child quality, have a 
stronger impact on keeping the marriage intact. Hence when divorce costs are low, 
parents have additional incentives to invest.
This effect, which applies to the stock of marriages, could have a potentially 
greater and offsetting welfare impact than the effect of lower divorce costs on children 
from marginal marriages alone. 7 7
76 There has been an increased willingness of courts to grant both parents legal custody (Brown 
et al (1997)). Consistent with the model, Seltzer (1990) finds granting legal rights to both parents 
reduces the likelihood of physical custody being shared between parents.
77Johnson and Mazingo (2000) and Gruber (2000) both show individuals exposed to unilateral 
divorce as children are more likely to do worse on a range of welfare outcomes as children and into
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The model stresses that this potentially offsetting effect is stronger the more likely 
it is that divorce occurs endogenously. In this scenario parents can be viewed as 
staying together “for the sake of the children”. In contrast, if divorce occurs largely 
for exogenous reasons, say because of the arrival of new information about the true 
quality of the marriage, then the first order effect of lower divorce costs is to increase 
marital instability which is likely to leave children worse off. Evaluating the relative 
importance of these two channels remains an important topic for future research.
The chapter also provides useful insights into the allocation of child custody in di­
vorce. In particular, I show joint custody is always optimal for couples with relatively 
homogeneous valuations of child quality, or with a similar degree of specialization in 
household production. This chapter helps provide a rationale for why we there has 
been a legal move towards the award of joint custody as divorce has become easier.
The model also helps explain why the incidence of joint custody has risen as female 
labor force participation has increased, and helps bring together a body of empirical 
evidence on the allocation of custody, the determinants of marital dissolution, and 
the effects of family policy on behavior within marriage.
The framework presents a stylized model of household behavior, and captures the 
main intuitions when actions within the household cannot be specified as part of 
the marital contract, and marriage is unstable. The model can be made richer in a 
number of ways to further address more specific questions. For example, endogeniz- 
ing household formation, fertility and labor supply, or allowing spouses to invest in 
children across marital states, would all be useful extensions to consider. 7 8
The chapter shows that the inability of spouses to write marital contracts con­
tingent on investments during marriage, leads them to make less than the surplus 
maximizing level of investments. This suggests that one reason spouses increasingly 
use pre-nuptial agreements is to precisely “tie their hands”, and reduce the possi­
bility of ex post renegotiation . 7 9  Many lawyers have put forward the case for the
adulthood. Consistent with this, the model predicts that an exogenous increase in the probability of 
divorce increases marital instability and so gives spouses less incentives to invest in marital specific 
capital.
78Brown and Flinn (2001) present a structural dynamic model of parental investments in children 
across marital states and empirically test for predicted effects of different given custodial arrange­
ments. Their model shares the characteristic that divorce occurs endogenously. However in their 
model parents only choose investments and not custodial arrangements, and investments can be ex 
ante specified in their framework.
79Rainer (2002) makes a similar argument with regards to spouses being able to write enforceable 
pre-nuptial agreements on the division of property.
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enforcement of marital contracts (“private ordering”) within marriage (Mnookin and 
Kornhauser (1979), Ramseyer (1998)) precisely arguing that greater marriage specific 
investments would be made as a result.
Finally, it has previously been argued that many policy interventions replicate the 
efficient outcomes that would be reached if children had a voice in household decision 
making (Becker and Murphy (1988)). This chapter shows how joint custody, child 
support, welfare payments, and legal custody help move household decisions closer 
to first best outcomes. It remains important to analyze if and how other aspects of 
family policy can overcome the inefficiencies caused by limits to marital contracting.
3.3.1 Appendix: Proofs
P roof o f Proposition  1: Spouse i ’s investment choice problem is;
maxVi(q) =  max(6wu(q) -  ^c) +  \  [h{<f>*) +  (1 -  ((6h +  9W) A (q) +  c)] -  pqt
<li Qi Z Z
The first term is the payoff outside of marriage, which is concave in <&. To ensure 
Vi(q) is concave in qi it is therefore sufficient to show that;
A ( < n  +  (1  -  G(4>')) ((e„ + e„) A  (q) + c)
is concave in <&. Differentiating this term with respect to <&;
Differentiating again;
[*'(*•) -  (1 -  G(0*)) + W ) ]  ^  + [*'(*•) + 2g(P) + ^VW)] (§ £ Y
As =  -  (Oh +  0W) < 0, = ~{0h + 6W) > 0 , sufficient conditions to
ensure the second order condition is negative are;
h'(<n < a  - g w )) 
h//( ^ )  +  2p(^) +  0 V ( ^ )  < 0
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The first of these is assumption A5. The second condition is true if;
r < - g'(f) ( A l )
and g'{(/)*) > 0. These are assumptions A4 and A6  respectively. Note that by 
assumption A3, </> is log concavely distributed. This ensures the the right hand side 
in (Al) is negative for sure and so A6  can be satisfied at </>* for some distribution of 
0.
The ex ante payoffs, V*(g), are continuous in (g ,^ qw) , and the strategy space for 
spouse i is a non-empty compact subset of 3£+ if the cost of investing is positive and 
finite. Hence under assumptions A3 to A6 , the payoff function is concave in g*, so by 
the Glicksberg-Fan theorem, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Turning to the efficiency of investments, there are two potential sources of ineffi­
ciency - investments cannot be ex ante specified in the marital contract, and divorce 
occurs with positive probability. In a benchmark first best world in which investments 
can be specified, there is no scope for renegotiation during marriage. If in addition 
divorce does not occur then parents choose investments to maximize the total mar­
riage surplus. The efficient level of investments solve the following pair of first order 
conditions;
+ i e { h ,w ]  (A2)(JQi
In the first best world equilibrium investments are determined by (i) the sum of 
parental valuations; and (ii) the returns on investment within marriage. Comparing 
the first order conditions (A2) and (7), spouse i overinvests if;
+«-> - c - 1 <*- ■ > f ) ( a . - £ ) ^
f t  ^ 1 :  g j - i ( g / , + ^ ) aE(surpy >-*‘)
(h + <U-| (fl/. + ew)
where the first inequality follows from Al. Rearranging this gives the result that 
spouse i overinvests if 6i < 0 which is never the case. Hence choosing the allocation 
of custodial rights to maximize the marriage surplus is equivalent to maximizing 
total investment into child quality because investments are always below the first 
best level.■
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P ro o f of P ropositions 3 and 4: Rewrite the wife’s investment choice problem
as;
max
Quj
9yjU  ^c
The first order condition is;
5^(0*) + 1 \(9h +  IS: +  (edq-u eh) 85 [i -  G(<n ]
\{6h + 0w)u  + (9W -  6h) u] g((f)*) +  9w-^G((f)*) +  [6wu -  \c\ g(4>*)^
=  P
There are four sources of investment incentive arising from having more own custody. 
Consider the simpler case where divorce occurs for largely exogenous reasons;
Case 1: Exogenous Divorce
The probability of divorce is approximately G(—c) and as child quality is not such 
a marriage specific investment, spousal investments do not affect much the value of 
happiness in the marginal marriage so that is close to zero. The wife’s first order 
condition reduces to;
(9h +  9W) —------ (- {9W — 0h) t t—
oqw oqw
[1 - G ( - c ) ] + e w- ^ - G ( - c ) = p
The effect of giving the wife more custody on her investment incentives is;
5'»■ - «  W,  ( £ )  " - ^  + ’- ' k  ( S  (A3)
The first term implies spouses want the high valuation parent to have sole custody. 
The second term implies spouses want more own custody to maximize the returns 
on their investment should the couple divorce. To maximize the marriage surplus, 
custody is allocated to equate the marginal returns across spouses. If parents have 
homogeneous preferences then equating marginal incentives implies —
h (< ^ ) which is satisfied if A = |  so custody is equally shared.
Suppose there exists some degree of preference heterogeneity at which the wife’s 
investment incentive increases in her own custodial share. This is when (A3) is 
positive, namely when . Similarly, if the husband’s investment incentives
are increasing in his custodial share it must be that . Hence both spouses
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investment incentives are increasing with more own custody for the set of couples that 
lie in (10) in the main text. These incentives are traded off by giving both spouses 
some custodial share. The high valuation spouse has the strictly greater share because 
the investment incentives on them having more own custody are greater than for 
the low valuation spouse. The set of couples for whom joint custody is optimal is 
decreasing in divorce costs as;
d / I — G (-c )\  = (1 + G (-c))g{-c)  +  (1 -  G (-c ))g (-c )
dc \  1 +  G(—c))  (l +  G{—c))2
<9 (1  + G ( -c ) \  — (1 ~ G(—c))g{—c) — (1 +  G (-c ))g (—c)
=  --------------------( T r c M ? ----------------------< 0
Case 2: Endogenous Divorce
In the general case with endogenous divorce the same method can be used to 
determine the set of couples for whom joint custody will be optimal. This is given 
by;
f(ff e \ ^ r f 1 -G(<t>') + S-h '(<p)  i  + G W - S  + h’W ) ] ]
Y  9h [\ + G ( ^ ) - S  + h ' ( 4 , y i - G { - c )  + S - h ' ( ^ ) \ l
where S  = ((Oh +  0W) A (q) +  c), and from A5 we have that 1 — G((f>*) + S  — h'((f)*) > 0. 
To summarize, joint custody is optimal for this set of couples because the wife’s invest­
ment moves with her custody if and the husband’s investment
moves with his own custody if ^  c)+g—^ (0 *) • above region both spouses
optimally have some positive custodial share. To see this consider a couple with pref­
erence heterogeneity so that Jj- > ’ ^be wife’s investment increases
with an increment to her custody, and the husband’s decreases with an increment to 
his own custody. Hence both spouse are better off if the wife has sole custody. To 
understand which spouse has the majority share of custody, there are four cases to 
consider.
(i) 1 +  G ( f )  > S -  hf(<f>*) > -G(4T)
In this region h'(4>*) > S  so the incentives to invest arising from the higher 
expected happiness in marriage outweigh the disincentives arising from the weakened 
endogenous divorce effect. The net effect of these incentives is now similar to the 
case where divorce occurs for exogenous reasons, but the set of couples for whom
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joint custody is optimal is greater than that given in (1 0 ).
(ii) G((t>*) > S -  h 'W ) > 0
In this region the incentives to invest arising from endogenous divorce slightly 
dominate those arising from the happiness effect. The net effect of these incentives 
is still similar to the case where divorce occurs for exogenous reasons, except that 
a smaller set of couples find it optimal to have joint custody compared to (1 0 ). 
Clearly at the border of regions (i) and (ii) when S = h'((J)*) the two new effects 
arising from endogenous divorce exactly offset each other and the set of couples who 
optimally choose joint custody is the same as in the case where divorce occurs only 
for exogenous reasons.
(iii) 1  +  G(<f?) > S -  h \(jf) > G{(f>*)
In this range the incentive to have less own custody arising from the weakened 
endogenous divorce begins to dominate those arising from exogenous divorce. The 
wife’s investment increases in her own share of custody if;
ew 1 - G m  + s - h ' W )
9h ~  1 +  <?(0*)-£  +  /i/(0*)
Hence the wife’s investment only increases in her own custody if she values child qual­
ity sufficiently more than her husband. For couples such that
the wife’s incentives increase with more custody, the husbands fall with more custody 
to him. Hence the wife still has sole custody if she values child quality sufficiently 
more than her husband. Similarly for couples with the husband
optimally has sole custody. For couples with relatively homogeneous preferences such 
that;
(0k,0w) : ^ e
Vh 1  -  G (-c) + S -  hUtf) ’ 1 +  G{4>*) -  S  +  h'(<£*)_
the dominant effect is for both spouses to prefer their spouse to have more custody. 
This is optimally traded off so that both spouses have some custodial share, with the 
high valuation spouse having the smaller share. This is because the disincentives to 
invest when a spouse has more own custody is greater for the high valuation spouse, 
and so investments, and the marriage surplus, are maximized if the low valuation 
spouse has the majority custodial share.
(iv) S -  h 'W ) > 1  +  G ( f )
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In this range the incentive to have less own custody arising from the weakened 
endogenous divorce effect dominates all other effects. The wife’s investment increases 
in her own share of custody if;
ew l  - G ( P )  + S - h ' ( 4>') 
eh ~ 1 +  G(<n -  s  + *)
which is a contradiction as valuations of child quality cannot be negative. In other 
words it is always the case that investment of either spouse increases if they have less 
custody. Hence joint custody will be optimal for all couples, with the low valuation 
spouse having the majority custodial share.■
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4 The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage
The family is a building block of society that has changed dramatically over the 
past two generations. Most attention has been on the rise in divorce. In particular, 
whether there exists a causal relation between divorce laws and the rise in divorce 
rates. Ironically much of this debate has taken place when divorce rates have been 
falling. Indeed the last 15 years have witnessed the longest period of sustained decline 
in divorce in America since records began in I860.80
Of more concern now is the sustained decline in marriage. Today, fewer people are 
marrying than at any time in the past 40 years, the children of the unmarried account 
for nearly as many as those living in single parent households, and the majority of 
births occur out of wedlock. 8 1
The decline in marriage is of concern if we believe marriage to be a good thing, 
in that there are positive private and social returns to marriage. A large body of 
literature, summarized in Waite and Gallagher (2000), shows a strong correlation be­
tween being married and having better health, higher wages, and accumulating more 
wealth. They argue these effects exist for married individuals relative to cohabitees 
as well as divorced individuals.
Furthermore, changing marital patterns have implications for the life cycle behav­
ior of individuals - their attachment to the labor market, savings, and fertility. Even 
ignoring the welfare consequences of those directly involved, the decline in marriage 
has macroeconomic consequences that affect us all.
This paper studies the effects of divorce law changes on incentives to marry. In 
particular I consider the effects on marriage rates of two changes in divorce law - (i) 
from mutual consent to unilateral divorce; (ii) from fault based to no-fault divorce. In 
much of the earlier literature these laws have been referred to almost interchangeably. 
However economic theory would suggest they ought to have very different effects on 
incentives to marry.
Unilateral divorce re-assigns the right to divorce. In contrast, no-fault divorce
80This paper focuses exclusively on the United States. Similar trends in marriage and divorce are 
observed in the UK and Canada, both of which have reformed divorce laws as in the United States.
81In 1994 37% of children in single parent households were living with divorced parents, 36% were 
living with a never married parent, and the remainder lived with a separated parent (Bureau of the 
Census (1996)). The percentage of births to unmarried women rose from 5% in 1940 to 65% in 2000 
(National Vital Statistics Report (2000)).
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reduces the costs of exiting marriage.82
If spouses can bargain efficiently, the Coase theorem implies that moving from 
mutual consent to unilateral divorce only affects the distribution of welfare within 
marriage, not the incidence of marriage and divorce. However spouses may be unable 
to bargain efficiently because they cannot commit ex ante to all possible divisions of 
the gains from marriage, or because the benefits from household public goods such as 
children are neither divisible nor transferable. In this case the incidence of marriage 
and divorce would be different under mutual consent and unilateral divorce regimes.
To make precise the effects of both laws, I proceed in two stages. I first set out 
a model of search in marriage markets, where individuals learn the true gains from 
marriage over divorce before and during marriage. I then test the predictions of the 
theory using US state level panel data on marriage rates over the period 1960-2000.
The search model makes precise that when spouses are unable to bargain effi­
ciently, moving from mutual consent to unilateral divorce has two effects which work 
in opposite directions - (i) the probability of divorce for any given couple rises, reduc­
ing the value of marrying today; (ii) each spouse is guaranteed at least their payoff in 
divorce if the marriage continues, and so cannot be locked into a bad marriage. This 
increases the value of marrying today.
If the first order effect of unilateral divorce is to increase the probability of divorce, 
individuals are only willing to enter matches of potentially higher quality than under 
mutual consent divorce. This increases the average quality of matched couples.
In this case, unilateral divorce causes individuals to become more selective in 
the marriage market, the flow of singles into marriage decreases, but because the 
probability of divorce rises, the stock of singles increases. Hence the change in the 
steady state marriage rate is ambiguous. Similarly the effect on the divorce rate 
is ambiguous because although the flow of individuals from marriage into divorce 
increases, the stock of married individuals falls.
If the first order effect of unilateral divorce is to ensure spouses cannot be locked 
into a bad marriage, then individuals are willing to enter matches of potentially 
lower quality than under mutual consent divorce. This worsens the average quality 
of matched couples as individuals are less selective in the marriage market. The 
effects on the marriage market then work in the opposite direction.
Which of these two channels is more important cannot be determined a priori. It
82 Jacob (1988) also argues that unilateral divorce has no relation to the cost of divorce.
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is left to the empirical analysis to distinguish which affect dominates.
Moving from fault based to no-fault divorce lowers the costs of exiting marriage. 
Divorce costs are lower under no-fault because less proof is required to file for divorce, 
and courts cannot impose financial penalties on at-fault spouses. By reducing the 
costs of exiting marriage, no-fault divorce raises spouse’s divorce payoffs, and increases 
the lifetime value of marrying today. This is because the lower expected gains from 
marriage are more than offset by the higher expected payoff in divorce.
Under no-fault divorce individuals are willing to enter a match of potentially lower 
quality than under fault based divorce, precisely because the cost of exiting marriage 
has fallen. This increases the marriage rate, worsens the average quality of matched 
couples, and subsequently leads to a higher steady state divorce rate.83
The model thus makes clear that each law has different effects on marital forma­
tion, marital dissolution, and selection into marriage. The empirical section of the 
paper tests these predictions using state level panel data.
The main results are the following. First, marriage rates declined significantly in 
states that adopted unilateral divorce. Prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce, 
marriage rates were 20% higher in states that eventually adopted, compared to non­
adopting states. The decline in marriage caused by unilateral divorce is present a 
decade after the implementation of unilateral divorce and accounts for half of the 
initial gap in marriage rates between adopting and non-adopting states. The effects 
are greatest in marriages involving younger age cohorts, whites, and those marrying 
for the first time.
The result that unilateral divorce caused a decline in marriage, is consistent with 
the probability of any given couple divorcing having risen and more than offset the 
effect that individuals cannot be locked into a bad marriage.
Second, the composition of those marrying under unilateral divorce differed from 
earlier marriage cohorts. In particular, the difference-in-difference in the duration 
of marriages that take place under unilateral divorce rather than mutual consent, 
increases significantly. This suggests unilateral divorce causes better selection into
83Models of search in marriage markets borrow heavily from the labor literature. No-fault divorce 
is similar to reducing firing costs. The fact that this has an effect on match formation is well 
established in the labor literature. However, the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce is 
not so easily translatable into the labor literature. This is particularly so because families, unlike 
workers and firms, may not be able to bargain efficiently. Furthermore, assortive matching in 
marriage markets is perhaps more prevalent than in the labor market (Burdett and Coles (1997)).
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marriage.
Throughout I find little or no evidence that no-fault divorce affected marriage 
rates. Taken together, the results suggest the first order effect of changes in divorce 
laws on marriage has been through changes in the right to divorce, rather than the 
costs of exiting marriage.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, the theoretical 
analysis makes clear the effects of divorce law on selection into marriage, marital 
formation, marital dissolution, and the relation between the two.
Second the paper clearly distinguishes theoretically and empirically, the effects of 
unilateral and no-fault divorce on marriage rates.84 Unilateral divorce accounts for 
much of the decline in marriage especially amongst younger cohorts. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of other laws such as legalized abortion, and other observable 
determinants of marriage rates. The effect of unilateral divorce is qualitatively large. 
Its introduction has the equivalent disincentive effects on marriage as a 16% rise in 
the female-male earnings ratio.
Third, the paper helps explain earlier findings in the literature on the relation 
between divorce laws and divorce rates (Friedberg (1998), Gruber (2000), Wolfers 
(2000)). By not explicitly taking account of the (perhaps unintended) effects of di­
vorce laws on incentives to marry and selection into marriage, least squares estimates 
of the impact of divorce laws on divorce rates are likely to be underestimated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides an overview of changes 
in divorce law that swept through America in the 1970s. Section three presents a 
model of search and learning in marriage markets. Section four contains the empirical 
analysis. Section five concludes. Proofs and data definitions are in the appendices.
5 A Brief History of Divorce Law
The 1970s witnessed major changes in divorce laws. Foremost of these was the intro­
duction of unilateral divorce. Between 1968 and 1977 the majority of states passed 
such laws, moving from a regime in which the dissolution of marriage required the
84Brinig and Crafton (1994) regress state level marriage rates (defined as the number of marriages 
per 1000 of the population) from 1965-87 on a time trend, state adult population and a dummy for 
unilateral divorce (which they refer to as no-fault) but do not include state fixed effects. They find 
a significantly negative effect of unilateral divorce on marriage rates.
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mutual consent of both spouses, to one in which spouses could unilaterally file for 
divorce.
To understand the motivation behind such laws, it is instructive to consider the 
case of California, one of the earliest adopters.85 Criticism of the mutual consent 
system stemmed from the view that it reduced the welfare of spouses, and led to 
perjured testimony in collusive divorce proceedings that fostered disrespect towards 
the law.86 Californian legislators believed they would improve welfare within families 
and end the legal convention in which extreme cruelty was almost the only universal 
ground for divorce (Parkman (1992)). The Californian Family Law Act became ef­
fective in 1970 and established two grounds on which spouses could unilaterally file 
for divorce - (i) irreconcilable differences; (ii) incurable insanity.
The reform received widespread support from conservative sections of society who 
perceived it as strengthening families and reducing the opportunities for divorce. 
Lobbies for divorced men and feminist groups also supported the move. Male lobby 
groups perceived mutual consent divorce to work in favor of wives because men had 
to “bribe” their wives for them to agree to divorce. Feminist lobbies viewed the 
reform as eliminating an unjust element of the legal system because women were 
often unable to “bribe” their husbands to divorce. Little if any consideration was 
given to the effect on the incentives to marry.
In addition to changing the right to divorce, the Californian law also established 
that the assignment of fault did not have to be established in divorce cases, nor did 
fault play any role in divorce settlements. Figure 1 shows the rapid spread of both 
unilateral and no-fault divorce laws. Table 1 gives the years in which the laws were 
passed by state.
This second strand of California’s law change, no-fault divorce, has often been 
confused with unilateral divorce. The innovative part of the Californian legislation 
was the introduction of unilateral divorce. As Gruber (2000) notes, in 1960 some 20%
85 The Californian experience is important because the National Conference on Commissioners of 
Uniform State Laws later based the standard for marital dissolution in the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act (1974) on California’s requirements for divorce.
86Both problems stem from whether spouses bargain efficiently. If spouses were unable or unwilling 
to make such agreements, the marriage could not be dissolved under mutual consent even though 
it would be Pareto efficient to do so. If spouses could bargain efficiently, the perception was that 
men had to “bribe” their wives in order for them to consent to divorce leading to collusion between 
spouses in court proceedings. Ellman et al (1998) provide evidence on how perjured testimony and 
collusion between spouses, were commonplace in divorce cases under mutual consent.
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of the population already resided in no-fault states. Distinguishing unilateral from 
no-fault divorce is important because each law has different effects on incentives to 
marry.
The search model set out in the next section makes clear that when spouses are 
unable to bargain efficiently, moving from mutual consent to unilateral divorce has 
two effects - (i) it increases the probability of future divorce for any given couple, 
reducing the expected lifetime value of marrying today; (ii) it guarantees each spouse 
at least their divorce payoff in marriage, so that they cannot be locked into a bad 
marriage, and this increases the expected lifetime value of marrying today.
If the first order effect of unilateral divorce is to increase the probability of divorce, 
individuals are only willing to enter matches of potentially higher quality than under 
mutual consent divorce. This can cause the marriage rate to fall. As the average 
quality of matched couples increases, in the long run this can cause the divorce rate 
to fall.
In contrast, moving from fault based to no-fault divorce lowers the costs of exiting 
marriage. Individuals are willing to enter a match of potentially lower quality than 
under fault based divorce, precisely because it is easier to leave any marriage. This 
increases the marriage rate, worsens the average quality of matched couples, and 
subsequently leads to a higher steady state divorce rate.
6 A Basic Framework
The marriage market is modelled in discrete time with finitely lived risk neutral 
participants.87 Each period new individuals are born into the marriage market at 
rate 1 — (3, and the same fraction of individuals die each period. Birth and death 
rates are the same across men and women, so total population remains constant and 
is normalized to one, with an equal number of men and women. An individual can 
be in one of three marital states - married, divorced or single (i.e. never married). 
The timing of the marriage market is as follows;
1. each period every surviving individual matches with a person of the opposite 
sex with certainty. The matched couple receive an imperfect signal (a) of the gain 
from their potential marriage.
87I extend the model in Bougheas and Georgellis (1999) to take account of remarriage, derive 
steady state marriage and divorce rates, and consider the effect of unilateral divorce.
104
2. each individual decides to marry or remain single. If at least one of the matched 
couple decides to remain single, both go back into the marriage market.
3. if they marry, the actual gain from marriage (</>) is realized in the next period. 
The couple can then either remain married forever or divorce and remain divorced 
forever.
This framework emphasizes the role of learning in marriage markets. There are 
two stages of learning - first, when individuals meet in the marriage market they 
learn something but not everything about each other, embodied in the signal, a. The 
signal can be thought of as being related to the immediately observable traits of a 
potential marriage partner.88 The signal determines whether an individual is better 
off marrying today or remaining single.
The second stage of learning takes place within marriage. Married individuals up­
date their prior beliefs about the gains from marriage (0) by accumulating knowledge 
during marriage. This determines whether the individual is better off remaining mar­
ried or divorcing.89 Divorce is thus an optimal response to new information received 
during marriage.
Individuals do not remarry and all participants are ex ante identical. I relax both 
of these assumptions later.
The signal of the gains from marriage takes a realization in the closed set [a, ..., a] = 
S. The probability density function of signals is /(a ), assumed everywhere positive, 
with associated cumulative density F(a). Conditional on the signal, the actual gain 
from marriage is </> with probability g((f)\cr). The distribution g{(p\(j) is assumed uni- 
modal and symmetric with support [</>, 0] for all signals. The associated cumulative 
distribution is G((p|cr).
I assume signals are ordered such that the distribution of the gains from marriage 
generated by higher signals stochastically dominate the distributions given by lower 
signals;
88These traits relate to market outcomes, such as earnings capacity, as well as non-market out­
comes, such as personality.
89In the labor literature, search models emphasize both “on-the-job” search, where separation 
occurs as workers re-evaluate the value of the current match as information about alternative matches 
becomes available; and learning about job characteristics, where separation occurs as workers learn 
the true quality of the match. Previous models of search in marriage markets include Becker et al 
(1977) and Mortensen (1988)). This model builds on Bougheas and Georgellis (1999), and focuses 
on learning before and within marriage. Allowing for on-the-job search gives qualitatively similar 
results if the cost of searching on-the job is sufficiently higher than the cost of search for singles.
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A ssum ption 1 (Stochastic Dominance): Ga(<t>\<?) < 0 for all 0.
Higher signals therefore imply higher expected gains from marriage. Married 
individuals are better off remaining married if the payoff in marriage is higher than 
the divorce payoff each period. The per period payoff to remaining married is 4>, the
Hence the expected lifetime value of marrying today having received signal a in 
the marriage market is;
where j3 is the probability the individual survives into the next period. The first term 
is the expected marriage payoff in the first period of marriage, conditional on having 
received signal a. The first term in brackets is the expected payoff in marriage from 
the second period of marriage onwards, conditional on the marriage remaining intact,
If the individual were to receive a higher signal in the marriage market, the ex­
pected payoff in marriage in the first period of marriage increases because of the
onwards also rise due to the same reason, but the expected divorce payoff falls. To 
ensure this last effect does not dominate;
Intuitively, as the signal improves individuals shift weight from their expected di­
vorce payoff to the expected payoff in marriage conditional on the marriage remaining 
intact, h((f)\<j). The value of marrying today increases as long as this expected payoff 
is itself increasing in the signal. This is what assumption 2 says.
Lem m a 1: I f  assumption 2 holds, the lifetime value of marrying today increases 
in the signal: Va(M\cr) > 0.
After observing the signal, individuals decide whether to marry or remain single.
90 The results are robust to the divorce payoff being stochastic as long as its expected value is 
independent of the signal a.
per period divorce payoff is exogenously given by </>*.90
( i )
namely if 0 > </>*. The second term in brackets is the expected divorce payoff where 
G{4>*\cr) is the conditional probability of the couple divorcing.
stochastic dominance of signals. The expected marriage benefits from the first period
A ssum ption 2: £  =  K(<j>\<r) > 0.
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The value of remaining single is;
V(S) = - c  + P J° m zx[V {M \a),V (S)]f(a)da  (2)
where the per period payoff to singles is normalized to zero and c is the per period 
search cost. The second term is the expected value of the optimal decision in the 
next period.91
A ssum ption 3: There exists a reservation signal g r  G E, such that V ( M \ g r ) =  
V(S).
In other words there exists at least one signal for which individuals would prefer 
to marry than remain single. By lemma 1, for all a G (g r , g \, V(M \g) > V(S) and 
vice versa for all a G [<7, g r ). The lifetime value of remaining single can then be 
rewritten as;
r&r ro
V{S) = - c  + P j  V{S)}(a)da + p  j  V(M\a)f{a)<kr
Jo, J0R
Solving for V(S)\
-C + PJH V(M\a)f(cr)dcr
V^  =  t U n )  (3)
The value of remaining single depends on the per period payoff to being single, and 
the expected value of marrying from the next period onwards. Both factors axe 
discounted at a rate which increases in the probability of no suitable match being 
found.92
The reservation signal g r  is set where individuals are indifferent between marrying 
today and remaining single;
V{M\or ) =  V{S) (4)
The value of marriage (1), remaining single (3) and equilibrium reservation signal 
(4), determine the marriage market equilibrium. The comparative statics properties 
of the equilibrium hinge on how the value of marriage and remaining single change 
with the reservation signal.
91 The per period search cost c is assumed to be small so that V(S)  >  0 and individuals always 
enter the marriage market.
92In other words as the reservation signal, c t r , rises the individual is more likely to remain single 
and so the expected payoff next period is discounted less.
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From lemma 1, if individuals set a higher reservation signal, the value of marrying 
today rises. This value increases more quickly in the reservation signal, the more 
informative signals are about the true gains from marriage;
Definition (Inform ativeness of Signals): Consider two distributions of mar­
riage market signals, a1 and a2 with support E. Signal a1 is more informative than 
a2 if for all a1 = a2 £ E;
d A ( 9v(<f>W2) \  n
d<f> V g & W 1) )  d( j ) \  g{(j>\(72) )
This definition has an intuitive interpretation. The term is the likelihood
that as the signal improves, the actual gain from marriage is 0. The requirement 
that this likelihood increases in the gains from marriage is the standard monotone 
likelihood ratio property (Milgrom (1981)). It implies that as the realization of the 
gains from marriage rises, the likelihood of obtaining a gain of <f) is higher for higher 
signals. The signal a1 is more informative than a2 if the likelihood of getting <j> 
increases more quickly conditional on signal a1 than a2.
The value of remaining single also increases as individuals set higher reservation 
signals. This is because the individual is more likely to remain single next period, so 
the future is discounted less heavily. In addition, the value of marriage next period 
rises, but the individual forgoes the value of the marginal marriage, V(M \gr), today. 
This increases the value of remaining single if signals are informative.
However the value of marrying today is more responsive to changes in the reser­
vation signal if signals are informative because the informativeness of signals has a 
direct effect on the value of marriage today, while the effect on the value of remaining 
single works through the (discounted) expected value of marrying next period.
The determination of the equilibrium signal is shown in figure A. Whenever signals 
are informative, the value of marrying today increases more quickly in the reservation 
signal than the value of remaining single. The model captures the intuition that if 
the lifetime value of marrying today rises, the equilibrium reservation signal falls. 
Individuals are willing to trade-off being in a lower quality match, with higher lifetime 
gains from marriage over divorce. This trade-off occurs when signals are informative.93
93If signals were uninformative, individuals would need to receive a higher signal in the marriage 
market to want to marry because the value of remaining single would increase more quickly in signals 
than the value of marrying today. With completely uninformative signals, the value of marrying
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A llow ing Rem arriage
Consider a richer framework in which individuals can remarry. The expected 
lifetime value of marrying today, having received signal a  is;
V (M \a )  =  $g((p\a)d(f) +  <l>g(<j>\<T)d<f> +  PG(<f>*\a)V(5 ) (6)
where V( S )  is the value of remaining single. The lifetime value of marrying today 
is still increasing in the signal received today under assumption l .94 Allowing for 
remarriage increases the divorce payoff from (f>* to V( S) ,  effectively reducing the 
cost of exiting marriage. Hence the value of marrying today is underestimated in 
the previous framework because the cost of divorcing is overestimated. The degree to 
which it is underestimated increases as divorcees remarry more frequently.95 In short, 
allowing for remarriage reduces the equilibrium reservation signal set in the marriage 
market, reducing the average quality of marriages.
M arriage M arket Equilibrium
To close the model I derive steady state marriage and divorce rates assuming in­
dividuals can remarry. Individuals can thus either be single or married. In steady 
state, the proportion of the population in each marital state k , n^, k 6 {s, m} is con­
stant. Individuals flow into singlehood through birth and divorce, and leave through 
marriage or death. Similarly individuals become married when they find suitable 
matches, and leave through death or divorce. The following flow equations define the 
steady state;
(1 ~/3) + /3Dnm = /3 (1 -  F(<tr )) ns +  (1 -  f$) ns (7)
P ( l - F ( a R))na =  /3Dnm +  (1 -  /3) nm
na nm — 1
today is the same for all signals. If signals are perfectly informative, married individuals never 
divorce. Given positive search costs and positive probability of death, the expected duration of 
search for singles is always finite.
94 The value of remaining single is independent of the signal received today because - (i) individuals
cannot recall past matches in the marriage market; (ii) individuals do not direct their search so
signals are uncorrelated over time.
95 The basic framework would understate the true value of marriage by less if the expected gain 
in marriage were declining in the number of times previously married.
109
where 1 — F(itr ) is the flow of singles into marriage, D =  G(4>*\a)f(a) da is the
flow of married individuals into singlehood, and I make the simplifying assumption 
that married couples die together. Solving for n^;96
(1 - /? )  +  ££> P ( l ~ F ( a R))
* 1 - p ( F ( a R) - D Y  m 1 - p ( F ( a R) - D )
To summarize, when individuals can remarry, signals are informative, and married 
couples die together;
Lem m a 2: The stock of singles increases in both the reservation signal, and the 
flow of married individuals into singlehood. The stock of married individuals decreases 
in both the reservation signal, and the flow of married individuals into singlehood.
As total population is normalized to one, the marriage rate is the fraction of 
singles that marry each period;
M R = ( l - F ( o R))n; (8)
This is the flow of singles into marriage, multiplied by the stock of singles. Finally 
the divorce rate is;
DR — (  f  0(4>•
\J(7R
which is the flow of married individuals into singlehood, multiplied by the stock of 
married individuals. Straightforward differentiation leads to the following result;
Lem m a 3: The marriage rate decreases in the reservation signal, and increases 
in the flow of individuals from marriage into singlehood. The divorce rate decreases 
in the reservation signal and increases in the flow of individuals from marriage into 
singlehood.
The marriage rate falls as individuals set higher reservation signals because the 
decreased flow of singles into marriage more than offsets the increased stock of singles. 
Setting higher reservation signals leads to selection into marriage - newly married 
couples are less likely to divorce for any given realization of gains from marriage. 
The divorce rate falls in steady state because there are fewer married individuals and 
there is a reduced flow from marriage back into singlehood.
96This implies a positive fraction of the population never marries, and this fraction increases in 
the reservation signal.
\a)f(a) d a ) n, (9)
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From (8) and (9), the relation between marriage and divorce rates is;
(10)
This implies that - (i) the divorce rate is less than the marriage rate; (ii) the divorce 
rate is less responsive than the marriage rate to the reservation signal; (iii) the divorce 
rate is more responsive than the marriage rate to the flow of individuals from marriage 
into singlehood.
Having described the process of marital formation, dissolution and the relationship 
between the two, I now use these results to consider two comparative statics exercises 
- the move from fault based divorce to no-fault divorce, and the move from mutual 
consent to unilateral divorce.
DR =  ---- 0  ^ D . — Mi?1 - p ( F ( a R) - D )
6.1 No-fault Divorce
Moving from fault based divorce to no-fault divorce reduces the cost of exiting mar­
riage, or equivalently, raises the divorce payoff (</>*) vis-a-vis the payoff in marriage. 
This has two effects - (i) the lifetime value of marrying today rises because of the 
increase in the expected divorce payoff97; (ii) the lifetime value of remaining single 
rises because the value of the marrying next period increases.
The first effect dominates at any given reservation signal because the expected 
value of marrying next period is discounted by the probability of the individual sur­
viving one period and a suitable match being found.
With informative signals, as the cost of exiting marriage falls, individuals prefer 
to marry today rather than wait another period in the hope of receiving a better 
signal. Individuals optimally set lower reservation signals and so marry with higher 
probability in the current period.
Lem m a 4: I f  the cost of exiting marriage falls, the equilibrium reservation signal 
in the marriage market decreases if marriage market signals are informative. The 
average quality of matched couples falls.
97To see this note that;
dV (M \a)
d(f>* 1 - / 3
+ 9(<P'W)V(S) +  G ( P \ a ) dV {S)
d</>*
> 0
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The result is shown in figure B. As the cost of exiting marriage falls individuals are 
less selective in whom they marry if signals are informative. Individuals are willing to
lifetime value of marriage. Hence newly matched couples are of lower quality than 
existing marriages. 9 8
To see the effect of no-fault divorce on marriage market equilibrium, recall the 
marriage rate is;
If the cost of exiting marriage falls, the marriage rate rises if signals are informa­
tive because individuals optimally set lower reservation signals. In steady state, the 
marriage rate rises because the increased flow from singlehood into marriage more 
than offsets the fall in the stock of singles. 9 9
The introduction of no-fault divorce has two effects on the divorce rate. First, for 
the existing stock of married couples the likelihood of divorce rises. Second, if signals 
are informative, the reservation signal falls, and the marriage rate increases. Newly
signal; (ii) increases the marriage rate; (ii) causes couples to become worse matched, 
and the divorce rate to rise in the new steady state.
98 The intuition holds more generally. If there is an exogenous decrease in the gains from marriage 
over divorce, the equilibrium reservation signal falls, and the average quality of matched couples 
falls. This implies individuals search for less time in the marriage market as the gains from the 
match fall.
" T o see this;
trade-off being in a potentially lower quality marriage, against obtaining the increased
MR=(l-F(aR))n;
Turning to the divorce rate, this is the fraction of married couples that have lower 
realized period payoffs in marriage than divorce;
married couples are less well matched than the existing stock of married couples 
causing the divorce rate to rise further in the new steady state.
To summarize;
R esult 1 : The introduction of no-fault divorce - (i) decreases the reservation
d M R
d a R l - / 3 ( D - F ( a R))
P - 1 - 0 D
^ / ( ^ h K  < 0
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6.2 Unilateral Divorce
To analyze the effect of moving from mutual consent to unilateral divorce, I extend the 
framework to allow for heterogeneity across genders. As discussed in section two, the 
divorce regime affects marriage and divorce rates only when spouses cannot bargain 
efficiently This may be because not all divisions of the gains from marriage cannot 
be ex ante committed to, or because benefits such as those arising from children, are 
neither transferable nor divisible. In this section I take the extreme case where utility 
is non-transfer able between spouses.
A natural way to introduce heterogeneity is to allow divorce payoffs to differ by 
gender;
A ssum ption 4 (H eterogeneity) : Men (m) have higher divorce payoffs than 
women (w): 0 *m > f t w.
Denote the joint distribution of spousal benefits in marriage, conditional on the 
couple having received signal a as g(4>m, 0 UJ|<7) with support [0 , 0 ] x [0 , 0 ] and joint 
cumulative distribution G(0 m, 0 u;|<r).
Analogous to assumptions 1 and 3 ,1 assume - (i) signals are ordered such that the 
distribution of marriage benefits generated by higher signals stochastically dominate 
the distributions given by lower signals; (ii) there exists a reservation signal cr)R such 
that V^MIcr^) =  V ^ S )  for j  6  {m ,w }.im
The lifetime value of marrying today depends on the divorce regime. Under mutual 
consent this is;
(i -  g(<t , <rw)) sWgtfww
+ ( 1  - 0 ) G { r ' , r ' \ a ) V i { S )
( i i )
where V^(S) is the value of remaining single in a mutual consent regime. The first 
term is the expected payoff in the first period of marriage, where g(ft\a) is j ’s mar­
ginal conditional distribution of payoffs. With probability 1  — G{ftn*, <f>w*\o) at least 
one spouse wishes to remain married, the expected payoff in marriage being calculated 
over all possible realizations to j , not just those greater than f t *. With probability 
G?(0m*, (f)w*|a ) divorce occurs and spouses return to the marriage market.
100 Stochastic dominance in this multi-dimensional setting places further restrictions on the payoff 
in marriage (Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982)).
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Under unilateral divorce the probability the marriage remains intact is;
s ( r * , r * w ) =  f*  f*  g ( r , r w ) d r d r
the probability that neither spouse wishes to divorce. Therefore the probability any 
given couple divorces is 1  — S((f)m*, (f)w*\o). Under unilateral divorce the lifetime value 
of marrying today is;
j_  [ s{<r, r» <?gm-w
i - p  + ( i - / 3) ( i  - s { r \ r m\°))vi(s)
where —j  denotes j ’s spouse and g{<j)3\.) =  g{(f^ \(p 3 > <t> Unlike under mutual
consent, if the marriage remains intact each spouses obtains at least their own divorce 
payoff. Spouses cannot be locked into “bad” marriages that they would leave if they
regime relates to individual gains from marriage over divorce.
The next result establishes the ranking of reservation signals across genders; 
Lem m a 5: I f  the gain from marriage over divorce rises for spouse j ,  the equilib-
consent, or unilateral divorce regime.
Given men have higher divorce payoffs than women so gain less from marriage 
over divorce, an immediate implication is that men set lower reservation signals than 
women, cr  ^ > a1^.  Men axe more likely to marry any woman they match wdth, than 
women are to marry any man they match with. As both have to consent to marriage, 
the marriage rate is determined by the reservation signal set by women.
The steady state marriage and divorce rates under unilateral divorce are given by;
reservation signal is cr ;^ (ii) the probability of the couple divorcing is 1 —S{4>m*, f>w*\a).
had the right to. Figure C makes clear how the likelihood of divorce under each
rium reservation signal increases if signals are informative under either a mutual
The steady state proportions of the population in each marital state is determined 
by a set of equations analogous to before, where two things have changed - (i) the
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To see the effect on the marriage market equilibrium of moving from mutual 
consent to unilateral divorce, note from (1 1 ) and (1 2 ) that there are two effects on 
the value of marrying today.
First, for any given realization of marriage benefits, divorce is more likely (see fig­
ure C). This lowers the value of marrying today. Second, conditional on the marriage 
remaining intact, the expected payoff to either spouse is greater than under mutual 
consent because spouses cannot be locked into bad marriages, and this raises the value 
of marrying today. This effect is larger the greater the degree of complementarity 
between spouse’s gains from marriage.
Whichever of these effects dominates determines whether equilibrium reservation 
signals are higher or lower under unilateral divorce. Rearranging (11) and (12), the 
lifetime value of marrying today is lower for j  under unilateral divorce if the lifetime 
expected gains from marrying over remaining single, conditional on the marriage 
remaining intact are lower;
(1 -  G) [  +  (1 -  /}) G Vi(S) > S  [  <t?g(4?\.)d4? +  (1 -  /?) (1 -  S)V=(S)
J$ J<P*
(13)
In other words, if the first order effect of unilateral divorce is to increase the 
probability of divorce, the lifetime value of marrying today is lower. Only couples 
that receive sufficiently high signals will still choose to marry under a unilateral 
divorce regime. This possibility is shown in figure D . 1 0 1
Those that marry under unilateral divorce are then better matched than couples 
married under mutual consent. In other words, the expected duration of marriage 
increases under unilateral divorce.
Using lemma 3, unilateral divorce has ambiguous effects on the marriage rate - 
the flow of singles into marriage falls as individuals set higher reservation signals, but 
the stock of singles rises because of the increased flow of individuals from marriage 
back into singlehood.
Similarly, unilateral divorce has ambiguous effects on the divorce rate. On the 
one hand as newly married couples are better matched this causes the divorce rate 
to fall. On the other hand unilateral divorce increases the probability of divorce for
101 Unilateral divorce laws may also reduce spousal incentives to make marital specific investments 
during marriage, further reducing the value of marrying today (Rasul (2003)).
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any given couple from G(.|cr) to 1  — S  (.|cr) so that the stock of married individuals 
falls. To summarize;
R esult 2: I f  the first order effect of moving from mutual consent to unilateral 
divorce is to increase the probability of divorce - (i) individuals set higher reservation 
values and so newly married couples are better matched than couples married under 
mutual consent; (ii) the stock of singles increases but the flow from singlehood to 
marriage falls; (Hi) the stock of married individuals falls but the flow of individuals 
from marriage to singlehood increases.
6.3 Empirical Predictions
Setting out a framework of search in marriage markets involving learning over time, 
makes clear the importance of distinguishing two important divorce law changes - (i) 
moving from fault based divorce to no-fault divorce; (ii) moving from mutual consent 
to unilateral divorce. To reiterate the effect of each of these on the marriage market;
1. No-fault divorce reduces the cost of exiting marriage. Individuals set lower 
reservation signals in the marriage market, and so the marriage rate rises. Newly 
married couples are less well matched than the pre-existing stock of marriages, 
and the steady state divorce rate rises.
2. If the first order effect of unilateral divorce is to increase the probability of 
divorce for any given couple, individuals set higher reservation values. This 
causes marriage rates to fall, and newly married couples to be better matched 
than couples married under mutual consent.
3. If the first order effect of unilateral divorce is that individuals cannot be locked 
into bad marriages, individuals set lower reservation values. This causes mar­
riage rates to rise, and newly married couples to be worse matched than couples 
married under mutual consent.
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7 Empirical Analysis
Figure 2 shows marriage and divorce rates from 1956 to 2000, defined as the number of 
marriages (divorces) per 1000 of the population aged 15 to 65.102 Trends in the divorce 
rate follow those in marriage rates after a lag of around 9 years, and consistent with 
search in marriage markets, marriage rates are more volatile than divorce rates . 1 0 3
Figures 3a and 3b show marriage and divorce rates by adoption of unilateral 
divorce law. States that adopt unilateral divorce have higher marriage and divorce 
rates than non-adopters, but there is no discernible difference in either trend prior 
to the 1970s.104 While both rates have declined across all states, by the end of the 
1990s marriage and divorce rates in adopting states had converged to the levels in 
non-adopting states.
Figure 4 shows how marriage and divorce rates changed within each adopting 
state, relative to the year of adoption of unilateral divorce. Within states, marriage 
rates often begin to decline after the introduction of unilateral divorce, with divorce 
rates beginning to decline after some lag.
Given the volatility in marriage and divorce rates in non-adopting states, changes 
in divorce laws do not explain all of the variation in the level of either of these rates. 
Using panel data I focus on whether divorce laws explain the difference-in-difference 
in marriage rates of adopters and non-adopters.
The empirical analysis is organized as follows. The next section reports the basic 
results, where I find unilateral divorce causes marriage rates to significantly decline 
in adopting states. This result is robust to a number of alternative hypotheses and 
econometric concerns. Section 4.2 examines the effect on marriage rates within spe­
cific cohorts. The effect of unilateral divorce on marriage rates is greatest for the 
young, those marrying for the first time, and whites. Section 4.3 analyses how the 
composition of the marital stock changes. In particular, I show the direction of selec­
tion into marriage is consistent with the effect of unilateral divorce causing a decline 
in marriage. Finally, section 4.4 shows the effect of unilateral divorce law is robust
102 These measures of marriage and divorce rates hide some of the underlying variation within age 
cohorts. In the next section I use marriage and divorce certificate data, available from 1970 to 1995, 
to construct age-gender specific marriage and divorce rates.
103The coefficient of variation is 1.57 for marriage rates and .62 for divorce rates.
104 Given around 40% of the population live in non-adopting states, a difference of 3 marriages per 
1000 of the adult population between adopting and non-adopting states translates into a quantita­
tively large difference in the number of marriages taking place.
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to controlling for other determinants of marriage rates.
7.1 Basic Results
I estimate panel data regressions for the marriage rate (m st) in state s in year t\
m st =  ols +  7 f +  51 st +  0Xgt + ust (14)
where a s are state fixed effects, r)t are year fixed effects, lst is a dummy equal to 
one if unilateral divorce is in place, X st is a set of observable covariates, and ust is 
a disturbance term. The sample runs from 1960 to 2000 and robust standard errors 
are calculated throughout. 1 0 5
Identification of 8 is possible because of variation in the timing of when states 
adopted unilateral divorce, and because some states never legislated for this change 
(see table 1 ).
In this section I define the marriage rate as the number of marriages per 1000 
of the adult population, rather than within more specific age cohorts. I do this 
for two reasons. First, age specific marriage rates can only be constructed from 
marriage certificates data. This is available from 1970 to 1995, making it impossible 
to distinguish the causal effects of divorce law from pre-existing trends in marriage 
rates.
Second, given higher marriage rates of adopting states (figure 3a), divorce laws 
may be endogenously determined by marriage rates, biasing estimates of 8. If legisla­
tors take account of the marital patterns of specific age cohorts, this endogeneity bias 
is reduced by using this broad definition of marriage rates. In particular suppose;
TTlst =  Oi™ +  7™ +  S lg t  -f- u ^  =  S lg t  +  U gt
1st =  a ls +  y lt +  firrigt + v lst =  ^mst + v st
Denote a2v = var(ala +  7 J +  v lst), o \ =  var(a™ + 7 ™ + v%), avu =  cov(ust, v st), and
105 As the adoption of unilateral law is positively serially correlated over time, standard errors may 
be biased downwards (Bertrand et al (2001)). Given divorce laws were gradually adopted, and not 
all states adopt, this problem may not be too severe. Estimating the model by GLS allowing for 
an AR(1) error, does not significantly change the coefficient on unilateral divorce in the baseline 
specifications. I also tested for unit roots in the marriage and divorce rate series using the test 
proposed in Im et al (1997). The null hypothesis of non-stationarity was rejected at the 1% level.
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normalize a2 to one. If the introduction of unilateral divorce reduces marriage rates 
(8 < 0 ), states with higher marriage rates are more likely to adopt unilateral divorce 
(/1 > 0 ), and error terms are positively correlated across the equations (avu > 0 ), 
then if only the marriage rate equation is estimated;
piim ? = * +  ^  +  (1 + M R , , > a  (15)
1  +  fi2al + 2fiavu
so that the estimated effect of unilateral divorce is biased upwards (i.e. less negative), 
and this bias decreases in 8. 1 0 6  In other words among cohorts that are most affected 
by unilateral divorce ( 8  is even more negative), 8  is likely to be close to zero or 
positive.
In this section I use this broad measure of marriage rates to deal with both 
problems discussed above. In the next section I do examine the effects of divorce 
laws within gender, age, race and marriage number cohorts.
Column 1  of table 2 runs the baseline regression of marriage rates on fixed effects, 
and a dummy for whether unilateral divorce is in place. 1 0 7  Controlling for state and 
time fixed effects, unilateral divorce significantly reduces marriage rates. The joint 
tests of significance for the fixed effects reported at the foot of table 2  are both 
significant at 1 %.
An identifying assumption in (14) is that in the absence of unilateral divorce, 
all states would have had the same trends in marriage rates. As the sample runs 
from 1960, it is possible to identify pre-existing trends in marriage propensities from 
the effects of unilateral divorce. I do this by including two dummies controlling for 
whether unilateral laws are passed in 2 or 3 years time, and whether they are passed in 
4 to 5 years time. Column 2 reports the regression - there appear to be no significant 
pre-trends in marriage rates, consistent with figure 3a.
An issue of concern is the assumption that unobservable state level determinants 
of the marriage propensity are invariant over time. This is unlikely to be true if state 
fixed effects are proxying for social norms, tastes for marriage, labor market changes
106If unilateral divorce laws are exogenous to marriage rates then fi =  crvu =  0 and plim 5 — 8. As 
8 increases;
dplim (5 — 5) 1 +  fJ>crvu - 1  < 0
107In all specifications I also control for the state adult population and its square to capture 
increasing returns to scale in the marriage market.
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and so forth. One way to control for unobservable state specific determinants that 
are changing is to allow state effects to trend linearly over time . 1 0 8
Column 3 includes linear state time trends. The coefficient on unilateral falls in 
absolute magnitude, but remains negative and significant. The state-time interactions 
are jointly significant. In the previous specification some of the effects of these changes 
were being attributed to unilateral divorce. By not allowing marriage propensities to 
trend linearly over time, the absolute effect of unilateral divorce is overestimated. As 
figure 3a shows, the long run trend in marriage rates is downward even in the absence 
of unilateral divorce - some of this trend is attributed to unilateral divorce when only 
fixed effects axe controlled for. It is not therefore surprising that the coefficient on 
unilateral divorce falls in absolute magnitude moving from columns 2 to 3 . 1 0 9
To better control for underlying changes in marriage propensities in column 4 I 
allow for state effects to trend quadratically. 1 1 0  The effect of unilateral divorce is now 
only identified from variations in marriage rates from an underlying quadratic trend 
within state over time. The coefficient on unilateral divorce in column 4 remains 
negative and significant. The quadratic state-time interactions are jointly significant 
and the overall fit of the regression improves. 1 1 1  In short even allowing for under­
lying marriage propensities to change quadratically over time, the evidence suggests 
unilateral divorce caused a significant decline in marriage. 1 1 2
108 The hypothesis that the decline in marriage is purely down to a shift in tastes does not easily 
fit the facts. The percentage of Americans that report a “happy marriage is a part of the good life” 
actually increased between 1991 and 1996 from 72% to 86% (Cherlin (1992)).
109 Another way of explaining why the inclusion of state specific trends changes the estimate of 6, 
is to note that the variation exploited in (14) is (using standard notation) (m at — Tns_) — (m. * — m ). 
If state level marriage propensities are changing this causes - (i) biased estimation of 8\ (ii) if the 
change in marriage propensity is correlated with the adoption of unilateral divorce, omitted variables 
bias exists.
110Hence I estimate the following specification;
m 3t =  a s +  7 t +  6lst +  A (as x t im et ) +  k (q;s x tim e2) +  ust
where tim et is a time trend. Adult population and its square are also controlled for. The residuals 
from this regression are also shown in figure 5.
111 The results are not driven by outliers. Dropping Nevada or California from the sample leads to 
the coefficient on unilateral remaining negative and significant, and it is not significantly different 
from that in column 4. If the sample is restricted to only include observations until 1988, the 
coefficient on unilateral falls to -1.08 with a t-statistic of 2.01.
112 An alternative method to capture time varying unobservable determinants would be to include 
the lagged marriage rate in (14). Doing this, the coefficient on unilateral continues to be negative 
and significant, but the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable introduces a bias of order As a 
check I estimated this specification using the Arellano Bond (1991) one-step GMM estimator. The
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Following Friedberg (1998), the bias caused by omitting state trends can be seen 
by plotting the residuals from (14). Figure 5a gives a stylized view of the estimated 
effects of a discrete law change (at time to) if state effects are not allowed to trend, 
when in reality they follow an underlying quadratic trend. Suppose only fixed effects 
are included in the regression. The effect of a policy change at time to corresponds 
to X  in figure 5a. With linear trends the difference-in-difference effect i s Y  — Z.
Figure 5b shows the actual estimated residuals. This shows what remains of 
the marriage rate to be explained by unilateral divorce when estimating (14).113 In 
the absence of state trends the effect of unilateral divorce is stronger (more negative) 
because of the confounding effect of time varying unobservables at the state level that 
drive the marriage propensity. This plot of residuals is consistent with the pattern of 
coefficients in columns 1,3, and 4 in table 2.
I now turn to separately identifying the effects of unilateral and no-fault divorce. 
As stressed in sections 2 and 3, these divorce laws affect incentives to marry in 
different ways. As no-fault was implemented before unilateral, states either have 
both unilateral and no-fault divorce law (42% of the observations), no-fault but not 
unilateral (38%) or neither (20%). In column 5 I replace the unilateral dummy with 
a dummy if no-fault was in place (as coded by Gruber (2000)). No-fault divorce has 
a negative and insignificant effect on the marriage rate.
Column 6  then controls for the possible combinations of unilateral and no-fault 
law in place, the reference category being neither law is in place. Again the results 
suggest that no-fault laws by themselves have no significant effect on marriage rates. 
Only when states have both unilateral and no-fault divorce is there a significant 
fall in marriage rates. The magnitude of the coefficient remains similar to previous 
specifications.
The first order effect of divorce laws on incentives to marry appears to be changing 
the right to divorce, as embodied in unilateral divorce. Changing the cost of exiting 
marriage through no-fault divorce has only second order effects on the lifetime value 
of marriage. 1 1 4
estimated coefficient on unilateral is -1.26 with a t-statistic of 1.62.
113To be clear, these are calculated by estimating (14) using years prior to the introduction of 
unilateral divorce, and then using these estimates to predict the residuals over the entire sample. 
This is done using fixed effects only, and by allowing state effects to trend linearly and quadratically 
over time.
114The framework set out in section three made clear that increased rates of remarriage, like no­
fault divorce, reduce the gains from marriage over divorce and so make individuals less selective in
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Figure 3a shows marriage rates in adopting states to be higher than in non­
adopting states. If the marriage market was out of equilibrium in the 1960s, conver­
gence in marriage propensities, or regression to the mean, may explain why marriage 
rates fell faster in adopting states. To address this issue, column 7 controls for the 
marriage rate in 1960 interacted with a time trend. There is no evidence that states 
with initially higher marriage rates would have experienced a greater decline in mar­
riage in the absence of unilateral divorce laws.
All the specifications have exploited variation across adopters and non-adopting 
states, treating the latter as a control group that did not receive the treatment of 
unilateral divorce. If however there are unobservable differences in adopting and non­
adopting states that are uncorrelated with state trends, the estimated coefficients 
will be inconsistent. The next specification uses only the subsample of 31 states 
that adopted unilateral divorce so identification arises from variation in the timing 
of adopting states. The result in column 8  is similar to that in column 6 . Only 
when adopting states introduced unilateral divorce in addition to no-fault divorce do 
marriage rates decline significantly.
In this specification, the qualitative impact of unilateral divorce law, over and 
above no-fault divorce, is to reduce the marriage rate by 1.35 marriages per 1000 of 
the adult population. This accounts for around half of the gap in 1970 in marriage 
rates between adopting and non-adopting states.
O m itted  P olicy  Variables
Unilateral divorce may just be proxying some other policy. I consider the following 
possibilities - legalized abortion, joint custody of children, and common law marriage.
Abortion was legalized in five US states in 1970, with the remaining states fol­
lowing suit in 1973. This is exactly in the middle of the period in which divorce laws 
were being reformed . 1 1 5  Legalizing abortion would reduce marriage rates if prior to 
legalization, couples faced social pressures to marry if they were to give birth out- 
of-wedlock. 1 1 6  Furthermore the legalization of abortion may reflect changing social
the marriage market. For remarriage to be driving the results it would have to be that rates of 
remarriage have declined over time. This is not the case. Using marriage certificates data, I find 
that around 20% of all marriages in 1970 involved an individual marrying for the second or more 
time, and by 1995 this figure had steadily risen to 33%.
115Abortion was legalized nationally following the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. 
The coding of when states legalized abortion is from Donohue and Levitt (2000).
116See Akerlof et al (1996) for an analaysis of such “shotgun weddings” .
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norms towards women’s rights, or changes in the distribution of bargaining power 
within families. If these factors are not controlled for by allowing state effects to 
trend over time, the estimated coefficient 5 would be inconsistent.
Column 1 of table 3 therefore controls for legalized abortion. As expected, this 
law has a significantly negative effect on marriage rates, but does not remove the 
effect of unilateral divorce over and above no-fault divorce found earlier.
Redistributive policies also affect incentives to marry. For example the move 
towards the promotion of joint custody of children in divorce, rather than maternal 
custody, effectively reduces the divorce payoff of women and raises it of men. This 
causes women to raise the reservation signal they set in the marriage market, so the 
marriage rate falls. 1 1 7  If the same factors drive the adoption of unilateral divorce and 
implementing legislation in favor of joint custody, then omitting this law biases 5.
Column 2 controls for the adoption of laws promoting joint custody. They have 
a negative, but insignificant effect on marriage rates. The effect of unilateral divorce 
over and above no-fault divorce remains negative and significant.
A number of states permit heterosexual couples to legally marry without a license 
or ceremony, known as common law marriage. As expected, states which permit 
common law marriage have significantly lower marriage rates than other states . 1 1 8  
However common law marriages have only gradually been recorded in marriage data, 
so the dependent variable in (14) is measured with error. Furthermore if common law 
marriage states are more likely to adopt unilateral divorce, this measurement error 
leads 5 to be inconsistent.
To deal with this I estimate (14) using only non common law marriage states. The 
result in column (3) shows that unilateral divorce continues to significantly reduce 
marriage rates. The fact that the estimated coefficient falls by around 40% suggests
117If joint custody laws increase the aggregate incentives of spouses to make marital specific in­
vestments, this would increase the value of marrying today and raise marriage rates. I take as given 
that this redistributive policy is not so strong as to change the ranking of divorce payoffs across 
genders. Laws favoring joint custody were adopted from the 1980s onwards in nearly all states. The 
definition and coding for joint custody is given in the data appendix.
118This is true both prior to any state introducing unilateral divorce, and over the sample period as 
a whole. To have a valid common law marriage a couple must do all of the following - (i) live together 
for a significant period of time - this is not precisely defined in any state; (ii) hold themselves out as 
a married couple -  typically this means using the same last name, and filing a joint tax return; (iii) 
state that they intend to marry. Common law marriage is recognized in AL, CO, DC, IA, KS, MT, 
OK, PA, RI, SC, TX and UT. Of these, AL, CO, IA, KS, MT, OK, RI and TX passed unilateral 
divorce laws.
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there is a bias caused by changes in the recording of common law marriages over time 
in marriage data.
Endogenous Tim ing o f Adoption
A second set of concerns arise from the identifying assumption in (14) that the 
marginal effect of unilateral divorce is the same across all states. At any moment, 
S is identified using only those states that have passed the law, so if early adopters 
are different from late adopters 6 will again be biased. This can arise if the timing of 
adoption is endogenous.
Figure 6  shows the geographical pattern of adoption across states. Unilateral di­
vorce appears to have been adopted in regional clusters, and to have spread eastwards 
over time. In the next column I therefore additionally control for regional fixed ef­
fects. 1 1 9  The result, in column 4, shows that the estimated effect of unilateral divorce 
over and above no-fault divorce is largely unchanged from before.
Another way to address this issue is to estimate the effect of divorce laws by 
restricting the sample to only include states which adopted up until 1972.120 Column 
5 gives the result. Unilateral divorce laws have significantly negative effects on the 
marriage rate for early adopters. The estimated effect is not significantly different 
from when the entire sample is used.
A complicating factor in identifying the causal effect of unilateral divorce is that 
marriage and divorce need not occur in the same state. If states neighboring s adopt, 
it can be “as if ’ individuals in s have access to unilateral divorce. If the behavior 
of neighbors to s is not captured by unobservable state trends in s, S is biased due 
to omitting unilateral divorce laws in neighboring states. This bias is negative if 
adoption by a neighboring state to s implies state s no longer needs to adopt.
The effect of laws in neighboring states will vary by the relative size of state s 
vis-a-vis its neighbors. The effect is greater if neighboring states are geographically 
larger - the effect of California adopting on Nevada would not be the same as the 
effect of Nevada adopting on California.
I control for the number of neighboring states that have adopted unilateral divorce
119The regions are defined using a standard classification of Pacific, Mountain, West North Central, 
East North Central, Middle Atlantic, New England, West South Central, East South Central, and 
South Atlantic.
120This splits the sample of adopters almost equally with AL, AK, CA, CO, FL, ID, 10, KS, KY, 
MI, NE, NH, ND and OK classified as early adopters. The results do not significantly alter if I 
divide states into adoption pre and post 1971.
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in each year. I weight the adoption of unilateral divorce in neighboring states by the 
area of these neighbors (in 1 0 0 0  of square km), and then also control for an interaction 
between this “weighted” measure of the number of neighbors that have adopted, with 
the area of state s itself.
The result in column 6  finds no evidence of such spillover effects from neighbor­
ing states biasing the previous estimates of the effect of unilateral divorce. 1 2 1  Such 
spillover effects may be of greater concern when estimating the impact of divorce laws 
on divorce rates (Wolfers (2000)).
Endogenous Legislation
Another concern arises if the adoption of unilateral divorce is endogenous to mar­
riage rates. If for example more liberal states are more likely both to pass unilateral 
divorce, and have higher turnover in the marriage market, the estimate of 8 in (14) is 
subject to endogeneity bias. To address this I calculate the percentage of births that 
occurred out-of-wedlock in 1970 by state. I then classify states as being high or low 
out-of-wedlock states and estimate the effects of divorce laws by each type of state 
separately. If only high out-of-wedlock states are those in which unilateral divorce 
has an effect, this may suggest that such divorce laws are endogenously passed. The 
results in columns (7) and (8 ) suggests unilateral divorce reduces marriage rates in 
both, but the effect is stronger in states in which more births occur out-of-wedlock.
7.2 Cohort Level Analysis
In this section I analyze the effects of divorce laws on marriage rates within gender, 
age, race, and marriage number cohorts. This precisely identifies the groups through 
which unilateral divorce causes the most disincentives to marry. As the model makes 
clear, the effect of divorce laws on marriage incentives is greatest for those early in 
the life cycle. This is because the lifetime value of marriage is more responsive to 
divorce laws as the probability of surviving to the next period increases.
To address this empirically, I define the marriage rate in cohort c for state s in 
year t as;
number of individuals in cohort c that marry in state s in year t 
mcst number of individuals in cohort c in state s in year t
121 Alaska and Hawaii are dropped from the sample in this specification. Controlling just for the 
percentage of neighbors that have adopted yields the same result.
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Marriage rates within cohorts are constructed from marriage certificate data and 
are available from 1970 to 1995. Similar cohort specific divorce rates can also be 
constructed from divorce certificates data over the same period.
Figure 7 shows age-gender specific marriage and divorce rates. The decline in 
marriage has been most pronounced amongst 15-24 year olds. Older age cohorts 
have rising marriage rates over time, as individuals increasingly search longer in 
the marriage market, cohabit prior to marriage, and have become more likely to 
remarry. 1 2 2  The rise and subsequent decline in divorce rates highlighted in figure 2 is 
most pronounced amongst 25-34 year olds for both men and women. Divorce rates 
amongst 35-44 year olds have steadily risen over time . 1 2 3
Some of these patterns reflect changing demographics over time. For example, the 
post war baby boom would have caused a marriage squeeze for women in the 1960s 
and 70s, and for men in the 1980s.
In table 4 I estimate the effects of divorce laws on cohort specific marriage rates, 
split between male and female cohorts. 1 2 4  In columns 1 to 3 I regress divorce laws on 
marriage rates for gender-age cohorts. Consistent with figure 7, I find the strongest 
effects of unilateral divorce over and above no-fault divorce on the youngest age 
cohort. A smaller but still significant effect is also found for men aged 35-44. The 
same pattern is repeated for women.
Columns 4 and 5 examine cohorts defined by marriage number. Unilateral divorce 
reduces marriage rates amongst those marrying for the first time, and has no effect on
122 The median age at marriage rose for women from 20 in 1968 to 23 in 1988, and from 22 to 25 
for men.
123This evidence is consistent with empirical studies of cohabitation. Cohabitation is often viewed 
as a trial period before marriage, thus only better matched couples may select into marriage. Al­
though cohabitation has become more prevalent (in 1960 there was one cohabiting couple for every 
90 married couples, by 2000 there was one for every 12 married couples) it remains short lived, pre­
ceding rather than replacing marriage. Bumpass and Sweet (1989) find 40% of cohabiting couples 
either marry or stop living together within one year, a third of cohabiting couples are still cohabiting 
after two years, and 60% of those in cohabiting unions marry their cohabiting partner. Furthermore, 
cohabitation is unlikely to explain the plateauing out of divorce rates in the 1990s. Couples who 
marry after cohabiting are typically found to have higher rates of marital dissolution (Bumpass and 
Sweet (1989), Waters and Ressler (1999)).
124The estimated specifications include state trends that trend quadratically over time. In addition 
I control for sex ra tiost - the sex ratio of women to men for the relevant age group in cohort c in 
state s in year t. Hence the estimated equation is;
West =  +  7 t +  A (a s x tim et ) 4- k (aa x tim ef) +  5lsi +  (3 (sex ra tiost) +  uat (16)
where tim et is a time trend.
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second marriages. Interestingly men are more likely to remarry a second time when 
no-fault divorce is introduced.
The final split in columns 6  and 7 is by race. The effect of unilateral divorce laws 
operates purely through the incentives to marry of whites. Marriage rates for blacks, 
amongst whom marriage rates are consistently lower than whites, are not significantly 
changed by any divorce laws. As Wilson (1987) argues, this may be because mar­
riageable black men are scarce due to high unemployment and incarceration rates. In 
the framework of the model in section 3, marriage market signals for blacks may be 
uninformative. Amongst whites, signals axe informative and the effect of divorce law 
is more in line with the analysis set out. Further research is required to explore this 
point fully.
Overall the results by cohort are consistent with those in the previous section. The 
move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce has significantly reduced marriage 
rates. The introduction of no-fault divorce has had little or no impact on marriage 
rates. Across both men and women, the greatest impact of unilateral divorce has 
been found amongst those aged 15-24, those in first marriages, and whites.
D ynam ics
The adoption of unilateral divorce moves changes the steady state marriage market 
equilibrium. Hence its effects ought to be long lasting. To estimate the long run 
impact of unilateral divorce I focus on the 15-24 year old age cohort. For this cohort 
I estimate the following dynamic specification;
10
rricst =  +  7 t +  £  fit_TLsT +  (3sexratiocst +  ust (15)
T= - 4
where Lst is a dummy equal to one if unilateral divorce was passed T  years ago in 
state s, and sex ratiost is the ratio of women to men aged 15 to 24, which controls 
for marriage market tightness. The estimated effects of unilateral divorce T  years 
after its introduction on the marriage rate (^_;r) are plotted in figure 4, along with 
a 95% confidence interval. 1 2 5
The precision with which the marginal effects are estimated improves over time 
as more states adopt unilateral divorce. Consistent with earlier results, the marginal
125In order to preserve degrees of freedom, I drop the quadratic state trends. A negative T  implies 
a year prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce. Only states that adopt late can be used to 
estimate fj,t_T for negative T. Given the sample runs from 1970 I restrict T  >  —4.
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effect of unilateral divorce is not significantly different from zero prior to adoption, and 
significantly negative after adoption. The impact of unilateral divorce on marriage is 
long lasting. The coefficients are negative and significant a decade after adoption. 1 2 6
Turnover
The model sheds light on turnover in the marriage market, namely the number of 
divorces per marriage. From (10);
DR (3D
~MR~ 1 -(3 {F {aR) - D )
The evidence in tables 2 and 3 suggested the first order effect of unilateral divorce 
is to increase the likelihood of marital dissolution. Hence unilateral divorce increases 
marital turnover by the above measure. In contrast, no-fault divorce has ambiguous 
effects on turnover - it increases the flow of individuals form singlehood into marriage, 
and from marriage into divorce.
In table 5 I estimate the effect of divorce laws on turnover in marriage markets. 
Column 1  uses the ratio of divorces to marriages per 1000 of the adult population 
as a measure of turnover. As expected, only when unilateral divorce is in place in 
addition to no-fault divorce, does turnover significantly increase. Columns 2 to 4 
show this effect to be strongest amongst youngest age cohorts of men. These results 
confirm that the effect of divorce laws on marriage rates is not fully matched by the 
same rise in divorce rates within cohorts. As the theory makes clear, the first order 
effects of divorce laws are on marriage rates, not divorce rates.
Columns 5 and 6  split the sample by race. Unilateral divorce increases marriage 
market turnover amongst blacks and whites. Putting this together with the earlier 
results on marriage rates, the results point to blacks being affected by unilateral 
divorce mainly through increases in divorce rates rather than marriage rates.
As expected, a very similar pattern of coefficients is found when I look at female 
specific cohorts, as shown in the bottom panel of table 5. Throughout I find little or 
no evidence of no-fault divorce by itself affecting marital turnover.
126The absolute magnitude of the effect is greater here than in table 2 because of the exclusion of 
state trends. Including state trends reduces the absolute magnitude of the estimated coefficients, 
but decreases the precision with which each is estimated because of the large drop in degrees of 
freedom.
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7.3 Composition of the Marital Stock
If moving from mutual consent to unilateral divorce causes the value of marrying 
today to fall, individuals set higher reservation signals and this reduces the flow of 
individuals from singlehood into marriage. Individuals that marry under unilateral 
divorce are better matched than the existing stock of married couples. If unilateral 
divorce then causes marriage rates to fall, the reduced flow of singles into marriage 
must more than offset the increases stock of singles.
In this section I present further supportive evidence that after the introduction of 
unilateral divorce - (i) the stock of married individuals fell; (ii) couples married under 
unilateral divorce were better matched than those married under mutual consent.
Figure 9 shows how the stock over time of ever married individuals, as a percentage 
of total population. This is calculated annually as two times the number of marriages 
minus divorces, divided by population.
Ideally I would like to measure how the stock of married individuals has changed. 
Using ever married individuals overstates the true change in the marriage stock be­
cause people also leave marriage due to death. However this measure still serves as a 
good proxy given a stable annual death rate of 1%. As married individuals are older 
than the average individual, the marital stock ought to fall by over 1 % due to death. 
Hence figure 9 suggests that from the mid 1970s, the stock of married individuals has 
actually been declining.
If the move from mutual consent to unilateral divorce causes individuals to become 
more selective in the marriage market, then the stock of married individuals would 
fall. In contrast, the move to no-fault divorce unambiguously reduces the reservation 
signal set in marriage markets and so would lead to an increase in the stock of married 
individuals. As in the previous section, the evidence is in favor of unilateral divorce, 
not no-fault divorce, having a far greater impact on the marriage market.
Figure 9 begs the question whether the composition of married couples changes 
after the introduction of unilateral divorce. Namely, is does unilateral divorce induce 
selection into marriage. To address this I use divorce certificates data to calculate the 
duration of first marriages before and after unilateral divorce is implemented. This 
is an all encompassing measure of the quality of matches in the marriage market.
The median year of adoption of unilateral divorce was 1971. I consider first 
marriages that took place in 1968 and 1974 in adopting and non-adopting states that 
had dissolved by 1995. The top panel in figure 10 shows how the distribution of the
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duration of first marriages in 1968 varies across states that did and did not adopt 
unilateral divorce laws. Prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce the average 
duration of first marriages is two years lower in adopting states . 1 2 7
The middle panel shows the frequency distribution of marriages that took place in 
1974. The mean duration of first marriages is actually significantly higher in adopting 
states . 1 2 8  Despite the duration of marriages falling over time in all states, the fall is 
smallest between 1968 and 1974 amongst states that adopted unilateral divorce.
The bottom panel shows the difference-in-difference in frequency densities between 
the two periods. 1 2 9  It shows the clear rightward shift of the difference in frequency 
distributions across adopting and non-adopting states.
This is consistent with couples that marry under unilateral divorce laws being 
better matched than those married under mutual consent. 1 3 0  Furthermore, as indi­
viduals do not have to divorce in the state in which they are resident, if individuals 
endogenously choose to divorce in unilateral states then this figure understates the 
true change in composition of those married in adopting states . 1 3 1
7.4 Other Determinants of Marriage Rates
Divorce laws are not the only aspect of marriage markets to have changed since the 
1960s. The labor market, incidence of cohabitation, and social norms have all changed 
beyond recognition in the last generation. These changes have been controlled for by
127Marriages that occurred in states that adopted after 1974 are not included in either sample. The 
mean duration of marriages that occured in 1968 is 11 years in non-adopting states, significantly 
above the duration of 8.8 years in adopting states.
128Mean duration is 6.94 years in adopting states, significantly greater at the 1% level than the 
mean of 6.5 in non adopting states.
129This is given by;
(Ppost_ adopter P pre_adopter) (Ppost_nonadopter P pre_nonadopter)
where p p0st_adopter  is the frequency density of marital duration in adopting states post adoption 
(i.e. in 1974) and so forth.
130 This result is not caused by simultaneous law changes that may have enforced longer periods 
of separation before divorce was legitimized. Required separation periods exist only in a minority 
of states, they were largely introduced at least a decade after unilateral divorce, and have increased 
on average from 7 months in 1980 to only 9 months by 2000.
131 From divorce certificates data, I find that 13% of divorces involve couples married in another 
state but in the same region, and 14% involve couples married in another region. The fact that 
there is a slight change in trend in marital duration in non adopting states could be explained by 
individuals living next to neighboring states that do adopt.
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allowing state effects to trend over time.
Adopting and non-adopting states differed in a number of observable dimensions, 
listed in table 6 . Adopting states have smaller populations, more blacks, lower female 
labor force participation and lower female-male earnings ratios than non-adopters. 
Some of these factors could explain the difference in marriage rates over time.
However a number of these could also be endogenous to the adoption of unilateral 
divorce. To address this I first regress marriage rates (defined as the number of 
marriages per 1000 of the adult population) on state and year fixed effects. I then 
regress the residuals from this regression, shown on figure 5b, on a dummy for 
unilateral divorce and other observable determinants of marriage rates. This allows 
an assessment of the qualitative importance of divorce laws vis-a-vis other observable 
determinants of marriage, and sheds light on what has previously been captured in 
the trended state effects.
The results are given in table 7. In column 1 I regress the residuals on unilateral 
divorce, adult population and its square. The estimated coefficient on unilateral 
divorce is negative and significant, suggesting that when this law is adopted in state 
5 , the marriage rate in state s falls below its long run mean. The magnitude of the 
effect is large - the introduction of unilateral divorce causes four less marriages per 
1000 of the adult population to occur in each state on average. This compares to an 
average marriage rate of 18 over this period.
Column 2 then controls for the proportions of the population that are black and 
other race, and the ratio of men aged 20-34 to women aged 18 to 32 as a measure 
of marriage market tightness. The more women per man in the pool of marriageable 
individuals, causes marriage rates to significantly fall. This is consistent with women 
setting higher reservation signals and being the more selective gender in the marriage 
market.
Part of the decline in marriage may be due to the rise in real incomes, or individ­
uals staying longer in school and delaying entry into the marriage market. Column 
3 adds in state per capita income and male and female years of schooling. Wealth­
ier states have lower marriage rates, suggesting that all else equal, the gains from 
marriage are higher for high income individuals. This may be because individuals 
positively sort on income in marriage markets. Marriage rates fall as men stay in 
school longer, and rise as women receive more education. I cannot reject the hypoth­
esis that these are equal and opposite effects. This is consistent with, all else equal,
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the gains from marriage being higher if spouses have more similar levels of education.
Public spending affect marriage markets. For example, it is well established that 
welfare payments increase the likelihood of marital dissolution (Nixon (1997)). By 
reducing the gains from marriage over divorce, such payments reduce the reservation 
signal individuals set in the marriage market. To see if this prediction holds up 
empirically, column 4 controls for state transfers to families, measured in $ 1000s per 
capita. I find that these significantly increase marriage rates . 1 3 2
Column 5 adds female labor force participation rates and female-male earnings 
ratios to the regression. Female participation significantly increases marriage rates. 
This suggests that being attached to the labor market raises the divorce payoff of 
women. Consistent with search in marriage markets, this implies women set lower 
reservation signals in the marriage market and so marriage rates rise.
The higher female earnings are relative to men, the lower is the marriage rate. This 
is consistent with the lifetime value of marriage being lower the greater the equality 
of earnings across genders. This may reflect the fact that when female earnings are 
closer to those of men, there are lower gains from specialization within the household 
and this reduces incentives to marry. 1 3 3
The impact of unilateral divorce on marriage is quantitatively significant. The 
introduction of unilateral divorce has the equivalent disincentive effects for marriage 
as a 23% fall in female labor force participation, or a 16% rise in the female-male 
earnings ratio. To put this into context, national female labor force participation 
rates rose from 45% in 1970 to 70% by 1990. The change in the female-male earnings 
ratio over the same period was from 30% to 50%.134
132This may be picking up spending on public goods that are used mostly by married couples, such 
as schools. I also controlled for state expenditure on education and found this to have a positive 
and significant effect on marriage rates. The effect of state transfers was unchanged.
133Using city level census data, Gould and Paserman (2002) find that wage inequality amongst men 
has contributed to a decline in marriage rates. I use CPS data to construct state level measures of 
male wage inequality, defined as the standard deviation of the log of real wages for men in the labor 
force. The results in column (5) are robust to controlling for male wage inequality. This entered 
negatively but was not significant.
134The results are robust to two further checks. First, if only adopting states are used to construct 
the residuals and estimate the regression, the pattern of coefficients is very similar. The effect of 
unilateral divorce is found to be even greater in absolute value. Second, if the sample is restricted 
to include observations only up to 1985, the coefficient on unilateral divorce falls in absolute value 
but is still negative and significant.
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8 Conclusion
Marriage as a social institution has been in decline for the last three decades. This 
is of concern if we believe marriage to be a good thing. The existing evidence indeed 
points to a positive association between marriage and welfare outcomes.
This paper has sought to understand why marriage has declined. In particular 
I provide a theoretical framework for thinking through how changes in divorce laws 
affect incentives to marry, and selection into marriage. This allows me to make 
precise the different effects of unilateral and no-fault divorce on marriage markets 
when individuals learn the true value of marriage before and during marriage.
Taken together the empirical results provide robust evidence that unilateral di­
vorce caused - (i) a significant decline in marriage. This effect is permanent, and most 
affects the young; (ii) selection into marriage - those that choose to marry under a 
unilateral divorce regime are significantly better matched than those married under 
mutual consent. Throughout I find that no-fault divorce has had little or no impact 
on marriage.
The result that unilateral divorce significantly and permanently reduces marriage 
rates, sheds light on the nature of household bargaining. If spouses could bargain 
efficiently, the Coase theorem implies the assignment of the right to divorce ought to 
have no affect on the incidence of marriage and divorce. This paper suggests house­
holds do not act in accordance with unitary or Nash bargaining models of behavior 
(Becker (1991), McElroy and Horney (1981)) as they would predict households bar­
gain efficiently and so the divorce regime ought to affect the distribution of welfare 
within marriage, but not the decision to marry. Understanding why households do 
not reach Coasean bargains is an active area of current research.
One reason may be marital contracts are unenforceable. This stems from the non­
verifiability to third parties of actions taken within the household. This leads spouses 
to renegotiate ex post over the division of the marriage surplus. Unilateral divorce 
reduces the expected value of this surplus and thus reduces the ex ante incentives of 
spouses to take first best actions within marriage. If so, we would expect to observe 
spouses making fewer marital specific investments, such as having children, after the 
introduction of unilateral divorce.
This paper helps to shed light on the empirical literature on the impact of uni­
lateral divorce on divorce rates. Friedberg (1998), Gruber (2000) and Wolfers (2000)
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find a significantly positive impact of unilateral divorce on divorce rates. However this 
paper makes clear that by ignoring the effect of unilateral divorce on selection into 
marriage, the impact of unilateral divorce on divorce rates is likely to be inconsistently 
estimated.
As the paper makes clear, the divorce rate depends on - (i) the marriage rate; (ii) 
the quality of matched couples. The earlier literature has essentially estimated the re­
duced form effect of unilateral divorce on divorce rates. Given that unilateral divorce 
has been shown to decrease marriage rates, and increase selection into marriage, the 
previous estimates of unilateral divorce on divorce rates are biased downwards.
In other words, the impact of unilateral divorce is even greater than that found in 
Priedberg (1998) because in the absence of unilateral divorce, marriage rates would 
have been higher and the quality of matched couples would have been worse. Decom­
posing the effects of unilateral divorce on divorce rates through each of these channels 
remains part of future research. 1 3 5
In addition, this paper shows the effect of unilateral divorce law on divorce rates 
should be long lasting, and not die out after around 9 years as found in the existing 
literature.
The decline in marriage has far reaching consequences both for those directly 
involved, and for society as a whole. Understanding the optimal response of govern­
ments to such rapidly changing marital patterns opens up another broad research 
agenda. Policy has moved to take account of the rise in divorce in the welfare and 
legal systems, most notably in areas of alimony, child support, and child custody. 
However there remain important issues as to whether and how policies ought to be 
designed in spheres such as pension rights, taxation, and savings, when also marriage 
is in decline.
135 As the model makes clear, the magnitude of the effect of unilateral divorce on marriage rates, 
ought to be greater than on divorce rates. I find unilateral divorce reduces marriage rates by around 
1.3 marriages per 1000 of the adult population. This is three times the effect of unilateral divorce 
on divorce rates found by Friedberg (1998).
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9 Appendix: Proofs of Results
P ro o f of Lem m a 1: Rewrite the value of marrying today (1) as;
V(M \a) = J % g { <j>\a)d4 + ^  [1 -  G ( 0 » ]  
=  J  <to(4>W)<ty + Y ~ p  \l - G(4>'\^ )] J  _4>h{4>\a)d<j> + G(ij>'\a)(l>'
where h{(p\a) = is the probability that the payoff in marriage is 0  con­
ditional on signal a having been observed and the marriage remaining intact. As 
h((f)\cr)d(f) =  1 , (f>h{(f)\(j)d(j) is the expected payoff in marriage conditional on
signal a and the marriage remaining intact. Differentiating with respect to <r;
0
- G M »
+ [1 -  G{4>"\a)\ f*  <t>ha(4>\a)d<j>
(Al)
The first term is positive because of the first order stochastic dominance of signals. 
The second term is positive because —Ga((j)*\a) > 0 and the expected benefit from 
marriage conditional on the marriage remaining intact must be at least the divorce 
payoff, 0*. Hence to ensure the value of marrying today is increasing in the signal it 
is sufficient that ha((f)\a) > 0  so the last term is also positive.■
P ro o f of Lem m a 4: Totally differentiating the equilibrium reservation value 
condition (4) with respect to the per period payoff in divorce;
daR
dV(M\<TR) dV(S)
d<j>* a</>*
dV(S) _  dV{M\aR) 
. daR duR
(A2)
Consider the numerator. The value of remaining single is given by (3) so that; 
9V(S) 0 f w dV{M \a)rJoi ■f{a)dad<P 1 -P F (a R) J aR dcj>'
Differentiating the value of the marginal marriage with respect to 0*;
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dv{M \aR) £  a a g N / w * -   ^ /j £
a<r i  -  f (oh) i  — 0 f (<tr )
>  1 - / 3 F ( < t*)
av(s)
a .^*
The second inequality holds because dVQ^}a>i = z^pG{(j)*\<j) which is decreasing in a by 
the first order stochastic dominance of signals. In other words the effect of changing 
the benefits from marriage are greatest on the value of the marginal marriage so that 
the numerator in (A2) is always positive.
The sign of the denominator in (A2) depends on the magnitude of Va(M\an). 
To see how this relates to the informativeness of signals, note that from lemma 1 
Vcr(M\a) > 0 if ha(<fr\cr) =  ^  > 0- This implies the value of marriage
increases in signals if;
gA<t>W) & [ i - g ( W ]
g(<p\<r) 1 ~  G((f>*\a)
which given G a {(jf\cr) <  0, implies ga{(j) |cr) > 0. The value of marriage increases 
more quickly in signals if the left hand side above becomes larger at higher levels of 
marriage benefits;
U t w .r ) > 0  (M L E P )
This is the standard monotone likelihood ratio property (Milgrom (1981)). It says 
that as the benefits from marriage rise, the likelihood of obtaining a particular benefit 
(f) is increasing in the signal. As this likelihood ratio increases for any given signal, 
the signal is more informative in the sense that the value of marriage increases more 
quickly in signals. This is the definition of informativeness of signals given in the 
main text.
Hence the denominator, — dV^ ° R^  < 0 when signals are informative because 
the value of marrying into the marginal marriage, V(M \gr), increases more quickly 
in the reservation signal than the value of remaining single (see figure A). Hence when 
signals are informative;
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daR
dV(M\<rR ) dV(S)
d<t>* d<t>*
8V (S) _  d V (M |g f l )  
.  d a R dcrR
+ve
—ve < 0
so that reservation signals rise as the costs of exiting marriage fall (so that </>* rises). 
Individuals become less selective over whom they marry if signals are informative of 
the true gains from marriage.■
P ro o f of Lem m a 5: I first show that V j(M \a ) > 0 for j  G {m, w} under each 
divorce regime. Under mutual consent;
P
- G , (r * , r * k ) |  )
\  - ( i - p ) v i ( s )  J
+  [i -  g (<t , < rw )i i t  p g A P W W
This is positive because of the first order stochastic dominance of signals and; 
/V < K 0 V ) < ^  > V i(S) for all <r e W ,o ]
J<b
Similarly under unilateral divorce;
P
~ P
I t .  P o m r *  > <rj' , a W
- a  - p ) v i ( s )
+ s ( < r ,< r w ) i t "  * w i ^ '  > r j*,cr)dp
which is positive because stochastic dominance implies Sa(4>rn*^ 4>w*\a) > 0  for all
( ■ r . r ) -
In order to show that if signals are sufficiently informative;
dvi{M\ojR) avHS)
d<jP*__________ 84P*
av^s) _  9V3{Myn)
do3D dcr3D
< 0
the only part of the proof of lemma 3 that needs to be checked is that still
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decreases in a in both regimes. Under a mutual consent divorce regime;
d_ ( dV j{M \o)\  =  J _  
da  \  d<$* J 1  — /3
Under a unilateral regime;
-  a  - m a s ) }  
+Ga(< r ,< r \° )v i ,( s )
< 0
d f dVj(M \a) 
da  V dfi*
13
1 - / 3
A  ( w )  (■ /? • <P9&\-)0 ~  (1  -  P) V j(S)) 
- f  (1 +  v ^ s ) g(^Y ))  -  s v l W f r W  |.)
where g{<t?\.) = p((^’|0 J > </> J>K, cr)- Noting that ^  J$ . =
-g { ( fp |.) < 0  and £  = - g ^ Y )  < 0 ;
d_ ( d V ’ ( M \ a ) \  =  0
da  \  dft*  )  1 — (3
-9°(<PI-) ( / £  V g i P Y W  -  ( i  -  P) v m )  
-9(<P\-)S£> <P9*(¥\-)<W
- f  ( i + v i ( s ) 9m . ) )  -  s v i ( s ) 9om . )
< 0
This ensures that for each regime, So that the numerator is
positive. As in the proof of lemma 3, > 0 for small search costs c, and againOCTr
for more informative signals, increases so that so that — dV3^ } a^  isd<J3D do3
negative.I
10 Data Appendix
The coding for un ila tera l divorce is taken from Friedberg (1998), table 1. The 
coding for no-fault divorce states is taken from Gruber (2000). Jo in t custody is 
defined to include - (i) joint legal custody where both parents retain joint respon­
sibility for the care and control of the child and joint authority to make decisions 
concerning the child even though the child’s primary residence may be only with one 
parent; (ii) joint physical custody where both parents share physical and custodial 
care of the child; (iii) any combination of joint legal and joint physical custody which 
the court deems to be in the best interests of the child. The coding of when states
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enact joint custody legislation is taken from Brinig and Buckley (1998). The coding 
for when ab o rtion  was legalized in each state is taken from Donohue and Levitt 
(2000).
M arriage and  divorce certificate data were obtained from the National Vital 
Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics, for years 1968 to 1995. 
The data includes all records for states with small numbers of events and a sample of 
records for states with larger numbers of events. Marriage microdata includes date of 
marriage, state residency, education, previous marital status, number of marriages, 
and ages of bride and groom. This covers around 44 states. Divorce microdata in­
cludes marital duration, number of children under 18, month and year of marriage, 
number of marriages, age, race, state residency of husband and wife, and the alloca­
tion of child custody is recorded after 1989. Divorce certificates data covers 26 states 
in 1968, 28 in 1969-70, 29 in 1971-77, 28 in 1978, 30 in 1979-80, 31 in 1981-85, and 31 
and DC after 1986. Marriages or divorces of members of the Armed forces or other 
US nationals that occur outside of the United States are excluded.
Labor m arket variables are all derived from Current Population Surveys from 
1964-2000. These are available for only a subset of around 23 states in the period 
1968-76. An individual is defined to be participating in the labor force if they are 
aged 16 to 64 (60 for women), in full-time employment, not in school and have worked 
for at least one week.
Transfer paym ents through 1995 consists of emergency assistance and aid to 
families with dependent children. From 1998 forward it consists of benefits, gener­
ally known as temporary assistance for needy families, provided under the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Data on out-of-wedlock births was obtained from the 1960-1995 National and 
State Data Files on Adolescent Fertility, Assembled by Child Trends, supplied by the 
Sociometrics Corporation, Los Altos: California.
All monetary variables are indexed at April 1st 2000 values.
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Figure C: The Probability of Divorce Under Different Divorce Regimes
Value o f  Marrying Today
Value o f  Remaining Single
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Figure 1: The Passing of Divorce Laws
Notes
1.
2 .
Unilateral sta tes  1 -----No-fault sta tes
1
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Figure 2: Marriage and Divorce Rates
—e Marriage Rate -----a------Divorce Rate
17.5 - - 8
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15 -
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- 4 .513.5 -
13 - - 4
12.5 - - 3 .5
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Sources for the coding for divorce laws are given in the data appendix.
Marriage and divorce rates are defined as the number of marriages and divorces per 1000 of the 
population aged 15 to 65. These are weighted by mid year state populations to form aggregate 
rates. In 2002 dl states, except NB and MS, required individuals to be 18 to marry without 
parental consent. NB sets the age of majority at 19, MS sets it at 21. DE, FL, GA, KY, MD, OK 
allow pregnant teens or teens who have already had a child to get married without parental 
permission. In FL, KY, and OK the couple must have court authorization.
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Figure 3a: Marriage Rates bv Adoption of Unilateral Divorce
Marriage rate (adopters) — a----- Marriage rate (non adopters)
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Figure 3b: Divorce Rates bv Adoption of Unilateral Divorce
Divorce rate (adopters) -  a-----Divorce rate  (non adopters)
9.5 -
8.5 -
7.5 -
6.5 -
5.5 -
4.5 -
3.5 -
2.5 -
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Notes
3. See also Table 1 for when each state adopted unilateral divorce laws. In total 31 states adopted 
unilateral divorce between 1968 and 1985. Each series in figures 3a and 3b is calculated as a 
population weighted average of state level marriage and divorce rates.
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Figure 4: Marriage and Divorce Rates For Adopters by Years Since Adoption of 
Unilateral Divorce Law
Marriage Rate Divorce Rate
10 -5 I  !  10 15
Hawaii
:_ A
Massachus<stts
Now Mewoc
; |V j
Texas
t— i— r  
Indiana
w ■ run m i
-10 i  0 I  10 15
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
•10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Years Since Adoption of Unilateral Divorce
Notes: The x-axis runs from 10 years prior to adoption of unilateral divorce, until 20 years after its adoption for each state. The vertical line in each chart signifies the year in which unilateral divorce was adopted. To allow the marriage 
rate axis to be comparable across states, the series for Nevada and Idaho are not shown.
Figure 5a: The Stylized Effect of State Trends
Adopters........
....... ............ . | X
/  Non-adopters
to Time
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Figure 5 b: The Estimated Effects of State Trends
   Resid from FE  * ------Resid from linear trends
 a  Resid from quadratic trends
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-9 -
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Notes
4. In fig u re  5b, th e r e s id u a ls  sh o w n  are from  est im a tin g  (1 4 )  u s in g  y ears  in w h ic h  u n ila tera l d iv o rce  
w a s  n o t in  p la ce . T h e  ser ie s  sh o w  s im ila r  trends i f  N e v a d a  is  e x c lu d e d  from  th e  sa m p le .
Adopters
Non-adopters
Linear State Trends
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Figure 6: The Adoption of Unilateral Divorce Laws Across the United States
CO (71)
Notes: Years in parentheses correspond to the year of adoption of unilateral divorce law. Coding for year of adoption taken from Friedberg (1998).
^
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Figure 7: Marriage and Divorce Rates by Gender and Age Cohorts
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Notes: Cohort specific marriage and divorce rates are derived from marriage and divorce certificates data. These are only available over the period 1970 to 1995. The marriage rate for cohort c in state s in year t is defined a s  (divorce rates within cohorts 
are similarly defined);
number of individuals in cohort c that marry in state s in year t
number of individuals in cohort c in state s  in year t
Figure 8: The Dynamic Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Marriage Rates
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Figure 9: Change in the Stock of Ever Married Individuals
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Notes
5 . F igu re  8 u se s  th e m arriage rate for 1 5 -2 4  year o ld  m en . T h e  c o rresp o n d in g  fig u re  fo r  w o m e n  in  th e  
sa m e  a g e  co h o r t is  v ery  s im ila r .
6 . T h e variab le  m easu red  in figu re  9 is the ch an ge in  the e v e r  m arried  p o p u la tio n , as a p ercen ta g e  o f  
to ta l ann ual p o p u la tio n . T h is  is  ca lcu la ted  a n n u a lly  as tw o  t im es  th e  n u m b er o f  m a rr ia g es  m in u s  
d iv o r c e s , d iv id ed  b y  p o p u la tio n . T he aggregate  figu re  for  th e  U S  is  th en  d er iv ed  b y  w e ig h t in g  the  
s e r ie s  from  ea ch  sta te  b y  s ta te  p o p u la tio n .
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Figure 10: Duration of First Marriages by Adoption of Unilateral Divorce
-e Pre (non adopters)  a ----- Pre (adopters)
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Notes: All es tim a te s  a re  b ased  on the  Epanechnikov kernel. The top figure show s the kernel density  es tim ate  for the duration of first 
m arriage for m arriages that occurred  in 1968 In non-adopting s ta tes , and s ta te s  that did adopt by 1974. T he middle figure show s the  
kernel density  estim ate  for the  duration of first m arriage for m arriages that occurred in 1974 for non-adopting s ta te s , and  s ta te s  that had 
adop ted  by then . The bottom  figure is the  difference-in-difference of these  frequency d ensity  functions;
(P past_adop ler  P p re ^a d o p le )  (P post_nonadop!er P p r t_ n o n a d o p lk
Post (non adopters) — a ------ Post (adopters)
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Divorce Rate
1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s US Population
20 9 17.8 15.7 6.4 9.3 9.7 9 3 1.73 Alabama
18.1 17.6 13.7 10.9 10.7 7.7 0.17 Alaska
18.5 16.5 145 11.6 10.6 9.5 1.09 Arizona
19.4 21.0 23.7 6.1 10.9 109 10.6 0 9 9 Arkansas
12.1 12.8 10.3 5.6 8.7 7.6 10.14 California
17.1 15.9 13.5 5.9 9.0 8.7 8.1 1.18 Colorado
12.1 12.4 10.7 2.2 5.1 5.7 4.7 1.37 Connecticut
11.3 12.5 11.0 2.7 6.7 7.0 6.9 0 2 6 Delaware
11.2 11.7 9 6 2 9 6.7 6.9 4.9 0.34 District of Columbia
17.5 17.5 16.5 7.3 112 10.6 9.4 3 89 Florida
21.2 18.0 1 32 4.6 8 3 8.5 7.8 2.41 Georgia
17.8 21 2 24.7 3.4 7.1 6.6 6.4 0.40 Hawaii
20.9 20.5 7.3 9.7 10.2 9.4 0 3 9 Idaho
15.8 130 11.8 6 5 6.4 5.5 5.15 Illinois
17.2 14.8 12.0 10.3 9.8 2.44 Indiana
15.0 14.0 13.0 3.4 5.4 5.9 5.9 1.33 Iowa
16.5 15.4 12.9 4 5 7.9 8.1 7.3 1.09 Kansas
15.7 172 182 4 2 6.3 7.5 8.7 1.61 Kentucky
16.1 14.2 13.8 4.9 1.78 Louisiana
17.6 162 132 4.4 7.6 7.8 6.5 0.51 Maine
17.7 152 126 3.1 5.2 5.4 4.9 1.84 Maryland
12.1 12.4 10.6 2.3 4.1 4.7 3.7 2 65 M assachusetts
15.3 13.1 11.1 4.1 6 8 6.6 6.2 4 08 Michigan
13.4 13.0 10.9 2 6 5.0 5.5 5.2 1.83 Minnesota
19.4 15.9 13.0 4.6 7.9 8.0 8.1 1.13 Mississippi
17.3 15.9 13.3 7.7 8.0 7.6 2.24 Missouri
16.2 1 4 3 124 5.3 8 8 8.6 7.2 0.35 Montana
14.8 13.0 12.1 3.1 5.5 6 3 6.1 0.72 Nebraska
262.5 171.4 133.3 37.7 26.1 21.1 12.8 0.33 Nevada
18.2 16.0 12.5 4.0 7.5 7.4 7.2 0.39 New Hampshire
11.6 11.8 10.6 1.5 4.1 5.4 4.8 3.28 New Jersey
21.4 16.6 13.1 11.1 11.6 9.0 0.55 New Mexico
12.7 13.3 12.5 4 2 5.4 4 8 8.31 New York
13.0 12.0 11.9 5.8 7.3 7.5 2.61 North Carolina
14.6 13.1 11.4 2.0 4.1 5.4 5.3 0.30 North Dakota
14.4 13.9 12.4 4.3 7.4 7.4 6 8 4.89 Ohio
18.9 13.8 8.3 116 11.6 10.3 1.30 Oklahoma
13.3 13.0 12.5 5.9 9.3 9.2 7.7 1.08 Oregon
12.4 11.5 10.0 2.3 4 2 5.0 5.1 5.53 Pennsylvania
12.0 12.3 11.8 1 2 4.4 5.6 5.2 0.44 Rhode Island
244 19.5 2 2 5.0 6.3 6.2 1.36 South Carolina
18.0 161 2.5 4.9 6 0 6.2 0.33 South Dakota
19.0 22.0 4.8 8 8 9.6 9.5 2.00 Tennessee
19.8 18.3 15.2 9.0 9 3 7.7 60 8 Texas
19.8 182 17.1 5.0 7.7 8.6 7.5 0.60 Utah
16.2 16.0 15.4 2.5 5 6 6.9 6.8 0.22 Vermont
17.2 16.5 151 5.4 6.4 6 6 23 5 Virginia
18.4 15.6 12.3 6.4 10.0 9.3 8 1 1.76 Washington
15.1 12.2 10.1 3.7 6.8 7.9 7.8 08 9 West Virginia
13.1 13.0 11.1 2 2 4 5 5.S 5.3 2.10 Wisconsin
17.8 15.6 7.5 106 11.4 9.9 0.18 Wyoming
16.4 15.4 1 32 4.1 7.1 7.5 6.9 United States
reverted back to fault based covenant marriages in 1997. Marriage rate data is available for 1957-2000, except Mississippi which starts in 1958. 
56-58, LO 56-70, 84-00, MA 56, NY 56-57, NC 56-57 and WV 56-57. The marriage (divorce) rate is defined as the number of marriages (divorces) 
ited if there at least five state observations. Decennial US average by weighting state averages by mid year population estimates. The column 
le period 1960-2000 by state.
Table 2: The Effect of Divorce Laws on Marriage Rates
Panel data regression estimates
Dependent variable: Annual m arriages per thousand of the adult population (aged 15 to 65)
(1) (2) Pre Trend
(3) Linear Stats 
Effects
(4) Quadratic State 
Effects
(5) No-fault Divorce 
Only (6) Divorce Laws
(7) Reversion to the 
Mean
(8) Adopting States 
Only
Unilateral divorce -4.36 -4.37 -.926 -1.43
(4.72) (3.22) (1.71) (1.84)
Unilateral adopted In 2-3 years time -.822
(.40)
Unilateral adopted in 4-5 years time 1.32
(.81)
No-fault divorce -.362
(1.54)
No-fault divorce only .275 .283 .768
(.51) (.55) (.63)
Unilateral and no-fault divorce -1.31 -1.29 -1.35
(2.20) (2.17) (2.30)
Marriage rate In 1960 x time trend -.001
(.675)
F-tests
Year Effects 3.97 5.06 9.44 11.37 14.12 11.04 8.62 9.03
State Effects 66.93 67.76 108.09 46.13 48.18 45.89 46.07 36.72
State Effects, Linear 53.72 14.14 15.21 13.81 13.03 8.11
State Effects, Quadratic 14.18 14.97 13.85 13.55 8.47
R-equarsd .8693 .8894 .9877 .9883 .9883 .9883 .9883 .9886
Number of Observations 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091 2086 2086 1266
Notes: Absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout. Sample period is 1964-2000, for all 51 states. All specifications control for adult population (in millions) and its square. The sample drops by 5 
in column 6 because the following states have unilateral and fault based divorce - CO 72, AR 97-00. The specification in column 7 controls for the historic marriage rate, measured in 1960, interacted with a time trend. The sample in column 6 
consists only of the 31 states that adopted unilateral divorce. F-tests for the joint significance of year and state effects were significant at the 1% level in all specifications above. Definitions of all variables are given in the data appendix.
Table 3: Robustness Checks
Panel data regression estimates
Dependent variable: Annual m arriages per thousand of the adult population (aged 15 to 65)
Omitted Policies Endogenous Timing of Adoption Endogenous Divorce Law
(1) Abortion (2) Joint Custody
(3) Non Common 
Law Marriage 
States
(4) Regional 
Fixed Effects
(5) Early 
Adopters Only
(6) Nalghborlng 
Adopting States
(7) Low Out-of- 
wsdlock Births
(8) High Out-of- 
wedlock Births
No-fault divorca only .360 .407 .766 .283 .004 .486 .042 .114
(.66) (.74) (1.07) (.55) (.02) (.92) (.22) (.11)
Unilateral and no-fault divorca -1.29 -1.28 -1.75 -1.29 -.844 -1.29 -.628 -4.17
(2.17) (2.15) (2.34) (2.17) (3.02) (2.03) (2.05) (1.86)
Lagalizad abortion -1.10
(1.85)
-1.11
(1.87)
-1.90
(2.46)
Joint Custody -.484
(1.45)
-.475
(1.11)
Nalghborlng states that adopt (weighted by tha araa of 
tha adopting nalghbourlng states In 1000 sq km)
-.001
(1.02)
Nalghborlng states that adopt x araa of stats s  (In 1000 
sq km)
.001
(1.26)
Rsglonal FE Yes Yes Yss
R-squared .9884 .9884 .9887 .9883 .9372 .9884 .9254 .9889
Numbar of Observations 2086 2086 1595 2086 1393 2004 1229 857
Note*: Absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout Al specifications control for adult population (in millions) and Its square. Column 3 restricts the sample to only indude states that do not allow common law 
marriage. In columns 4 to 6, regional fixed effects are also controlled for. The regions are defined using a  standard classification of Pacific, Mountain, West North Central, East North Central, Middle Atlantic, New England, West South Central, East South Central, 
and South Atlantic. In column 5, early adopters are defined as those sta tes that adopted unlateral divorce up to and including 1972. Alaska and Hawafi are dropped form the neighboring states specification In column 6. In columns 7 and 8 1 split the sample by 
the percentage of total births that occur out-of wedlock in 1970. Low out-of-wedlock states have tess than the average percentage of births out-of-wedlock. F-tests for the joint significance of year and state effects were significant a t the 1% level in all the 
specifications above. Definitions of all variables are given in the data appendix.
Table 4: The Effect of Divorce Laws on Marriage Rates Within Cohorts
Panel data regression estimates
Dependent variable: Annual marriages per thousand of the cohort population
Men Age Marriage Number Race
(1)15-24 Year 
Olds
(2) 25-34 Year 
Olds
(3) 35-44 Year 
Olds
(4) First Marriage 
(15-34 year olds)
(5) Second Marriage 
(25-44 year olds)
(6) White 
(15-44 year olds)
(7) Black 
(15-44 year olds)
No-fault divorce only .129 .578 .118 -.552 .400 .895 -3.23
(.21) (1.34) (.33) (1.19) (1.80) (1.07) (1.52)
Unilateral and no-fault divorce -1.37 -.170 -.988 -1.22 -.243 -3.06 -1.46
(1.90) (.33) (1-86) (2.52) (.71) (3.50) (.49)
R-squared .9823 .9587 .9488 .9614 .9625 .9486 .9014
Number of Observations 1109 1109 1109 1087 998 896 783
Women
(1) 15-24 Year 
Olds
(2) 25-34 Year 
Olds
(3) 35-44 Year 
Olds
No-fault divorce only .726 .181 .136
(.97) (.45) (.47)
Unilateral and no-fault divorce -1.66 .032 -.809
(1.90) (06) (1.84)
R-squared .9788 .9724 .9588
Number of Observations 1109 1109 1109
(4) First Marriage 
(15-34 year olds)
(5) Second Marriage 
(25-44 year olds)
(6) White 
(15-44 year olds)
(7) Black 
(15-44 year olds)
-.178 .048 1.32 -2.64
(.38) (.23) (1.41) (1.20)
-1.32 -.293 -3.38 2.84
(2.65) (.91) (3.53) (.72)
.9605 .9622 .9509 .9393
1087 998 896 730
Notes: Absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout. Cohort specific marriage and divorce rates are derived from marriage and divorce certificates data. These are only available over the period 1970 to 1995. All 
specifications control for the female to male sex ratio in the appropriate age group, and include quadratic state trends over time. Definitions of all variables are given in the data appendix.
Table 5: The Effect of Divorce Laws on Turnover in the Marriage Market
Panel data regression estimates
Dependent variable: Annual divorces per marriage by cohort
Men
Age Race
(1) Adult Population (2) 15-24 Year Olds (3) 25-34 Year Olds (4) 35-44 Year Olds (5) White (15-44 year olds)
(6) Black 
(15-44 year olds)
No-fault divorce only .009 -.0003 -.023 .024 .002 .179
(1.65) (.09) (1.73) (.72) (.21) (2.05)
Unilateral and no-fault divorce .019 .019 .026 .058 .061 .265
(2.85) (3.34) (1.43) (1.36) (4.67) (1.94)
R-squared .9362 .9584 .9617 .9470 .9475 .8720
Number of Observations 2009 779 794 794 611 209
Women
(2) 15-24 Year Olds (3) 25-34 Year Olds (4) 35-44 Year Olds (5) White (15-44 year olds)
(6) Black 
(15-44 year olds)
No-fault divorce only -.001 -.028 .032 .002 .079
(.27) (1.52) (.60) (.19) (1.34)
Unilateral and no-fault divorce .020 .018 .136 .063 .137
(3.26) (.77) (1.46) (4.80) (1.92)
R-squared .9617 .9660 .9305 .9479 .8601
Number of Observations 794 794 794 617 367
Notes: Absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout. Cohort specific marriage and divorce rates are derived from marriage and divorce certificates data. These are only available over the period 
1970 to 1995. All specifications control for the female to male sex ratio in the appropriate age group. Definitions of all variables are given in the data appendix.
Table 6 : Descriptive Statistics By Adoption of Unilateral Divorce (1964 - 2000)
Adopting States
Mean Standard Deviation 95% Confidence Interval
Adult population (millions) 5.84 0.12 5.61 6.07
Proportion population black 15.07 0.30 14.49 15.66
Proportion population other race 1.69 0.07 1.56 1.82
Personal Income per capita ($1000) 12.70 0.31 12.09 13.32
State Transfers to Families ($1000 per capita) 1.45 0.03 1.39 1.50
Male labor force participation rate 85.70 0.19 85.32 86.08
Female labor force participation rate 60.66 0.37 59.93 61.39
Female/male earnings ratio 39.53 0.40 38.74 40.32
Marriage rate (per 1000 of adult population) 22.10 1.05 20.05 6.04
Divorce rate (per 1000 of adult population) 7.64 0.12 7.40 7.88
Non-Adoptina States
Adult population (millions) 6.82 0.17 6.49 7.16
Proportion population black 8.93 0.19 8.56 9.30
Proportion population other race 4.14 0.19 3.76 4.53
Personal income per capita ($1000) 13.41 0.24 12.93 13.89
State Transfers to Families ($1000 per capita) 1.37 0.02 1.33 1.42
Male labor force participation rate 85.97 0.16 85.65 86.29
Female labor force participation rate 62.65 0.29 62.08 63.22
Female/male earnings ratio 41.03 0.32 40.40 41.66
Marriage rate (per 1000 of adult population) 15.02 0.15 14.70 15.32
Divorce rate (per 1000 of adult population) 5.88 0.08 5.73 6.04
Notes: Labor market variables were derived from CPS utilities files for years 1964-2000. All monetary amounts are indexed at April 1st 2000 values. Personal 
income per capita data is converted to April 1st, 2000 values, and is also calculated using mid year population estimates. Transfer payments through 1995 
consists of emergency assistance and aid to families with dependent children. From 1996 forward it consists of benefits, generally known as temporary assistance 
for needy families, provided under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Table 7 : Other Determinants of Marriage Rates
Dependent variable: Residual from annual marriages per thousand of the adult population (aged 15 to 65) regressed on state and year effects only 
This is calculated from years In which unilateral divorce was not in place
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unilateral divorce -4.12
(4.75)
-4.36
(4.57)
-4.00
(3.94)
-4.58
(4.54)
-4.90
(4.78)
Adult population (millions) 1.00 1.17 1.62 1.57 1.40
(3.18) (3.63) (4.87) (4.76) (4.19)
Adult population squared -.040 -.050 -.066 -.076 -.065
(1.96) (2.42) (3.20) (3.71) (3.12)
Proportion population black -.042 -.006 -.103 -.053
(1.13) (.16) (2.54) (1.21)
Proportion population other race .131 .179 .099 .130
(2.51) (3.37) (1.84) (2.39)
Sex ratio (0-1) -9.98 -8.06 -6.20 -5.76
(2.36) (1.89) (1.46) (1.36)
Per capita Income ($1000) -3.92 -.415 -.242
(4.74) (5.07) (1.98)
Male years of schooling -4.87 -6.57 -7.66
(3.29) (4.42) (5.02)
Female years of schooling 8.29 8.73 8.74
(4.33) (4.61) (4.56)
State transfers to families ($1000 per capita) 4.40 4.80
(6.27) (6.76)
Female labor force participation rate (0-100) .209
(2.61)
Female/male earnings ratio (0-100) -.299
(3.01)
Adjusted R-squared .0260 .0319 .0464 .0686 .0735
Number of Observations 1623 1623 1623 1623 1623
Mean (sd) of variable
0.48
(0.50)
3.25
(3.41)
22.18
(53.4) 
11.05
(12.4) 
3.75 
(8.50) 
0.94 
(.10)
13.92
(8 .20)
13.62
(.68)
13.31
(-64)
1.35
(.73)
63.03
(10.7)
40.61
(10.9)
Notes: Absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses. Sample period is 1964-2000. The dependent variable is calculated by estimating (14) using only years prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce, and then using these estimates to predict what the 
residuals over the entire sample. This Is done using fixed effects only. Ail monetary variables are Indexed at April 1st 2000 prices. The sample size is smaller than in table 2 because labor market variables can only be constructed for a subset of 22 states 
from the CPS data for years 1968-76. The sex ratio is the ratio of females to males aged 15-65. Transfer payments (family assistance) - through 1995, consists of emergency assistance and aid to families with dependent children. For 1998 forward, 
consists of benefits— generally known as temporary assistance for needy families— provided under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. The average marriage rate over the sample in columns 1 to 6 was 17.8. 
Definitions of all variables are given in the data appendix.
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